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7SUMMARY
The critical reception of Kristeva's writings has
largely been in the field of feminist thought, literary
studies and social theory. Her thought has been
appreciated or abandoned on the grounds of its argument
that the concepts and practices of 'psychoanalysis' and
'literature' present the truth of modern social and
political relations - in distinction from and criticism
of philosophical 'system' . The thesis implicitly
challenges this general reception of I<risteva's
thought. It presents a systematic reading of Kristeva's
writings and discloses the Hegelian ambition of her
analysis of the 'subject' in social and political
relations.
The main object of the thesis is to establish the
philosophical foundations of Kristeva's 'return to
Freud' in the philosophy of law from Kant to Hegel. The
thesis presents the significance and limitation of her
engagement with German idealism, and the consequences
of that limited engagement for the ambition of
Kristeva's oeuvre. The meaning of the speculative
philosophy of law is recovered from its premature
reduction in the developments of, and departures from,
her thought in contemporary critical engagements with
French and German philosophy.
8INTRODUCTION
The thesis argues that Kristeva's founding distinction
between the 'semiotic' and 'symbolic' has opened up
psychoanalysis to the philosophy of law from Kant to
Hegel, but that that this encounter is held off by the
fixation of Kristeva's 'materialist t concepts. The
concepts cannot be unfrozen without sublating the
primacy of the founding distinction.
The theory of the 'semiotic' and 'symbolic t
 facilitates
Kristeva's claim that the 'speakitig subject' known to
psychoanalysis puts the 'subject' back into its
concrete history, recognizing it a as a unity of trives
(nature) and language (culture). However, the avoidance
of German idealism as a whole undermines both
Kristeva's Copernican claim for 'reason since Freud',
and the comprehension of social and political relations
derived from the knowledge of pschoanalysis.
Kristeva's 'return to Freud' contains an explicit and
an implicit return to Hegel. The explicit return to
Hegelian dialectic is a condition of Kristeva's thesis
that Freud's discovery of the 'unconscious' not only
favours, but is inseparable from a materialist
dialectic of the subject in social and political
relations. The implicit return to Hegel lies in
Kristeva's departure from the Hegelian 'system', where
her sublation of 'Hegelian totality' in a materialist
concept of 'infinity' returns her to the debates of
German idealism, and specifically to Hegel's criticisms
of Kant and Fichte's political philosophy. (See
Appendix)
First: the explicit return to Hegel. Three of
Kristev&s untranslated early essays (1971-3) are
recovered in chapter 1 for their significance for the
reception of Kristeva t s thought. They reveal that the
Kristevan oeuvre, best known for its reformulation of
9the Lacanian 'symbolic' and for its practical concept
of 'poetic language', begins as a return to Hegelian
logic and dialectic. The explicit return to 1-legel
deploys the 'idealist dialectic' to argue the unity of
the Freudian 'unconscious', the meaning of 'art', and
the value of materialist social and political thought.
Kristeva's fundamental claims for the knowledge and
practice of psychoanalysis and literature are
impossible without the 'sublation' of the Hegelian
'concept'.
The reformulation of the Lacanian 'symbolic' into a
theory of the 'semiotic' and the 'symbolic' in
Kristeva's doctoral thesis (1974) is recapitulated in
chapter 2. The reformulation of Lacan founds Kristeva's
key argument: that the psychoanalytic concept of the
'signifier', once revised through a return to the
theory of the drives, overcomes the limits of
philosophical reason and places the 'subject' in its
concrete and historical relations; and, further, that
the concept of the 'semiotic' discloses the meaning of
'art' and signficance of the emergence of avant-garde
and modern literature. 'Psychoanalysis' is not only a
theory of culture in this argument (after Lacan), but
is held to be a knowledge of the practical through
which 'literature' is revealed as a socio-historical
practice. I<risteva's arguments are worked out in an
engagement with selected configurations of
consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and
claim a
	
'materialist'	 reformulation of Hegelian
'negation'
Kristeva's argument in her doctoral thesis that the
theory of the 'subject' derived from psychoanalysis
complements and fills the gaps in Marxist thought
(Lenin, Mao) is the object of chapter 3. The reformed
Maoist dialectic holds out the possibility of the
transformation of modern, abstract and 'speciously
universal' human law (legality and morality). This
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possibility is proposed on the basis of the reversal of
moments in the Hegelian 'system'.
The significance of Kristeva's abandonment of the
Maoist dialectic and turn to a deeper engagement with
psychoanalysis is demonstrated in chapter 4. The turn
to psychoanalysis sustains the fundamental concepts of
the early work: the 'semiotic' and the 'symbolic'; and
the materialist notion of 'rejection' which stands as
the 'negative force' in Kristeva's logic and in her
estimation of critical discourses. Kristeva's later
writings (1980-84) elaborate the content of the
concepts of 'negativity', 'infinity' and 'practice'
which received a more formal and logical treatment in
the early writings. The discontuities between the early
and later works are addressed, here, but the emphasis
remains on the necessity of Kristeva's construal of
'speculative philosophy' for her use of 'reason since
Freud' as the basis for a social and political theory.
After the abandonment of Maoism and the elaboration of
an 'ethics of psychoanalysis', Kristeva seeks in her
latest works (1991-93) to determine the relation
between the 'ethics' and the 'politics' it implies.
Chapter 5 shows the importance for her treatment of
social and political relations of Kristeva's endeavour
to specify the boundary of '(psycho)analysis', and
hence transcend it. A critical enquiry is made into her
recent evaluation of French and German political
philosophy for the task of elaborating a 'politics'
after Freud, and the criticisms are substantiated on
the grounds of the limitations of Kristeva's Hegelian
ambition.
The implicit return to 1-legel, and the failure to
recognize it either within the Kristevan oeuvre or in
its reception, lies in the construction of Kristeva's
fundamental concepts. The 'Intertext', placed between
Parts I and II of the thesis, brings into focus the
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implicit return to Hegel sustained through Kristeva's
abandonment of the 'revolutionary' standpoint and
reassessment of the 'semiotic' in the later writings.
Kristeva's failure to reinterrogate the concept of the
'symbolic' returns her thought to Hegel's engagement
with Kant's critical philosophy and with subjective and
objective idealism (Fichte and Schelling).
Kristeva departs from Hegel before comprehending either
the meaning of Hegelian 'necessity' and 'speculative
exposition' in the Phenomenology of Spirit, or the
structure of the Science of Logic and its relation to
the standpoint and progression of the earlier text. The
departure determines the fall into a pre-Hegelian
methodological position, and its consequent
dichotomies. The implicit return to the aporiae of
transcendental practical philosophy returns Kristeva's
thought to Hegel's comprehension of the forms of
/ philosophy in Kant, Fichte and Schelling.
The aporiae of Kristeva's thought stem from the
presupposition of philosophy in her theory of culture.
The relation sustained between psychoanalysis and
philosophy throughout the oeuvre is insufficient to the
task of establishing a genealogy of culture; it
undermines the scope claimed for the subject-law
relation known to psychoanalysis in the re-cognition of
social and political relations. The theses reveals the
dependence of Kristeva's thought on the Hegelian
dialectic, and expounds the premature departures from
speculative philosophy. It identifies the limitations
of her endeavour as an outcome of the avoidance of
Hegelian mediation
12
CHAPTER ONE
	 'UNKNOWN TO MYSELF': AFTER HEGEL
Introduction
The purpose of the return to Kristeva's early writings
is to show that her elaboration of the concept of
'poetic language' begins as a return to Hegel, and
therefore that the meaning and estimation of
'literature' in her thought presupposes a construal of
speculative philosophy. The deployment of Hegelian
'logic' in the early essays illuminates the cOnsistency
throughout her oeuvre of Kristeva's claim to surpass
the 'system' and to present the terrain on which the
problematic of the 'subject' in modern social and
political relations can be thought. It is a claim which
this thesis is concerned to lay open, and to question -
notably in its construction of 'speculative thinking'.
The early essays are evidence of Kristeva's encounter
with philosophy and demonstrate an explicit return to
Hegelian dialectic after historical materialism.
Although Kristeva will abandon the Hegelian 'system',
Hegelian dialectic remains crucial, and appears in her
thought as the extreme limit of philosophy's capacity
to grasp the production of 'signifying practices'. The
theory of 'poetic language' locates the enactment and
presentation of this production in modern literature.
Hegelian philosophy is not only foregrounded as the
necessary 'passage' for the exposition of the concept
of poetic language;l the Hegelian 'concept' is itself
the passage to grasping the 'truth' of poetic language
as 'signifying practice'. This substantial claim for a
return to Hegel in Kristeva's writings opens the way
for an assessment of the Kristevan deployment of the
Hegelian dialectic; not simply of her negotiation of
Hegel as such, but of the specific encounter with Hegel
which leads to a supposed 'sublation' (Aufhebung) of
the system.
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The endeavour in these early essays to specify a
'materialist dialectical logic' claims the
inseparability of 'logic' and 'politics'. It argues
that the source for the disclosure of this
inseparability lies in the 'idealist dialectic', and
that the relation of logic and politics can now be
expounded thanks to the Freudian discovery of the
'unconscious'.. This early emphasis on the
inseparability of logic and politics and on the role of
history in their relation (that is to say, Kristeva's
'rediscovery' of Hegelian dialectic recalls -
implicitly - the debates of German idealism, and
Hegel's response to the philosophies of Kant and
Fichte.2 However, the endeavour to specify a
materialist dialectical logic leads Kristeva to make an
abstract beginning in Hegel's Science of Logic
The essays of the late 1960s and early 1970s work
through Hegelian concepts: both dialectical contraries
('universal and particular', 'identity and non-
identity', 'finite and infinite') and philosophical
categories ('becoming', 'determination', 'negation',
'sublation'). The following discussion of three of
those essays 'frlatière, sens, dialectique' (1971), 'Le
sujet en procès' (1973) and 'L'expérience et la
pratique' (1973) explores the dependence of Kristeva's
theory of 'poetic language' on a construction of
Hegelian 'negativity' on an explicit return to
Hegel) .3
The immediate deployment of logical categories
nevertheless restricts the elaboration in this chapter
of the implicit return to Hegel that lies in Kristeva's
passage out of 'idealist dialectical logic'. Her
abstract beginning demands a premature and over brief
account of Hegel's criticism of Kant and Fichte's
practical philosophy.
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Kristeva's reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit is
also constrained by the difficulties which arise from
her extraction of a concept of 'negativity' from the
Science of Logic. However, it will be evident that the
materialist 'inversion' of Hegel substitutes a
genealogy of culture for Hegel's philosophy of history.
The encounter with philosophy in the early writings
forms the background to the reformulation, expounded in
Revolution in Poetic Language, of Lacan's 'symbolic'
into 'the semiotic and the symbolic'. The later
employment of psychoanalytic concepts from Freud, Lacan
and Klein presents an account of 'symbolization' which
overcomes the difficulties arising from the earlier
direct approach to logical categories. The account of
symbolization comes to ground the genealogy of culture
outlined in the early essays, but will consolidate
Kristeva's claim that her concept of 'infinity'
sublates Hegelian 'totality'.
It will be argued here that the 'sublation' of Hegel
misrecognizes speculative thought precisely where it
contributes most to the problematic Kristeva addresses:
the subject 'in' modern social and political relations.
In order to propose her own estimation of 'philosophy'
and 'literature' (their respective powers to present
the contradictions in social and political relations)
Kristeva must reduce the complexity of Hegelian reason
and misrecognize the meaning of 'speculative thinking'.
This chapter will therefore rehearse Kristeva's
'passage' through Hegel, in anticipation of the
argument to be developed: that her problematic both
begins and remains Hegelian, in other words that that
there is an explicit and an implicit return to Hegel in
Kristeva's writings.
*
Of the two major sections in this chapter, section A
will present the significance of Hegelian dialectic as
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a point of departure for the concept of 'poetic
language' . Kristeva's rediscovery of 'negativity' in
the dialectic - after Marxism - proceeds to a synthesis
of Hegel and Freud. This synthesis is expounded as a
sublation of Hegelian 'negativity' in the concept of
'infinity' to be derived from an analysis of modern
'literature', an analysis that is informed by the turn
to language in Lacan's dialectical return to Freud.
Section B presents the concept of 'rejection' which is
substituted for Hegelian 'negativity' as the negative
force of the materialist dialectic. The concept of
rejection forms the basis both of the claim to go
beyond Hegelian dialectic with Freud's 'science of the
subject', and of Kristeva's estimation of 'poetic
language' as a post-Hegelian practice. The section will
argue that the synthesis of Hegel and Freud, and the
problematic claim to go 'beyond' Hegel, and philosophy
as such, is informed by the inconsistencies which
present themselves in the interpretation of Hegelian
logic. The Kristevan 'subject', which is presented as
an inversion of Hegelian 'self-consciousness'
(specifically by way of Bataille's relation to Hegel),
suffers from the manner in which Kristeva's concept of
'infinity' arises.
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A. The Return to Hegelian Negativity
In	 'Matiêre,	 sens,	 dialectique'	 (1971)	 Kristeva
outlines a genealogy of culture based on a synthesis of
Hegelian dialectic, dialectical materialism, and the
Freudian theory of the unconscious (after Lacan).
Kristeva's 'materialist dialectical logic' requires a
return to and passage through Hegel's 'idealist
dialectical logic t . Hegelian science is fundamental to
Kristeva's concept of dialectic, for it is taken to
have come closest to discovering the materialist
dialectic (in her sense, as informed by the Freudian
'unconscious'), and is the thought 'sublated' in
Kristeva's synthesis.
It is Kristeva's view here, as throughout her writings,
that the Freudian theory of the unconscious introduces
a 'cut' in the subject, and it is this which overcomes
the obstacles to thinking the materialist dialectic:
the unconscious: a hinge which permits method
(theory) to think the engendering of the
subject as one of the moments
(determinations, contradictions) of matter
and/or of the eclipse of the (conscious)
subject and as struggle of contraries. (MSD,
p. 282)
On this view, only a materialist dialectic informed by
the Freudian theory of the unconscious can present the
'concrete' history of the subject in social and
political relations, avoiding, on the one hand, either
a transcendentalism or a one-sided mechanistic thinking
of history - neither of which can think the 'subject';
and on the other, the restriction of the dialectic
attributed to the 'system', which is held to unfold the
dialectic as a totality.4 The discovery of the
'unconscious' saves dialectical materialism both from
the residual effects of the 'overturning' of Hegel - a
universal, uninvestigated, subject of history - and
from falling back into the idealist 'system' itself:
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It is concrete history, a precise series of
transferences, with its precise conditions,
which drives material contradiction to become
a signifying determination .....But this
becoming, far from being that of a pure
linearity, as a mechanistic conception of the
subject would let us suppose, is a
translation that theory can henceforth think
thanks to the cut [coupe]
	
in the subject
which the unconscious introduced. (NSD, p.
282).
Whatever the 'fate' attributed to Hegel's rediscovery
of the dialectic (its subjection to the 'system'
conceived as exposition in/as a 'totality'), idealist
dialectical logic is the sine qua non for articulating
the 'production t at work in the materialist dialectic.
In Kristeva's thought Hegel's logic renders possible
what the Freudian discovery realized.
Kristeva's estimation and employment of Hegel in
'Matiêre, sens, dialectique' turns on three 'moments'
taken from the system. They are deployed in the three
stages which present Kristeva's 'inversion' of Hegel
and its result. These stages are: the 'production of
determination' (Hegelian logic), 'language at work'
(the logic of the signifier), and 'the scission of the
sphere of meaning' (the logic of matter). My
designation of these stages is taken from the following
statement:
Our reasoning will therefore take the
following course: (i) the discovery of
contradiction as unrepresentable production
of syntax and/or of formal thought; (ii) the
realisation of this contradiction in the
modern text as preservation of the
contradiction, without seeking its solution/
suppression; (iii) the ex-position of this
contradiction	 outside	 the	 'sphere	 of
meaning'. (MSD, p.271).
The three 'moments' from Hegel's system mobilized in
these stages are the dialectic of 'determinate being'
(taken from the Science of Logic), the 'speculative
proposition' (taken from the Preface to the
Phenomenology of Spirit), and the 'absolute idea' (from
18
the Science of Logic). In the first case, Kristeva
uses the logical development of the category of
'determinate being' to establish the problematic of the
finite-infinite relation. In the second case, the
'speculative proposition' is brought in to aid the
sublation of the 'language' object (language qua object
of linguistics). In the third case, Kristeva finds the
idealist dialectic's 'return to the real' out of which
dialectical materialism has found a new basis, 'matter'
(MSD, p. 280).
The essay as a whole develops within the aim
to question the status of the object and,
more generally, of the objectivity in the
isolation of the object 'language' as formal,
syntactic grid. (MSD, p. 272)
The sublation of the object 'language' is the advance
to Kristeva's concept of infinity. Infinity 'in'
/ language is, further, specified in distinction from
'philosophical infinity'. Hegel's speculative thinking,
therefore, while an aid to the sublation of 'language'
as object, is itself sublated in the advance to
Kristeva's concept of infinity. Sections 1 and 2, which
follow, present the first two stages of Kristeva's
'inversion' of Hegel. Section 2 discusses Kristeva's
concept of infinity 'in' language (the Kristevan
signifiert). It demonstrates the conflation of Hegel's
criticism of the fixed categories of the understanding,
on the one hand, and Kristeva's criticism of the
fixation of language qua object of linguistics; and
shows that this conflation permits the substitution of
'language at work' for speculative exposition.
'Language at work' is held to realize the 'infinity'
that the Hegelian concept cannot comprehend. The
response, here, to Kristevan 'infinity' proposes that
the turn to language cannot advance to Hegel's concept
of infinity, and is what preempts a proper grasp of
speculative exposition.
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1. Finite and Infinite: the Production of
Determination
Kristeva interprets Hegel's logic of 'determinate
being' as presenting the 'production of determination'.
Her argument is that, if idealist dialectical logic is
the self-presentation of the concept in its self-
constitution, it cannot be defined or employed as a
method. Rather, the Logic presents the 'negativity'
which gives the Marxist analysis of class struggle its
impetus, and whose occlusion lies behind the dogmatic
fate of that analysis. The Logic's presentation of
'negativity' is what gives dialectical logic its
revolutionary value. The return to the Logic is
therefore the way out of dogmatic Marxism. It will
also, however, come to be the way out of Hegel. On the
one hand, Kristeva contends that the return to
'Hegelian negativity' is necessary if the social and
political significance of the Freudian account of the
t subject' is to be fully explicated. On the other, this
synthesis of Hegel and Freud brings with it the
substitution of the concept of 're-jection' for
Hegelian 'negativity' .5
It is by way of the unconscious - realm of
pure contradiction - that the Hegelian
foundation finds its objectification and its
reality.. . We will return to this punctuality
of contradiction which the unconscious is,
destroying the Cartesian subject and leading
it back to proximity with material
contradiction; let us say: to its zero with
its body and its death. (MSD, p. 280)
Kristeva endorses the Logic as a logic of the self--
constitution' of the concept: 'the scission of itself
through itself' (MSD, p. 274). The exposition of the
concept has a twofold value for Kristeva. First,
dialectical logic extracts reason from the conceptions
of formal thought (from the subsumptive activity of
representational thinking). Furthermore, with idealist
dialectical logic, 'idealism' relinquishes the
presupposition of the 'absolute I' as foundation of
20
reality and of formal thought. This is because Hegel
shows, in Kristeva's words, that 'the true generative
necessity is not that of an act. . . but that of a
dialectic' (MSD, p. 271).
Implicit in Kristeva's commendation of Hegelian
dialectic is the sublation of the relation of reason
and being in Fichte's system. In Fichte's philosophy
the principle of the 'absolute I' gives rise to a one-
sided relation of positing (Setzen) and being(-posited)
(Gesetztsein). The reference in Kristeva's essay to a
letter of Hölderlin's, criticizing Fichte to Hegel,
suggests an intimation of the Hegel-Fichte relation.
Nevertheless, Kristeva commends Hölderlin's position on
Fichte not only as a criticism of the absolute subject,
but as an early attempt to seek out the logic of matter
'after' Hegel (MSD, p. 279, n.2). This claim is
dependent on her construal of the progression of the
'concept'.
The unity of the Logic is 'the progression of the
concept towards the exposition of itself' (SL, p. 122).
The result of the understanding's concept of infinity
is the abstraction of the progression into a 'double
result'. Kristeva herself turns the unity of the Logic
into a 'double result':
The Hegelian logic, in its objective - but
also subjective - part thus interests us here
- being a genetic exposé of the concept and
positing the latter, on the one hand as a
becoming (of which Being and Essence are only
moments) and, on the other hand, 'not only as
subjective presupposition but as absolute
basis' (inasmuch as it has made itself
basis). (MSD, pp. 271-2)
The separation of what Kristeva intends to hold
together - the progression of the Logic as a whole, and
the result - is manifest in her assertion that the
progression is a 'becoming' . This definition restricts
Kristeva's grasp of Hegelian logic because it inherits
the concept of progression as it is posited in the
21
sphere of 'being' - in the first book only of the Logic
as a whole. The dialectic of 'determinate being'
(Dasein) falls in the first of the two books of the
Objective Logic - comprising the 'doctrine of being'
and the 'doctrine of essence'. Kristeva's materialist
rethinking of the finite/infinite relation derives from
and is counterposed to the concept of infinity which
unfolds in the sphere of 'being' - despite her claim to
embrace the subjective and objective parts of the Logic
(JYISD, p. 271).
The restriction is consequential for the move beyond
'language t to 'poetic language': what Kristeva's
concept of infinity goes beyond is the finite/infinite
relation as grasped by the understanding. This
undermines her claim that 'poetic language' advances
to, or realizes, 'infinity', since this concept of
infinity arises in a release from Hegelian 'totality'.
The definition of the progression of the Logic as a
'becoming' is also the source of Kristeva's emphasis on
contradiction as the motor of the dialectic. It is this
emphasis which leads Kristeva to credit 'idealist
dialectical logic' with a 'revolutionary value'. On her
account, the dialectic discovers determination as
'contradiction', or 'production of determination'.
Dialectical logic not only demonstrates how:
formal thought conceives of determination as
an elementary and fundamental relation for
the constitution of signification and/or
syntax, and considers it in this perspective
only in the framework of identity and of the
positing of the same {le méme]. (MSD, p. 272)
but renders:
the production of the determination whose
strategic	 role	 in	 syntax	 we	 have
underlined....	 Hegel	 restores	 to
determination its negative essence. (ibid.)
Idealist dialectical logic overcomes the formal
conception	 of	 determination.	 It	 recognizes
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determination as contradiction but does not remain in
the resolution of the contradiction in the 'nothing'
(the result for representation). Determination,
conceived as contradiction, is the negation which -
Kristeva cites 1-legel - 'does not go beyond the
resolution of the contradiction in the nothing without
its positive side being recognized - that by which it
presents itself as absolute activity and foundation or
absolute reason' (MSD, p. 273).
Kristeva's reconstruction of negation in the sphere of
determinate being, of 'something and other', recognizes
that Hegel's concept of determination is mobilized
against formal thought's fixation of 'abstract
identity' separated from difference: 'it is a matter of
an identity posited as such in the sole measure in
which it is (and is it) for the other, thus through
"the multiplication and diversification of its
relations with the other"' (NSD, p. 272). Kristeva's
citation from the Logic implies a grasp of Hegelian
self-identity as it proceeds dialectically out of two
determinations of qualitative being: first, the concept
of indifferent exteriority; second, the concept of the
infinite as 'absolute' exteriority.
Nevetheless, Kristeva's grasp of the dialectic becomes
inconsistent at this point, since she restricts the
Hegelian concept within the dialectic of the 'limit'
(Grenze). The dialectic of determinate being proceeds
to the concept of limit, but this is not its final
determination. The transition in the Logic from 'limit'
to 'limitation' (Schranke) and thence to the 'ought'
(Sollen) expounds the moments of Kant's distinction
between pure theoretical and pure practical reason, and
of Fichte's foundation of theoretical in practical
reason. The fixations of 'limit', 'limitation', and the
'ought' in Kantian and Fichtean philosophy is the
object of Hegel's criticism.
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Aspects of the dialectic of 'Grenze' and 'Schranke'
reemerge in Kristeva's reconstruction of Hegelian
logic:
The 'something' and the 'other' being the
same thing are nevertheless posited with
precision, thus already determined (through a
negation), which is what constitutes the
limit differentiating the one from the other.
Nevertheless, enclosed in this limit, the
'something' determined is pushed by
contradiction to disquiet and to the passing
of the limit, in order to form its unity
(zero) with the other - the 'something' is
pushed into movement, let us say into the
struggle. (MSD, p. 272)
This passage refers first to limit as Grenze
('differentiating the one from the other') and then to
limit as Schranke ('the passing of the limit').
Kristeva adopts 'absolute activity' as it presents
itself in the passage from Grenze to Schranke in the
logic of 'being', and discovers there the revolutionary
value of the dialectic: the necessity which compels
'the something' into 'the struggle'. This way of
casting the outcome of this dialectic shows that the
transition to the 'ought', that Hegel presented as the
highest point of contradiction proceeding from the
concept of limit, has not been followed through. As a
consequence, Kristeva comes to take the relation in
which the 'ought' consists as the very principle of the
Hegelian 'system'. Such a construal of the Logic both
freezes the dialectic and fails to account for Hegelian
'necessity'
What Kristeva clearly endorses in the concept of Grenze
is that it is a transition, by way of contradiction,
from abstract identity, the indifferent exteriority of
'something' and 'other' . Hegel remarks that:
We must observe the development of the
concept, which manifests itself, however,
rather as an entanglement and contradiction.
(SL, p. 126)
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The commendation of 'contradiction' as the
'revolutionary value' of Hegelian logic is at odds with
the latter's development of the concept of limit. The
necessity of the moment of Grenze is well understood by
Kristeva but her account conflates Kantian and Hegelian
'limit'. Hegel shows that the Kantian conception of
'limit' as 'enclosure' (of reason) has its truth in
limit as 'separation' of 'something' and 'other'. The
enclosed and the enclosure in Kant are disclosed in
Hegel as an abstract opposition whose truth is the
self-movement of qualitative distinction in which the
relation to other is a 'middle', the limit: 'Limit is
the middle between the two of them in which they cease'
(SL, p. 127). There is no 'limit' except as the
movement of separation of 'something' and 'other', and
therefore 'something' is not enclosed by a limit.
Separation is how the 'limit' - in Kant of 'reason' and
its 'surroundings' - looks when it is seen that the
relation of 'something' and 'other' is the negation of
the negation which takes place on each side. This
movement of negation on both sides is the negation of
simple or indifferent exteriority: 'there is a single
determinateness of both'	 (SL, p.	 126) in which
'something' and 'other' remain independent but
inseparable, 'both something and other'. The 'limit'
manifests the aspect of separation in the sublation of
simple exteriority:
in the limit the non-being-for-other becomes
prominent, the qualitative negation of the
other, which is thereby kept apart from the
something which is reflected into itself.
(SL, p. 126)
Kant's statement on the Grenze in the Prolegomena to
any Future Metaphysics posits the limit of theoretical
reason:
Bounds [Grenzen] (in extended beings) always
presuppose a space existing outside a certain
definite place and enclosing it. (Prol., p.
101)
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Hegel shows that practical reason in Kant is subject to
the same Grenze because although 'duty' refers outside
the Grenze to the 'surroundings' (to the 'space for
knowledge of things-in-themselves' of which 'we can
never have definite concepts'),6 the Grenze reappears
in the 'as if' structure of 'duty', although now as
'limitation' (Schranke): 'Duty is an ought directed
against the particular will' (SL, p. 136). Directed
against the particular will•, duty remains in a one-
sided relation to determinate being: 'it is held up as
an ought to the will insofar as this has the capacity
to isolate itself from the true' (ibid.). Infinite and
finite are opposed.
The movement from the concept of Grenze to the concept
of Schranke is the movement from the limits of Kantian
theoretical reason to the Fichtean Sollen. In Fichte's
Wissenscha.ftslehre theoretical reason is 'grounded' in
practical reason.7 The Sollen explicates the 'passing
of limits' which is demanded in the 'ought' both of
Kantian duty and of Fichtean knowledge of the
practical. But Fichte's exposition of the conception of
limitation implicit in Kant's practical reason re-
presents Kant's own concept of Schranke in the
Prol egomena:
Bounds [Grenzen] (in extended beings) always
presuppose a space existing outside a certain
definite place and enclosing it. Limits
[Schranke] do not require this, but are mere
negations which affect a quantity so far as
it is not absolutely complete. (Prol., p.101)
The problem of the 'not absolutely complete' will
reemerge, as the Hegelian dialectic shows, within the
Kantian and Fichtean 'ought', since the Sollen contains
a Nicht-Sollen: the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions of
infinity demand that infinity not be reached.
This infinite has the fixed determination of
a beyond which cannot be reached for the very
reason it it is not meant to be reached
[nicht erreicht werden soil]. (SL, p. 142)
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Hegel's point is that, not only is the Sollen a
'formalism of possibility' which implies an
impossibility (SL, p. 133), but it is a direct self-
contradiction since it contains a Nicht-Sollen.
Kristeva has an intimation only of 'impossibility' and
not	 'possibility'	 when	 she	 considers	 this
finite/infinite relation, and hence does not make the
transition from 'contradiction' to 'absolute
contradiction'; does not discover that the highest
point of contradiction is co-extensive with absolute
finitude.
The understanding is satisfied that it has
reconciled these two [finite and infinite],
but the truth is that it is entangled in
unreconciled, unresolved, absolute
contradiction... The contradiction occurs as
a direct result of the circumstance that the
finite remains as a determinate being opposed
to the infinite, so that there are two
determinatenesses; there are two worlds, one
infinite and one finite, and in their
relationship the infinite is only the limit
of the finite and is thus only a determinate
infinite, an infinite which is itself finite.
(SL, p. 139)
The inconsistency in Kristeva's reconstruction of Hegel
is the attempt to extract 'contradiction' as the motor
of the dialectic from the standpoint which clings to
finitude, from the standpoint she attributes to the
Hegelian 'system' while preserving 'negativity' as
contradiction with a 'revolutionary value'
For Kristeva, 'determination is movement, at the same
time as being or because it is a limitation' . For
Hegel, absolute contradiction fixes the limitation:
determination is no longer a movement but an
alternating determination [Wechselbestimmung], a 'bad
infinity' in which the movement from finite to infinite
and back again manifests and makes absolute the
repetition of the 'same' . This is to say that the bad
infinity makes absolute the 'simple qualitative being'
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from which reason was first extracted by determination
as the movement of contradiction.
Nevertheless, the bad infinity or double result is the
'external realization' of the concept of infinity that
it does not advance to. It is therefore not a return to
'something' as indifferent exteriority, or to the
abstraction which is formal thought's conception of
identity. It has passed through the concept of Schranke
and so posited the unity of 'something' and 'other':
'the infinite itself attains affirmative being only by
means of negation, as the negation of the negation.'
Bad infinity is therefore a 'result' (even if double):
when this its affirmation is taken as merely
simple qualitative being, the negation
contained in it is reduced to a simple
immediate	 negation	 and	 thus	 to	 a
determinateness and limit. (SL, p. 141)
The 'limit', or contradiction, which extracted reason
from simple immediacy, is what leads to the bad
infinity if it is itself fixed by reason. Kristeva
grasps the first movement:
Conceived as a contradiction, the
determination extracts the reasoning that
posits it as such from the principle of
identity as affirmation of the same (MSD, p.
273; my emphasis)
but fails to draw the consequences of the concept of
limit; does not grasp the movement in which the logic
unfolds what takes place in the 'bad infinity' - the
'return' to immediacy. Kristeva attributes to Hegel -
and philosophy in general - only a vague presentiment
of the significance of the 'void' philosophical reason
posits and which will creep up on its mastery.
Hegel's Logic, however, confronts the void. The return
(Rückkehre) to the moment of simple qualitative being
in the dialectic of 'finite and infinite' is only
possible because the indeterminate 'something' is
sublated. The repetition means, 	 therefore,	 that
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'infinity' is not only indeterminate, but a void -
'although the in-itself of the finite, nevertheless a
beyond in the dim, inaccessible distance, outside of
which the finite is and remains' (SL, p. 140). The void
belongs to the infinite 'in its simple determination,
affirmative as negation of the finite' (SL, p. 137).
When Kristeva fixes the dialectic in the movement of
Grenze and Schranke, she turns 'negation of the
negation' into affirmative negation: 'the negative
affirmation or the affirmative negativity which
constitutes all dialectical determination' (MSD, p.
27). Hegel shows that negative affirmation is the
Sollen which contains a Nicht-Sollen: 'a beyond which
cannot be reached, for the very reason that it is not
meant to be reached, because the determinateness of the
beyond, of the affirmative negation is not let go' (SL,
p. 142).
It is not simply a question of Kristeva having
presented Kantian and Fichtean practical reason under
the guise of Hegelian reason. It is a question of what
happens when she 'lets go' of the affirmative negation
without having thought it through. Her departure from
the 'system' starts out from the finite/infinite
relation as it is posited by the understanding.
Consequently the concept of the 'system' re-presents
reason 'posited' in its 'enclosure'
it is the series finitude-unity-sphericity-
totality which saturates this system (despite
its fundamental movement), assigning it its
power (and not struggle), and its bounds
[bornes]. (MSD, pp. 273-4)
This departure from the Logic will affect the ensuing
concept of infinity 'in' language.
2. Infinity 'in' Language: the Logic of the Signifier
The union (impossible for the concept which
originates despite everything from the
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understanding, whatever be its becoming) of
finite (determined) and infinite (its
negative affirmation) is realised in this
logic which Hegel renders thinkable without
for all that approaching it, and which is at
work in poetic language: the logic of the
signifier. (MSD, pp. 276-7)
Kristeva's departure from Hegel rests on the assertion
that the 'impossible union' of finite and infinite
structures the idealist dialectical logic and
proscribes its scope. The Logic cannot move from a
discovery of the movement of 'contradiction' to a grasp
and presentation of its fundamental moment. The
fundamental moment is the 'scission of matter',
'heterogeneous contradiction;	 its presentation is
possible by way of 'the logic (law) of the signifier':
contradiction reveals itself as the basic
matrix of all signifiance or, if one wishes,
of all signifying practice. The specificity
of 'poetic language' within these signifying
practices consists in the fact that
contradiction goes so far as to represent
itself there as law of its functioning. (MSD,
p. 276)
Even though Kristeva's position on the 'origination' of
the Hegelian concept from the understanding is a
critical one, the logic of the signifier is itself
approached by way of Hegel's 'speculative proposition'.
this 'relation represented by the simple
copula' in the proposition, a subjective
relation which 'from the grammatical point of
view. . . (is) founded on the indifferent
exteriority of subject and predicate' is
thus, in a logic of genesis, a contradiction
which presents itself as determination. This
is what the generation of the concept
demonstrates to grammar, thereby suspending
syntactic articulation, or at least opening
it onto the abyss - for whoever wants to
think this contradiction. (MSD, p. 275)
Kristeva aligns the hindrance to representational
thinking brought about by the speculative proposition
with a displacement of the object of linguistics. What
is checked by Hegel's 'speculative proposition' is the
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movement of representational thinking when it confronts
the normal, external, relation of subject and
predicate. Representational thinking moves across the
content (accidents or predicates) and returns to the
'passive' subject which serves as the 'basis upon which
the movement runs back and forth' (Phen. #60). Since
this is a passive and empty basis without the
predicates, the movement of representational thinking
runs through and out of the•determination as a whole;
it 'roams at will' (ibid.). When representational
thinking loses the solid and empty ground of the
tsubject l , because the relation of subject and
predicate is not an external connection, its free
roaming is hindered:
Picture-thinking [das vorstellende Denken],
whose nature it is to run through the
accidents or predicates and which, because
they are nothing more than predicates and
accidents, rightly goes beyond them, is
checked in its progress, since that which has
the form of a predicate in the proposition is
the substance itself. It suffers, as we might
put it, a counter-thrust [Gegenstoss].
(ibid.)
The connection of subject and predicate which permits
the free roaming of 'thought' is, for Kristeva, the
syntax of the understanding, object of linguistics.
Linguistics 'has given itself as its object language as
expression of the understanding' (MSD, p. 275). The
'hindrance to thought' in the speculative proposition
and the logic at work in poetic language, the 'text',
are comparable insofar as they are activities excluding
the syntax of the understanding: 'representative
thought is checked in its course "when what has the
form of a predicate in the proposition, is substance
itself"' (MSD, p. 277)	 As a 'result', for Kristeva,
speculative thinking 'introduces a production!
generation that the act of the understanding doesn't
show' (MSD, p.281).
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Kristeva's criticism of the Hegelian concept ('which
originates, despite everything, from the
understanding') is inconsistent with her acknowledgment
that the act of the understanding is both obstacle to
and function of the dialectic: Hegel
conceives the genesis or production of
determination as being the affirmation of a
negation which draws (the individual) into
the negative movement of the understanding.
(MSD, p. 272)
Implicit here is the move through Fichte in Hegelian
dialectic. External reflection fixes, without
recognizing, the constitutive act of reason (absolute
Setzen). Fichte disclosed a transcendental logic behind
the principles of formal logic: the principles of
identity and non-contradiction are themselves
'abstractions from' transcendental logic, from the
activity of reason.8 Hegel showed that the Fichtean
absolute fixed, without recognizing, the principle of
absolute opposition - whose moments were discussed in
section 1 above.
Kristeva notes that external reflection turns away from
the movement of determination because it holds fast to
the abstraction from the activity of the understanding
which leads to the formal conception of determination:
the external relation of subject and predicate. She
therefore both acknowledges and denounces the necessity
of the Fichtean moment in Hegelian logic. Denouncing
the 'origination' of the concept from the understanding
is an inconsistency analogous to the one exposed above:
the extraction of 'negativity' (contradiction) from the
dialectic, and its preservation in the face of the
'absolute finitude' from which it is inseparable.
Kristeva confines the 'concept' to absolute finitude:
'Hegel thus discovers a logic which is at work in the
genesis of the concept and which the concept itself
does not represent, even if it consitutes itself in it'
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(MSD,	 p.	 274-5).	 'Negativity'	 (genesis)	 is then
developed into her own notion of 'generation'
The denunciation and abandonment of the Hegelian
concept; the notion of 'generation'; and the assertion
that the 'text' can represent 'contradiction' - all
proceed by way of a return to external reflection and
its grasp of the relation between subject and
predicate. That is to say, Kristeva sees the
reintroduction of Vorstellung as the way out of Hegel's
system, since it is what Hegelian philosophy
'rigorously excludes'. The evidence for this comes from
the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit:
philosophical exposition would obtain a
plasticity only when rigorously excluding the
ordinary type of relation between the parts
of a proposition. (cited in NSD, p. 278, n.l)
The	 'text'	 realizes	 infinity,	 and contradiction
'represents itself there' because poetic language
'sublates'	 and does not	 'exclude'	 the ordinary
proposition: it is 'language at work'.
Kristeva asks of Hegel's distinction between the
ordinary and the speculative proposition: 'But would
this be a philosophy? And won't "plasticity" always
leave a place necessary to a discourse for representing
it, and which would be this "ordinary syntax" that
Port-Royal and the Encyclopaedia had already posited?'
(ibid.). Kristeva fears that the relation between the
speculative	 and	 ordinary	 proposition	 is	 a
'Wechselbestimmung', an alternating determination. She
will therefore substitute poetic language for
philosophy as what 'can' unify these two moments.
Hegelian philosophy is deemed unable to, because - as
has been shown - the concept and its movement
('production/generation') have been separated into
finite opposed to infinite. By contrast, in poetic
language:
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The terms (signifieds) determined (by the
signified), thus 'finite', are put into
relation through the aid of the signifier
(contiguity, phonic resemblance) which
substitutes itself for the copula (is)
realising the relation in the judgement and,
thereby, in the sentence. (MSD, p. 277)
Kristeva derives an intimation of this in Hegel from
the latter's analogy between the speculative
proposition and rhythm:
The conflict of the form of a proposition in
general and of the unity of the concept which
destroys this form is analagous to that which
takes place in rhythm between meter and
accent. The rhythm results from the balancing
between the two and from their unification.
Likewise, in the philosophical proposition
the identity of the subject and predicate
musn't destroy their difference which the
form of the proposition expresses, but their
unity must flash out like a harmony. The form
of the proposition is the manifestation of
determined meaning, or the accent which
distinguishes the content in it; but the fact
that the predicate expresses the substance
and that the subject itself falls into the
universal, is the unity into which this
accent expires. (cited in MSD, p. 277, n.3)
Kristeva fails to draw the conclusions for the Hegelian
'concept' that this passage expounds; that is to say,
she fails to grasp that speculative thought not only
'hinders' the subject-object relations of formal
thought, but that this 'hindrance' comes about through
the subject-substance relation whose unfolding is
speculative exposition. Instead, Kristeva asks: 'but
would this be a philosophy?'; and remarks that: 'Even
in Hegel, if in the discrete fashion to be found
recurrently since Freud, there is an indication that
the dialectical logic in language would be that of
poetic language' (MSD, p. 268). She proposes, further,
that the 'comparison to a prosody' (all that is
discerned of the analogy between the speculative
proposition and 'rhythm' in the above passage) is
Hegel's only way of 'showing' what cannot be
represented by philosophy: the 'unheard of syntax
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baffling [déroutant] the syntax of the sentence' This
'unheard of' syntax is 'the logic of the signifier'.
The logic of the signifier is the logic of 'language at
work: the 'text'. 'Work, substituting itself for the
act opens on to a linguistic functioning where the
relating of contradictory terms constitutes the law
superimposing itself on the syntactic law articulating
the signifying act, and comes (as in Mallarmé's Un coup
de des) to prevent it from completing itself in a
phrastic whole' (MSD, p. 279). The relating of
contradictory terms constitutes a law: this is the
'realization' of Kristeva's (positive) infinity. Its
'superimposition' on the syntactic law establishes the
union of poetic (connotative) and formal (denotative)
language, since it works out of, but prevents the
completion of, the formal proposition (phrastic whole).
The latter's 'rigorous exclusion' by Hegel would, in
Kristeva's view, permit its return in the form of a
'discourse for representing' speculative philosophy.
Moreover the 'text' makes a significant advance on
transcendental philosophy: 'In the same gesture - for
the text - the status of what is not meaning or
language finds itself modified: this "outside" is
maintained as non-transcendental "object", not a beyond
of the subject, but its contrary, producing it' (MSD,
p. 279).9 The claim to the modified outside -
'heterogeneous contradiction' - presents the
'materialism' of Kristeva's 'infinity'. Yet it retains
the nature of a negative affirmation. That is to say,
Kristevan infinity - in Hegel's terms - is as much an
infinite 'in its simple determination' as the Fichtean
absolute she contrasts it with.
Here it is equally the I [Nol] which returns
to its other - infinite, independent of it,
its contrary which affirms it in negating it.
The sphere (of the understanding, of
subjectivity, of objectivity) is perforated
in this return, and it is in heterogeneity -
radical exteriority of meaning - that the
35
text which works on contradiction emerges.
(MSD, p. 278; my emphasis)
Heterogeneity, the 'radical exteriority of meaning'
expresses the logic of matter which Kristeva counters
to Hegelian 'system'. It is the so-called 'sublation'
of 'Hegelian totality', and therefore the third and
final stage in Kristeva's inversion of Hegel.
*
The discussion of Kristeva's adoption and adaptation of
Hegel's logic of determinate being has established that
Kristeva's 'heterogeneous contradiction', understood as
a law, derives from her extraction from the dialectic
of 'Hegelian contradiction', posited as the 'law' of
the dialectic. It has been shown that this is the 'law'
of Kantian and Fichtean practical philosophy. The
following section will show how this retention of the
'law' of contradiction, however it is reformulated,
affects the concept of re-jection - the 'sublation' of
Hegelian 'negativity'; and how it brings about the
division of Kristeva's subject 'in' social and
political relations.
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B. The Reformulation of Ne gativity : Re-/ection
1. The Advance to the Concept of Matter
At this paroxysm of idealism, the latter
inverts into its contrary and it is there
that Marx, Engels, Lenin seized it in order
to make of this former summit - the Absolute
Idea - a new base: matter. (MSD, p. 280)
Kristeva proposes a twofold significance for the
transition to the 'absolute idea' in the Science of
Logic: the significance for idealism - reclosure
(subjective or structural); and the significance for
materialism - transition to 'matter' . The latter
significance is there for materialist thought because
the 'Absolute Idea' is the moment in which the logical
genesis of the concept 'returns to the real'. As a
result of this understanding of the Logic two
conceptions of becoming are posited: the becoming of
the concept and the becoming of matter. This means for
Kristeva that the 'field' of signification (the
subject, the concept, meaning) can be opened up to
'heterogeneous contradiction' (the 'field' of socio-
his torical contradiction).
These two t fields' are implicitly contrasted with the
Kantian and Fichtean finite/infinite relation when
Kristeva distinguishes between the infinite as 'one of
two' and the infinite as 'the other of one' (Kristeva's
heteros). The latter is reached via the absolute idea
and makes of it the 'summit' of the Hegelian system and
the 'possibility' of materialist thought: a 'revision'
of the 'process of causality' . It is this revision
which establishes the relation in Kristeva's thought
between Hegelian dialectic and Lacan's return to Freud.
This is the explicit return to Hegel, and it leads to
the claim that Lacan's dialectical interpretation of
Freud contains a reminder to historical materialism:
it is a psychoanalyst, and one since Freud,
who was the first to posit the necessity of
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recognising the principle of heterogeneity as
the first stage in the revision of the
process of causality, writing notably: 'It is
strange that materialist thought seems to
forget that it is from this recourse to
heterogeneity that it took its impetus.'
(MSD, p. 280; citation from 'La chose
freudienne', Ecrits)
The assertion that Lacan was the first to posit the
necessity of recognizing the principle of heterogeneity
subjects the Freudian 'discovery' to an inversion
analogous to the materialist inversion of Hegel. The
return to Hegel is justified by the importance of
recognizing the connection between the 'discovery' of
the unconscious and materialist social and political
thought. It justifies Kristeva's hypothesis that a
return to Hegel might suggest an 'inversion' of
Freudian thought too, insofar as it did not proceed to
that recognition: the drives are the fundamental moment
in the new terrain opened up by psychoanalysis for
thinking the subject; and the 'unconscious' is rendered
anew as a 'middle' in the becoming of matter - a
'becoming' which is therefore formed by 'meaning', and
is historical.
The return to and inversion of Hegel's thought in
general, taken to be the thought of the Absolute Idea,
will permit the 'positing' of the principle of
heterogeneity: the relation of meaning and matter can
only be posited by way of the Hegelian concept, since
the latter produces matter as its 'contrary' but fails
to grasp the significance of this outcome of its
dialectic.
The Hegelian relation inverted: not return of
meaning to the real, but designation, through
meaning, of the irreducibility which opposes
it to a matter in contradiction whence, and
in opposition to which, it posits itself.
(NSD, p. 282)
The Hegelian concept (the dialectic of the 'unitary
notion of the thinking subject') designates, and thus
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engenders its contrary: matter as 'subject' (MSD, p.
281). For Kristeva, Lacan's recognition of the
principle of heterogeneity goes by way of and beyond
Marxism, Hegel, and the 'primacy' of the unconscious,
since to posit the principle is to open the field of
meaning	 (including	 the	 'processes	 called
psychoanalytic') to the field of socio-historical
contradiction. Kristeva's concept of 'matter'
establishes her claim to have opened up a materialist
social and political thinking 'with' the subject:
matter is not a beyond of the subject nor its
transcendence: it is its heterogene, the
contrary of this 'something' which it is and
which, thus, determines it while determining
itself in the contradiction which posits
them. 10
The claim to grasp the concrete history of the subject
in its social and political relations, by inverting
idealist contradiction into heterogeneous
contradiction, establishes Kristeva' s finite/infinite
relation: 'other of one' (producing it) and not 'one of
two' . 'One of two' would, in Kristeva's view,
correspond to the idealist finite/infinite (absolute
finitude: Hegel's 'there are two worlds'), although she
has not followed through the moments the Sollen.
For Kristeva, Hegelian philosophy has exposed and
Lacanian psychoanalysis has articulated two ways in
which the subject may 'escape' the encounter with
heterogeneous contradiction. The first is by way of the
transcendental alternative; and failing that, by way of
the 'channel, of objectal investment' (MSD, p. 283).11
The latter is articulated in Lacan's concept of the
'imaginary':
Freud demonstrated how the outside takes the
place of an object introduced into the
imaginary of the subject by the bias of
narcissism. Lacan: 'The imaginary function is
that which Freud formulated to govern the
investment of the object as narcissism. It is
to this point that we have ourselves returned
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in demonstrating that the specular image is
the channel which the transfusion of bodily
libido takes towards the object t . (MSD, p.
283, n.l; citation from 'Subversion du sujet
et dialectique du désir', Ecrits, p. 282)12
Kristeva's	 designation	 of	 the	 'outside'	 as
heterogeneous contradiction raises the question whether
through its relationship [parenté] with
Hegel, the Freudian discovery is susceptible
to an 'inversion' analogous to that which
materialism carries out in the Hegelian
system, that is to say to a scission of the
signifying sphere and to an affirmation of
its heterogeneous outside (in this case, to
an opening of the processes called
psychoanalytic towards the field of socio-
historical contradictions). (MSD, p. 280)
Although the unconscious - 'realm of pure
contradiction' - is the passage through which the
Absolute Idea is 'put back on its feet', the Freudian
treatment of the unconscious remains in the 'field' of
signification. For Kristeva, the concept of the
'imaginary' comprehends the post-Hegelian 'escape' for
the subject lacking the transcendental alternative, and
opens up the question of the 'relation to
heterogeneity'. On Kristeva's reading, it is the
recognition of heterogeneity (or rather, the positing
of its necessity, by Lacan), and of the 'imaginary' as
an escape, which expands the significance of
psychoanalysis as a theory of civilization. The social
and political significance of the psychoanalytic
articulation of the 'imaginary' pertains to its
knowledge of psychosis as a 'structure': 'a "psychotic"
structure of the subject of which psychoanalysis, with
Lacan, has had the merit of giving us the truth - as
being the structure of a monotheist (which is to say
homogenizing) civilization' (MSD, p. 285).
A homogenizing civilization must 'redouble' itself in
order to secure its stability. Monotheism shores up
homogeneity via its double - the objet petit a,
'presenting death'. As a structure of the 'subject',
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psychosis	 re-presents	 monotheism's	 'escape	 from
heterogeneity'. This account of 'homogenizing
civilization' not only rejects post-Hegelian thought
which returns to a pre-Hegelian position, 'for which
matter is a transcendence' (MSD, p. 284). It is also
supposed to apply to the Hegelian 'system', which is
held to withdraw (at the 'summit' of the absolute idea)
from the 'irreducible positing of the heterogeneous';
and to succumb to a subjective reclosure; which is to
say, to the redoubled but homogeneous structure where
'all objectality is presented in the form of "objet
petit a" t (NSD, pp. 284-5).
The 'cold universality' of philosophical exposition,
which frustrates desire and phantasm (see note 12), is
itself the downfall of philosophy since, at the
'summit' of the becoming of the concept, it proceeds to
a twofold reclosure. First, subjective reclosure: 'the
dialectical reflection emanating from the I is not led
to its suppression in the heterogene where I finds its
foundation'. Second, the structural reclosure: since
the I 'plays the totalizing role', the transition to
the real - which Hegel's 'absolute idea' represents in
this 'inversion' - binds the real in a 'relational
systematicity' (MSD, p. 281). Philosophical exposition
(idealist dialectic) fails to approach and posit the
heterogeneity which shows up at the summit of the
system.
The account of 'monotheist civilization' in
'L'expérience et la pratique' throws light on the claim
which opens the transition from idealist to materialist
dialetical logic presented in 'Matiêre, sens,
dialectique' . Kristeva asserts, drawing on Sollers,
that 'materialism can only be expounded as a twofold
unity'. Positing heterogeneity is not only an outcome
of the confrontation of idealism and historical
materialism. It surpasses this confrontation, as its
cause. 'The materialist dialectical logic is thus the
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logic of dialectical materialism, i.e the logic of the
cause of the materialism/idealism confrontation, as
well as the logic of the method as subject of a process
without subject' .13
In the developed materialist revision of the process of
causality - developed 'with' Freud and modern
literature - heterogeneous contradiction is known to
engender and exceed the 'symbolic order' . It is not
only idealist philosophy but also Marxist discourse
which re-presents this order, since the Marxist subject
of practice is 'a tenacious "I" armed with ideological
and theoretical assurance' (EP, p. 134). Not knowing
the 'negativity' at its basis, its fate is to block the
process of practice: 'Fixing an opaque real in an
atomic and null subjectivity' (ibid.). For Kristeva,
this failure is due to the fate of Hegel's 'practical
concept' in Marxism.l4 Only the turn first to
(Bataillean) 'fiction', and then subsequently to Maoist
practice, shows the way out of the mechanical
repetition which withholds Marxist theory and practice
from the 'real, material and signifying, objective and
subjective device/organization (dispositif)' (ibid.).
The 'inversions' of Hegel and Freud, and the discovery
of the 'cause' of the idealism/materialism
confrontation is coextensive with Kristeva's position
on 'subjective' and 'social' change in modern social
and political relations: the site of change is
'relation to heterogeneity'. 'Beyond' the objectal
investment is the seizure of the monotheist structure -
and	 possible	 transformation	 of	 'monotheist
civilization'
If one alters this structure by way of
relation to its heterogene, which engenders
it and constantly insists on it, one is in
the	 presence	 of	 an	 'other'	 subjectal
configuration that certain signifying
practices bring on the scene. In these
practices, where the subject says, matter,
far from 'presenting' itself as 'objet a' or
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as complement in a redoubled but homogeneous
structure, contra-dicts it as infinite
outside of the signifying double (redoubling
of the subject, relation of the subject to
the signifier), and forms the constant and
radical contradiction which determines these
other contradictions (or relations) internal
to the homogeneous domain of meaning.
'Signifying	 practice'	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 the
presentation of contradictions in social and political
relations (political experience), qua relation of
social and political relations to their 'principal
contradiction' : matter in contradiction. The latter
posits the subject (and meaning) as one of its moments.
The logic of this 'saying' (presentation) is the logic
of the signifier. The relation to the infinite
(presentation and not representation of political
experience) is 'poetic language'. It produces the
connection (liaison, Logos) between the logic of the
concept (the subject, meaning) and matter (posited as
heterogeneous outside). Kristeva's logic of the
signifier, relating and (re)producing matter and
concept is not only presented by way of the Hegelian
concept,	 but the latter is its substantial,
historical, element.
2. Iviatter in Contradiction
The Kristevan finite/infinite relation designates her
absolute ('matter'), but expresses the non-relation of
finite (meaning) and infinite (matter) since 'outside'
meaning refers to the absolute impossibility of the
relation of meaning to matter (matter posits meaning as
one of its moments, meaning says matter - as
ungraspable).
Poetic language is the relation to matter qua
'outside', as it is posited by meaning. This logic of
matter intimates another Grenze (absolute limit) within
the movement of Schranke (passing the limit): meaning
posits matter 'as an outside of its limit, as the
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infinite that its limit releases and of which meaning
is one of the determinations - which it is, besides,
the only one to determine' (MSD, p. 282).
If matter 'engenders' meaning as one of its moments,
nevertheless meaning's relation to the infinite is
fixed in the moment of the Grenze: of the 'release' of
infinity. This one-sided relation of finite and
infinite is expressed by Kristeva as 'the Hegelian
relation inverted: not return of meaning to the real,
but designation, through meaning of the irreducibility
which opposes it to a matter in contradiction whence,
and in opposition to which, it posits itself' (MSD, p.
282). This irreducibility, as we shall see,
subsequently informs the founding distinction of
'semiotic' and 'symbolic', and can be referred here to
a moment in Hegel's dialectic of finite and infinite,
i.e. to the moment of 'falsifying the double unity' of
finite and infinite:
taking the infinite in one of the two unities
not as negated, but rather as the in itself,
in which, therefore, determinateness and
limitation are not to be explicitly present
{nicht gesetzt werden sollen - should not be
posited], for these would debase and ruin it.
(SL, p. 145)
The one-sided relation of finite and infinite is
revealed in the account of symbolization in Revolution
in Poetic Language, where the 'semiotic', in which
Kristeva seeks a pre-symbolic law is posited as
regulated but without law: as the 'chora', in which
'determinateness and limitation should not be posited'
Poetic language is therefore the relation to matter as
it is determined by posited meaning, to the 'outside'
It is therefore both a renewal of and dependent upon
the finite: an infinite process. Given the
'irreducibility' which opposes meaning to a matter in
contradiction the possibility of language as poetic
language, the 'saying' of matter, is a difficulty: 'if
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it is not remainder, loss, hasardous object,
complement, can matter be said as heterogeneity in
discourse? (MSD, p. 285).
Kristeva asserts the following. 'Theoretically',
heterogeneity is spoken as dialectic of nature. 'For
the "subject"', its paths were traced by Freud as
'beyond the pleasure principle' (ibid.). Kristeva makes
the 'drives' in Beyond the Pleasure Principle bear the
'social and political' conflict. This is achieved by
stressing the moment of heterogeneity - 'transition' -
in the theory of the drives. Where Freud conjectures
'in addition to the conservative instincts which impel
towards repetition there may be others which push
forward towards progress and the production of new
forms' (BPP, p. 309), Kristeva affirms the 'external
disturbing forces' (source of the 'detours' of the
death drive) as socio-historical contradiction, and
therefore divests the drives of their 'dualism'.15
With respect to the possibility of 'poetic language',
therefore, the texts presenting matter are designated
as those which 'feel' the paths traced by Freud. Only
they can
feel the disquieting limits which define them
as texts: in a movement of becoming out of
matter and history across the unconscious;
thus in a determining contradiction with
them, and practising at the same time their
own contradictions. (MSD, p. 285; my
emphasis)
The unconscious, the middle of the movement of
becoming, belongs therefore to the 'logic of the
signifier' . The Freudian discovery displaces Hegelian
logic: it is the logic of the '"scission" of the
subject in the signifier' (MSD, p. 271). It does not
itself present the logic of history (matter), but is a
psychoanalytic logic 'in the sense in which Freud heard
the hysteric's body speak'.
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The significance of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure
Principle therefore lies outside the realm of the
signifier 'as such', in the paths of heterogeneity it
traces, 'for the "subject"'. The logic of positing, or
theory of symbolization, which articulates the
transition from the drive to the signifier is set out
in Revolution in Poetic Language. This logic discloses
the signifier as site of the relation to heterogeneity
(release from the Grenze) which makes poetic language
the practice of 'subjectal' transfiguration and the
surpassing of the Hegelian system. The logic of the
signifier at work in poetic language realizes a
contradiction of the signifieds, which is:
no longer that of a totality (sentence,
subject, concept, judgement, syllogism) but -
the unlimited signifier having supplanted the
copula (being) - that of an infinity. The
concept thus returns to its foundation and
contradicts itself there in becoming text.
(JYTSD, p. 277)
Texts 'feel the disquieting limits which define them as
texts: in a movement of becoming out of matter and
history across the unconscious' (MSD, p. 285).
Kristevan matter is thought 'as historical, i.e. in
becoming' (MSD, p. 284). The advance to the concept of
matter is therefore a synthesis of the 'concept' and
'drives', an 'inversion' of Hegel and Freud which re-
forms dialectical materialism.
The remainder of this chapter will outline Kristeva's
move from the Science of Logic to the Phenomenology of
Spirit, and continue to mark the premature exits from
the Hegelian text. These are marked in order to
approach a statement, in the final section of the
chapter, of what is at stake in the crucial and
sustained Kristevan problematic: the division of the
'poetic' and 'social' subject which arises from the
primacy of the subject in process as a 'split' subject.
46
Kristeva's attention goes to specific configurations of
consciousness in the Phenomenology in order to present
Bataille as the first to respond to the difficulty of
the 'saying' of matter.16 The theme of the essay
'L'expérience et la pratique' is the possibility of the
literary function as a practice which does not avoid
the socio-historical moment.
3. Unknown to myself via the Janus-face of desire
since the bourgeois Revolution, the essential
adventure of literature has been to take up,
to dissolve, to displace Christian ideology
and the art from which it is inseparable.
(EP, p. 107)
The appreciation of Bataillean 'experience', 'desire'
and 'fiction' contra Hegelian Erfahrung, Begierde and
philosophical exposition expounds Kristeva's
investigation into the 'power' of literature. It is a
question of ]J,terature's power to attack the 'reserves
of social power' in our society, and the 'monotheist'
instance of our civilization, the latter designated as
the significance which the 'absolute idea' has for
idealism. The analysis of the 'failure' of (late
nineteenth-century) avant-garde literature in its
attack on Christian ideology and its art is assessed in
terms of the transformed notion of 	 'Hegelian'
negativity which has been outlined above.17
The diagnosis of this failure supports Kristeva's
deployment of Bataille and Lacan contra Hegel - whose
philosophy is held to have 'explicated' Christian
idealism. Bataillean 'fiction', outreaching both avant-
garde literature and philosophical exposition, knows
the necessity of a 'thetic' moment in the affirmation
of heterogeneity (since, as shown, the Kristevan
infinity of the signifier is a release from and re-
posing of finitude). The failure of the avant-garde's
attack on 'the humanist, substantialist, o directly
transcendental instance' lies in the avoidance of the
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thetic moment. Its attempt at explosion, dissolution,
and death accentuate the negation immanent to and
sublimated in Christianity. It is therefore confined to
the 'inverse' of this sublimation - to the negativist
fetish:
the sole arrest that this course towards
dislocation gives itself is the desire
captured by an object which is either a
bodily fragment or a fragment of language.
The fetishization of the fragmented body or
of the verbal components, indeed of the
'text', is thus the inverse bound up with a
negativism which attacks the unity of the
subject but which does not go out of it into
the natural and social process. (EP, p. 108)
Avant-garde literature takes the 'second' path in the
escape from heterogeneity. The relation to
heterogeneity ('going out into the natural and social
process') demands in contrast to the 'funereal,
macabre' problematic a passage through the finite as
the condition of the renewal of the process of
negativity.
The process of negativity unfolds, but
doesn't want to know that a thetic moment, a
stasis, an ephemeral arrest is the condition
of its renewal. As if the affirmative moment
daunted the process of negativity and as if,
rather than attacking it, this negativity
preferred to leave it in suspense, intact,
elsewhere, to others. (EP, p. 107)
Kristeva finds confirmation of her position on the
avant-garde problematic - the pure accentuation of
Christianity's sublimated negation - in Bataille's
position on 'poetry'. She derives support for the
affirmation of the thetic moment as condition of the
'essential adventure of literature' from the passage in
Bataillean experience through the 'subject'
(affirmation and expenditure of the thetic moment).
This possibility of saying the heterogeneity of matter
in discourse (i.e the possibility of poetic language)
was raised in 'Matière, sens, dialectic', where
Bataillean 'experience' was merited as 'first' on the
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path of the negation of the signifying subject and of
the objets petit a which 'betray' it, i.e. on the path
of affirmation of 'a heterogene' (MSD, p. 285).
'L'expérience et la pratique' explores Bataillean
experience as the threefold problem of 'saying'
prediscursive	 materiality,	 of	 'leading	 into'
heterogeneity, and of having it 'pass into a
problematic community'. The first calls on Bataillean
'fiction' against the Hegelian absolute knowledge that
'constitutes itself precisely in the assumption of
heterogeneity in an opaque-atomic subject' (EP, p.
110). As has been shown, once knowledge (savoir) has
been defined thus as systematicity, it is 'a limit'
(Grenze) 'to be cleared' (Schranke). Thus Kristeva's
emphasis on the Bataille-Hegel relation, and her turn
to Bataillean 'desire' for the second aspect of her
problematic. The Bataillean 'minor sovereign', desire,
is absorbed into the problematic of clearing the limit
of (modern) reason - of leading into heterogeneity,
since Bataille runs the relation of desire and self-
consciousness in idealist dialectic against the grain
(a rebours), disclosing the 'repressed' moment of
experience in Hegelian knowledge.18
Bataillean experience is therefore the process of the
constitution of self-consciousness 'in reverse' (from
'unary' subject via desire to the unknown).19 'Unknown
to myself' is not deemed to be the 'result', but
instead the movement 'a rebours' which embraces the
'unknown' as a moment reveals that the truth of 'self-
consciousness' is symbolization. Experience is 'after'
Hegel in the sence that it is a practice
(transformative of the symbolic). The 'reversal' of the
process of symbolization proceeds by way of the
discovery of experience beneath the Hegelian Erfahrung
that is 'always' an experience of knowledge (savoir).
In Kristeva Bataille's 'eroticism' therefore becomes a
Janus-face unearthed from Hegelian phenomonology -
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where it 'constitutes' self-consciousness (the 'unary'
subject) as a paranoid subject. The moments of this
self-constitution, when run 'against the grain', show
the 'repressed moment' of Hegelian phenomenology:
Begierde points to the schizoid rupture where
Bataillean	 experience	 is	 elaborated.	 Experience
rehearses	 immediate	 'sense-certainty'	 which	 the
phenomenological 	 process,	 dialectic	 'of	 self-
consciousness', definitively leaves behind.
Bataillean experience avoids 'absolute knowledge' and
the 'discursive real' (Christianity's confusion of
discourse with experience, EP, p. 111) and is on the
path to heterogeneity by way of the heterogeneous
'operations' which pass through language. 'Laughter'
and terotjcism are 'Bataille's' traversal (affirmation
and expenditure) of the thetic-affirmative moment. They
are Kristeva's response to the problem of leading the
speaking subject to the pre-discursive movement, to the
'flux' of extra-discursive negativity 'circulating in
nature and society (the society of others)'.
Kristeva's criticism of the subjectivism of avant-garde
literature is that it 'leaves to others' the
affirmative moment, which is the subjective and social
moment in the process of negativity: the moment of 'the
process of signifiance that makes of the subject a
subject of knowledge [savoir] and a social subject'
(EP, p. 109). This is what Bataille does not
'abdicate' : the relation to others, the group, the
social community. The avant-garde's failure of the
thetic moment 'leaves to others' the relation to others
since the thetic moment is the 'threshold' of relation
to the group. 'Subjective and forcefully elitist' the
avant-garde text leaves to metaphysics the relation to
others, thus leaving metaphysics to 'reconstitute
itself'
it is precisely on this threshold that
metaphysics reconstitutes itself, that the
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combatted unity reinstalls itself and that
subjects, however lucid they have become
about their internal mechanism (thanks to
psychoanalysis and to the negativist-
fetishist avant-garde), become opaque again,
servers of the oppressive law, of technical
reproduction, of the positivist saturation
and even of social conformism. (EP, p. 109)
Bataille's reversal of 'Hegel' does not abdicate the
subject (moi) but makes of the combatted unity 'only
vertigo, "foyer", dance, where knowledge is not, but
where the heterogeneous breaks loose' (EP, p. 109).
Kristeva reassumes the 'Hegelian' logic of
determination and finds a way out of external
determinacy (indifferent externality) in her way
through Bataille's 'I wanted only to rediscover
cohesion in the diversity of described facts' (EP, p.
110). The advance from the logic of the concept to the
logic of matter explicates Bataille's utterance in
Eroticism: 'I have sacrificed everything to the search
for a point of view whence the unity of the human
spirit comes out again' (cited in EP, p. 110).
The shapes which lead the subject's 'lucidity' up to
the movement preceding discouse are 'laughter' ('at
every stasis assumed and traversed') and 'eroticism'
('the affirmation of life as far as into death') (EP,
p. 112). These 'middles' on the path to heterogeneity
presuppose and 'expend' the unary subject and therefore
attack the latter's metaphysical fixation. Kristeva
calls this presupposition and expenditure 'stasis,
ephemeral arrest', discovering such a procedure
specifically in Bataille's position on 'reproduction',
quoting from Eroticism: 'the fundamental meaning of
reproduction is no less the key to eroticism' (EP, p.
112). Bataillean desire is the passage Kristeva seeks
since 'eroticism' figures the struggle (contradiction)
of	 the	 symbolic	 (reproduction-filiation) 	 and
heterogeneity (death):
That death is invisible, outside reproduction
and filiation, that their struggle is the
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truth of the social relation, this is what
Bataille has appear across the mechanical
monotony of social reproduction. (EP, p. 112)
'Fusion' in Bataille is the introduction of separation
into the procreation that society 'advocates in order
to perpetuate its continuity' . It is therefore not
continuity vis-à-vis discontinuity (the symbolic,
signification) but their contradiction: 'union across
separation and discontinui. ty' (ibid.). By emphasizing
the importance to Bataille of reproduction as 'the
linkage which resists violence and death, the logical
principle assuring "the passage of continuity and
discontinuity" without which there is no contradiction'
(ibid.), Kristeva takes Bataillean experience into the
genealogical reformulation of Lacan, the attempt to
breach the symbolic without re-positing the 'atomic'
subject of Marxism:
[Bataille] rehabilitates the sensible human
activity of the I [moi] but in order to
denounce its illusion. He insists on the
unity of the human spirit (Eroticism), but in
order to discover there the 'I-for-death'. He
proclaims love and fusion, but as deaths.
(EP, p. 109)
Bataille is therefore presented against the backdrop of
elitist and fetishist literature, for his social and
political thought:
what is aimed at is not the abolition of
filiation, of the One or of mastery, it is
their recognition [reconnaissance] as moments
indispensable to a putting into play which
surpasses them, in order to discover through
[a travers] them the subject's adequation
with the movement (the 'flux', the 'flame')
of nature and society. (EP, p. 112)
Bataille's significance for Kristeva lies precisely in
the 'relation to heterogeneity' which his reversal of
Hegel enacts, in three moments. (1) Bataille's text
acknowledges - passes through - the 'thetic moment'
(the unary subject). (2) It presents desire ('minor
sovereign') as the passage for the speaking subject.
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(3) It goes back to immediate sense-certainty in Hegel,
overcoming Erfahrung as the experience of self-
consciousness since returning to the radical moment in
experience, which takes place for Hegelian
consciousness 'behind its back 1 . These conditions have
no hierarchical order, although for Kristeva the first
is what saves Bataillean fiction from missing its mark.
4. Constitutive and Consummating Desire
A reading of Hegel and Bataille demonstrates
how, for philosophy, desire arises on the
path of the constitution of unity, while for
Bataille it is, in reverse [a rebours], the
path of its consummation, its annihilation.
(EP, p.113)
Kristeva's textual reading of the dialectic of desire
in the Phenomeriology of Spirit is discreditable for
mistaking the outset of the dialectic for its outcome.
The significance drawn from the dialectic - 'desire is
the essence of self-consciousness' - makes a nonsense
of Hegelian Erfahrung, in which 'desire discovers that
self-consciousness is not the essence of desire' , and
thereby fetishizes moments of the Hegelian text.
Nevertheless, a premature challenge to Kristeva t s way
out of Hegel through Bataille would succumb to a self-
defeating external return to Hegel. The import of
Kristeva's reformulation of Lacan for the explicit and
implicit returns to Hegel must be discovered by way of
her presupposition of the 'achieved dialectic'
In Hegel, desire (Begierde) is a moment in
the constitution of self-consciousness: it is
thus a particularisation and a concretisation
of negativity, a representation of its at
once most differentiated and most suppressed
movement, it is an achieved dialectic. (EP,
p. 113)
The analysis	 of	 Begierde underlies both	 the
interpretation of Hegelian 'experience', 'force', and
'negation',	 and	 the	 assertion	 that	 speculative
exposition resubmits not only to the 'theological'
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unitary subject but to modern philosophy's
justification of the subject's 'juridical corollary,
the State' (ER, p. 115). Kristeva's reading of the
dialectic of desire is a crux of her estimation of
reason and practice after Freud. In Kristeva's thought
Begierde is the most 'open' configuration of Hegelian
phenomenology. Its moments expose philosophy to the
discoveries of psychoanalysis. They portray the
'essence' of the monotheist subject - for the
materialist thinker who will come to read the dialectic
against the grain (a rebours) in order to put
philosophy's exposure to the discoveries of
p sychoanalysi s into effect as a materialist practice:
Bataille.
Bataillean 'operations' exceed the limit of avant-garde
experience - subject to Hegel's criticism of the
'flight from the finite' - because the return to Hegel
engages the theological instance, and displaces the
inverse of it that is engendered in the sublimation of
heterogeneity (fetish, objet petit a). The disclosure
of heterogeneity therefore goes by way of the
transformation of Hegelian 'desire', arising 'on the
path of the consitution of unity' (ibid.).
In Kristeva's account, Hegelian dialectic is not only
the explication of Christian idealism, but the site
where the f1ux' of negativity exceeding discourse and
judgement breaks through into philosophical thought.
The philosophical project - having always been on the
path of 'the One' - shows the trace of heterogeneity
once idealism reaches its summit in Hegel, 	 as
dialectical exposition.
The appraisal of Begierde as a homogenizing but
inherently divided trajectory rehearsing that of Life,
the 'fluidity of the differences', in the element of
the unity of certainty and of consciousness (EP, p.
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113) is taken from the following passage in the
Phenomenol ogy.
The simple I [Moi] is this genus or the
simple universal, for which the differences
are nothing [néant], but it is this only when
it is the negative essence of the independent
moments which have formed themselves. Thus,
self-consciousness is certain of itself only
by superseding this other which presents
itself to it as independent life; it is
desire, certain of the nullity of this other,
it posits this nothingness for it [pour moil
as proper truth, annuls the independent
object and so gives itself the certainty of
itself as true certainty which has therefore
come to be for it [pour elle) in an objective
form. 20
'We note', states Kristeva, 'the "paranoid mark" in the
path of desire: self-consciousness constitutes itself
through the supersession of the other, or of the Other,
and desire is this supersession itself' (EP, p. 113).21
Kristeva apprehends the movement of supersession of the
object which is Hegelian desire and, having presupposed
self-certainty as the outcome of the movement, takes
this movement to be the 'essence' of self-
consciousness: 'The movement of scission continues and
is the very essence of self-consciousness,
corresponding to desire'. Hegelian self-consciousness
is consequently taken to be a 'paranoid' unity because
its essence (path) is the movement of scission. This is
why the dialectic can be approved as a chink in
philosophy which Lacan extends into the articulation of
what is glimpsed there; which, in turn, begins to be a
practice in Bataille.
Kristeva's move between Lacan and Bataille's 'post-
Hegelianisms' can be witnessed in the following passage
from tLtexpérience et la pratique', which I have
divided accordingly. With respect to Lacan:
Hegel states a truth about the subject that
Lacan will made explicit: the subject is only
paranoid under the impulse of desire which
sublimates and unifies the schizoid rupture
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in a quest for objects; paranoia is thereby
not only the precondition of every subject -
one becomes a subject only by accepting, be
it provisionally, the paranoid unity which
supersedes the {heterogeneous] other - but
dwells in immediate proximity to the
fragmenting [morcellement] that can be called
schizoid, camouflaging its secret even while
drawing on its energy. (EP, p. 113; my
emphasis)
With respect to Bataille:
Although the 'fluidity of the differences'
constitutes the unity of self-consciousness,
it menaces it too, for, in this fluidity
alone there is no more room for any unity of
self-consciousness, any desire, or subjection
(Unterwerfung) to life; on the contrary, what
determines this division is death, the
inorganic, rupture and differentiation with
no unifying fluidity. (EP, p. 113)
The 'consummation' of unity is a process which breaches
the 'paranoid' unity constituted by way of desire qua
the reiterated process of supersession of the other.
The Bataillean process translates law, unity into
desire: 'the thetic-affirmative phase opened onto the
heterogeneity which dissolves it is no longer law,
commandment, unity; it is called desire' (EP, p. 112).
Desire is 'no longer law'. In Kristeva's account
Bataille's sovereign subject is a 'trans-Oedipus',
'knowing' the Oedipus complex as a limit. Kristeva's
psychoanalysis of monotheism therefore opens up the
pre-Oedipal 'subject' as a 'refusal of the new law
through a new fiction' (EP, p. 123). This convergence
of the thetic-affirmative phase, qua process installing
the Oedipal law, and qua Hegelian constitution of self-
consciousness, is a reading of the dialectic of desire
which presupposes the 'self-consciousness' which the
movement of Begierde discovers is not the essence of
its movement.
Lacan's reading of Hegel lies behind the emphasis on
the presence of Hegel in Bataille's theoretical
writings; and on the rendering of Bataillean 'fiction'
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as the expendEture of Hegelian self-consciousness.
Kristeva	 accepts	 from	 Lacan,	 first,	 that
phenomenological experience is teleological, an
experience 'of knowledge' from the beginning.22 Second,
and consequently, she accepts the concept of desire
('desire divides the subject from itself') as a
strictly psychoanalytic discovery.
5. Experience, out of Erfahrung
If it is possible for others, for Orientals
whose imagination doesn't burn at the names
of Theresa, HeloIse, Isolde, to abandon
themselves to empty infinity with no other
desire, we cannot conceive of ultimate
collapse in a way other than love. At this
price alone, it seems to me, I get access to
the extreme limit of what is possible and if
not, something is missing from the path in
which I can't help but burn everything -
right up to the exhaustion of human strength.
(Bataille, L'expérience intérieure, p. 154)
The expenditure of the 'achieved I' orients Bataillean
'experience' (and desire) through Hegelian desire (and
experience) because the passage through desire is a
condition of western society: 'Bataille takes up this
unified consciousness and leads it backwards (a
rebours) through desire and without a "middle" term, to
the moment of experience it has forgotten t (EP, p.
115).
The 'Hegelian' unity of certainty and self-
consciousness on whose path desire arises involves a
'mystery' for the experience of consciousness, and - in
Kristeva - for the philosophical knowledge which
'rests' on it. Hegel's 'Introduction' to the
Phenomenology states the 'void', for consciousness, in
the movement of experience: the necessity of the
transition to a new configuration takes place for
consciousness 'behind its back' . Kristeva hypostatizes
this void in the transition from immediate sense-
certainty to self-consciousness.23
57
in the whole of its trajectory the Hegelian
dialectic starts by dissolving the immediate
unity, given to sense-certainty; but, having
noted the moments of its division, of its
doubling and its mediation with respect to
the other, the dialectic comes back to the
same, fills it with the other and
consolidates it.... This is the ambiguousness
of the idealist dialectic; it posits
division, movement and process [procès] but
discards them in the same move, in the name
of a higher metaphysical and repressive
truth, which will be '. self-consciousness' and
its juridical corrolary - the State. (EP, pp.
114-5)
Bataillean experience (consummation of unity) is
located in this 'void' , not in immediate sense-
certainty as such, but at the Hegelian point of
discarding it in the constitution of self-
consciousness. It is therefore a 'refusal' of mediation
and a breaching of the accomplishment of the reasoning
subject, one which must therefore go by way of its -
Occidental - essence: 'it is to an achieved "I" [moi]
that the heterogeneous appears as desire and eroticism
in the moment when desire exhausts the "I"' (EP, p.
115).
This reading of Hegel situates the transition out of
immediate sense-certainty in the configuration of
'desire'. The negation of the 'simple and independent
substance' - 'foundation' of sense-certainty - is
clinched with the negation of 'independent life',
producing an insistence on self-consciousness as 'the
negation of the object in its alterity' and 'its
introduction into the knowing subject' (EP, p. 113).
Hegel's dialectic is held to reveal the essential
moments in the constitution of subject, law, State. It
is desire, not as mediation but - because of mediation
- as reversal that explodes the 'lure' of unity:
unseating 'power in our society' (ibid.). Bataillean
'negativity' encounters the social and familial
interdict, whose traversal by desire is a return to
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immediate experience. Experience is a destruction of
western reason and its political corollaries 'right up
to the exhaustion of human strength', including,
therefore the stasis or ephemeral arrest - ipse, the
initial and conditional affirmation of the subject,
'lost in the unknown' (EP, p. 116).
in fusion neither ipse nor the whole
subsists, it is the annihilation of
everything which is not the final 'unknown',
the abyss where one founders.(L'expérience intérieure, p. 148)
In Kristeva's theory of symbolization, and therefore
her genealogy of civilization, Bataillean 'sovereignty'
corresponds to the introduction of the heterogeneous.
It presents the supersession of 'Hegelian' negativity
by way of Freud: re-jection as the expenditure of
stasis traversed through desire.
6. The 'Subject in Process'
At this point it is necessary to recall and
reintroduce the unitary, relational and
social manner Marxism. inherited from
Feuerbach in order to think the subject;
thus, to take up once more the subject which
calls itself 'I' {moi] and which struggles in
a social community - out of its social
position; to seize this discourse and the
historico-social contradiction it represents,
and to renew in each of its representations
the heterogeneous contradiction that 'class
consciousness' had suspended and of which the
poets had made themselves the explorers. It
is not a 'joining' of two sides, prior to
constituting some ideal totality: it is a
question of their throwing light on one
another and so restoring to the subject its
internal/external	 motility,
	
and	 thusjouissance, through/across [a travers] the
risk of its social combat which gives it its
liberty in the implacable logical constraints
of its political struggle. (SP, pp. 103-4)
The last of Kristeva's early essays under discussion,
'Le sujet en procès '
	 ( many passages of which
contribute to the middle Sections of Revolution in
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PoeUc	 Language,	 those	 on	 'Rejection'	 and
'Heterogeneity'), sets out the problematic informing
all her writings. I shall argue that the 'two sides' of
Kristeva's 'subject', which emerge clearly in the above
passage, involves a Hegelian problematic which
underlies both the revolutionary emphasis in the early
work and the negotiation of 'law' in the later
writings. This is also to say that the 'abandonment' of
Naoism (by Kristeva along with the Tel Quel collective
as a whole) and the turn to psychoanalysis is quite
consistent with the mapping out of the question of the
subjective and socio-historical process (procès) in the
early 1970s: both the commendation of Maoist theory and
practice and then the articulation of psychoanalytic
theory and practice are responses to this 'mapping'.
The impression that Kristeva's work abandons
'revolution' for 'reformation' or even 'quietism', must
be led back to the sustained enquiry into the 'sujet en
procês'. Kristeva's treatments of the subject-in-
process show the search for a 'site' which is not 'some
ideal totality' constituted on the joining of the split
subject; but is a 'site' on which the sides may 'throw
light on each other'
The problematic of this 'site' derives from Kristeva's
relation to Hegel. The two inversions of Hegel
presented in this chapter - the Marxist and the
Freudian - produce the divided subject in question.
While the encounter, via Hegel, of Marx and Freud does
interrogate 'the subject-object relation', this is the
'weak' side of Kristeva's thesis, which posits Hegelian
self-consciousness as 'negation of the object in its
alterity'. It is the 'explicit' return to Hegel in
Kristeva's writings. The problematic of Kristeva's
divided suject contains the implicit return to Hegel,
since it is here that her problematic is closest to
Hegelian subject-substance, even if her position has
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emerged from and at the cost of a premature exit from
Hegel.
The division of Kris
first, the Marxist sul
in a social community,
second, the Freudian
pleasure principle'
heterogeneity emerges.
eva's 'subject' thus presents
ect, the subject who struggles
out of its social position; and
'split'	 subject 'beyond the
it of which the relation to
This means that Kristeva's embracing of psychoanalysis
in no way abandons the discourse of historical
materialism, but argues precisely for a focus on its
themes: 'to renew in each of its representations the
heterogeneous contradiction that "class consciousness"
had suspended and of which the poets had made
themselves the explorers' (SP, p. 105).
Kristeva's appreciation of Bataillean 'fiction' derives
precisely from the intricacy of her concept of 'socio-
historical process' This concept is critical of the
Marxist conception of the subject, but aims to dispel
the 'mechanical' historicity which is its fate rather
than the root of that fate: the notion of determination
by the relations of production from which emerges the
subject's 'struggle' out of its social position.
Kristeva discovers in Bataille a response to her
problematic in part because Bataille knows the problem
of the 'suspension' of heterogenous contradiction in
'class consciousness'. More importantly, his non-
abdication of the thetic-affirmative moment
acknowledges the socio-historical contradiction which
Marxist discourse represents. Bataillean fiction is in
full knowledge of the limitation of avant-garde
literature and the poet 'explorers', but does not
revert to a mechanistic conception of history with its
'atomic' subject. The 'sovereign subject' therefore
formulates what the 'writer' is, beyond the latter's
'subjective-elitist' fate:
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the writer is not only the sole subject in
our culture for whom language is a
heterogeneous contradiction that the social
censure has not repressed, he is also the
sole subject for whom the 'signifieds', the
'ideational contents', the 'themes' are also
heterogeneous contradictions and it is for
this reason that they bear a truth that
symbolic and/or social censure has not been
able to repress. (EP, p. 120)
For Kristeva, therefore, Bataille's text is a response
to her problematic because it 'bears on' the thetic-
affirmative moment in the process of signifiance. My
intention has been to make it clear that this is a
distinctly socio-political difficulty, most clearly
expressed in the presentation of the 'Marxist' and
'Freudian' subjects.
The complexity which faces Kristeva's thesis on the
power of literature to attack the seats of power in our
society (on post-avantgarde 'cultural revolution') is
clearly outlined in the 'Prolegomenon' to Revolution in
Poetic Language:
The text is a practice that could be compared
to political revolution: the one brings about
in the subject what the other introduces into
society. The history and political experience
of the twentieth century have demonstrated
that one cannot be transformed without the
other. (RPL, p. 17)
This statement expresses the separation of 'political'
and 'cultural' (poetic) revolution, and corresponds to
the duality of the subject (the subject in social
relations, whose historico-social contradiction 'class
consciousness' suspends; and the Freudian 'subject'
explored by the poets). Kristeva is enquiring after the
site of 'transformation' of subject and society, given
the difficulty of avoiding the 'escapes' from
heterogeneity without suppressing in a new manner
either the historico-social contradiction or the drive-
related	 'subject'.	 She	 is	 determined	 not	 to
underestimate the task of avoiding a resubmission to
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the 'metaphysicalt and 'monotheist' separation out of
the unity of the subjective and the social. Bataille
is, for Kristeva, the first to attempt an operation on
this 'site':
It is in and through this splitting [of
knowledge and jouissance] that power is
installed as oppressive force: the subject
who knows... exercises a power which is
confused with state power and, more and more,
tends to substitute itself for it; as for
jouissance, one preserves for it dark rooms,
alcoves or recesses in religion. The
operation Bataille attempts effaces this
splitting and makes a contradiction of it:
for jouissance to be that of a subject, it
must contain the instance of knowledge
[savoir] where the subject is accomplished;
and, bound up with this - in order that
knowledge be not an exercise of power, but
the operation of a subject - it must discover
in its logic the jouissance that constitutes
it. (EP, p. 119)
Bataille's achievement is the disclosure of the 'unity'
of the subject of knowledge and jouissance by turning
the separation of 'state' and 'religion' into a
contradiction. Such a disclosure or 'operation'
therefore aims at the seats of power which institute
and sustain the separation, because it aims at the 'I'
whose contradictions are suspended and whose 'power'
comes to be identified with state power.
In Revolution and Poetic Language Kristeva will point
to a limitation of the Bataillean 'operation' in the
conditions of advanced capitalism, whose ramification
'makes it almost impossible for the signifying process
to attack. material and social obstacles, objective
constraints, oppressive entities directly' (RPL, p.
105). There is an intimation of Bataille's limitation
in the earlier essay: 'Linguistic subversion can join
with ideological subversion, as in Joyce. Bataille does
not always touch the verbal substance: it is perhaps a
limitation of his experience which nevertheless has the
advantage of facilitating its communicability' (EP, p.
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120). The crucial claim of Revolution in Poetic
Language is the necessity of an attack on the
'signifying structures' (linguistic subversion). This
estimation of Bataille, which delimits the force of the
attack on the 'seats of power', is intrinsic to the
focus on symbolization in Revolution in Poetic
Language. Only the theory of 'symbolization' puts
poetic language onto a terrain on which the stages in
cultural revolution can be analysed and evaluated.
I suggested above that the 'prematurity' within
Kristeva's genealogy of culture of her focus on the
Science of Logic was 'remedied' in the doctoral thesis
by her theory of 'symbolization'. Two difficulties
arise in this 'turn to language' . The first is that it
retains the problem of the 'limit' discussed above,
arising from Kristeva's departure from the Science of
Logic before the exposition of the Kantian and Fichtean
Sollen. The second is that it tends to obscure the
profounder relation to Hegel, which presents itself in
the thesis of the separation of the 'subject', as the
subject 'who knows', who is in a social struggle, and
who is 'split' by the drives. The avoidance of the
subject-substance relation in the Phenomenology of
Spirit is cemented by Kristeva's arrival at the
'separated' subject through an inversion of Hegel. The
'inversion' of Hegel in the early writings is
inseparable from their revolutionary standpoint; and
yet it is never requestioned, even when that standpoint
is abandoned.
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Summary and Conclusion
Chapter 1 has established that the passage through and
inversion of 'Hegeliant negativity and 'self-.
consciousness' produces the three stages of Kristevan
logic (the logic of determination, of the signifier,
and of matter in contradiction). The stages proceed
from a construction of the Hegelian 'system 4 which re-
presents Hegel's unfolding of Kant and Fichte's
practical philosophy. The salient critical points to
emerge from the above analysis of the place of Hegel in
Kristeva's early texts are the following:
(1) The logic of the concept, designated as the law of
signification, relies on the failure to grasp Hegel's
're-cognition' of the Kantian Grenze.
(2) The logic of the signifier, affirmed as release
from totality and 'union' of finite and infinite,
'passing' the limit, retains an aspect of the concept
of Schranke. The release is 'always' from this finite
(meaning as homogeneous, the 'thinking subject', 'the
One').
(3) The logic of matter, the 'other of one', is meant
to counter the idealist Sollen, but it bypasses its
dialectic and retains the moment of absolute
opposition. As a result the 'logic' of the signifier
does not step out of Hegel's unfolding of the Sollen in
Kant and Fichte's practical philosophy. It does not
step out of the concept of infinity which posits a
'double result', since there is both a claim to the
union of finite and infinite and an endless projection
of that union owing to the absolute contradiction of
finite and infinite. The logic of matter (matter in
contradiction) ,presents an 'irreducible' opposition of
'meaning' and 'n1tter', and retains 'matter' as an 'in
itself'. Kristeva's materialist dialectical logic
suffers from the transcendental pitfall which results
from 'taking the infinite in one of the two unities as
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the in itself'. The logic of production thus maintains
an 'in itself' whose problematic is that of the
relation to the 'law' (symbolic) it would transform.
The transformation of the 'symbolic' is the crux of
Kristeva's claim that modern literature is a signifying
practice. The insistence on the notion of the 'text'
has led to an uneasy opposition between the history of
western monotheism (and western 'thought') and an open
typology of poetic language, a typology which
nevertheless presents advances in the diclosure of the
fundamental structures of western civilization. This
opposition reinforces the	 'refusal'	 of Hegelian
philosophy of history, even though Kristeva's
problematic begins as and remains Hegelian. It begins
as Hegelian because the explicit return to Hegel
contributes to Kristeva's determination of the meaning
and value of 'literature'; and because this meaning and
value is expounded as the inseparability of 'logic' and
'politics'. It remains as Hegelian because Kristeva's
construal of and departure from the 'system' re-
presents the unfolding of Kant and Fichte's practical
philosophy in the Science	 of Logic.	 Hegelian
'necessity', reduced by Kristeva to a 'law' of
contradiction which could not account for the movement
of the dialectic, is never approached. The
comprehension of the meaning of 'necessity' in Hegel
requires a comprehension of the moments of the Sollen
as an absolute contradiction, and not only as the
'formalism' of (im)possibility' which remains the
starting-point for Kristeva's materialist rethinking of
transcendental philosophy.
Kristeva's claim to have determined and rethought the
'revolutionary value' of Hegelian logic leads to the
appearance of historical stages in the 'practice' of
poetic language (the avant-garde, Bataille, Joyce,
Céline). It is the concept of infinity, held to be
'concrete' in the logic of the signifier, that
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underlies the claim to transitions in poetic
'practice t , and hence to Kristeva's estimation of 'art'
as the site of critique in modern social and political
relations (as the presentation of their
contradictions). The details of the 'sublation' of
Flegel, however, show that the claim for 'art' is
insecure, and that Kristeva's 'infinite' leads to a
difficulty in assessing the differences between the
stages in poetic 'practice' which have been proposed.
It will be seen in chapters 2 and 3 that the founding
distinction between the 'semiotic' and the 'symbolic'
Kristeva's reformulation of Freud and Lacan - clarifies
the two unities of finite and infinite by expounding
the moments of 'symbolization'. The difficulty of
Kristeva's 'infinite' - how it is related to the 'law'
it would transform - emerges more clearly as the
failure to recognize mediation in what is to be
transformed. Part I below will recapitulate Kristeva's
theory of symbolization, and the 'Intertext' which then
follows returns to the philosophical problem, showing
how Hegel's early engagement with the Fichtean and
Schellingean systems expounded the pitfalls of
subjective and objective idealism that Kristeva's
concept of 'practice' does not overcome.
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PART ONE
RENEWAL OF VIOLENCE: ON HUMAN LAW
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Introduction to Part I
The following discussion of Kristeva's doctoral thesis
considers its treatment of the connection between the
social subject and the subject known to psychoanalysis.
The relation proposed between these 'subjects' presents
the condition for the historical impact of the practice
of 'poetic language', and hence of practice in
Kristeva's full sense. Revolution in Poetic Language
thus focusses the problematic outlined in the
conclusion to chapter 1 above - the claim that
'literature' is a socio-historical practice; and
expounds the moments of the logic of the signifier by
way of a theory of symbolization which arises from the
reformulation of the Lacanian 'symbolic'.
The reformulation of the Lacanian symbolic into the
'semiotic t
 and the 'symbolic' provides an account of
the engendering of the latter: a theory of
symbolization that is informed by Klein's elaboration
of the pre-Oedipal stages of child development, and
which returns to Freud's theory of the drives for the
materialist	 determination	 of	 the	 intrsymbolic
'semiotic' functioning. The reformulation of Lacan's
concepts of the 'symbolic' and the 'imaginary'
nevertheless maintains the former as a founding event:
the entrance into language. The theory of symbolization
and the genealogy of culture which rests on it are
therefore based on a foundation distinction between the
'semiotic' and the 'symbolic'.
The recapitulation of Kristeva's thesis roughly follows
the development of its theoretical part, in order to
demonstrate that the 'political' problematic is
fundamental to her theory of symbolization.l Part I
recapitulates,	 first,	 the	 criticism	 of	 the
philosophical and Marxist response to what is diagnosed
as the	 'crisis in our sociality';
	 second,	 the
rethinking of
	 'negativity'	 on	 the	 terrain of
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psychoanalysis (of the 'subject', 'struggle',
'freedom'); and finally, the return to the notion of a
'social' moment of practice.
The early theory of the 'semiotic' expounds a
materialist logic of negativity (drive re-jection)
which accounts for the bifurcation of the 'subject' of
revolution. The objective, here, is to show that the
consequences of the division of Kristeva's 'subject'
into a 'poetic' and a 'social' subject stems from the
primacy of the 'split' subject known to psychoanalysis.
The separation which holds between an implicit process
and a moment of social action is crucial for the
different approach to the meaning of the 'semiotic' in
the later writings. The later works foreground how the
retrieval of the 'semiotic' affects our evaluation of
the 'imaginary's' function and effects in existing
social and political relations. This change in focus on
the implications of the 'semiotic' corresponds to
Kristeva's transition from a Maoist politics to an
ethics of psychoanalysis.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVOLUTION IN POETIC LANGUAGE: THE 'SEMIOTIC' AND THE
'SYMBOLIC'
Introduction
The chapter will establish how the account of
symbolization developed in Kristeva's doctoral thesis
is called to resolve the difficulties encountered in
the early essays, difficul.ties which arose as a result
of the direct approach to Hegel's Science of Logic. The
attempt to overcome the philosophical abstraction
Kristeva perceived in all idealist treatment of the
'subject' led, in the early essays, to an astract
analysis of the concept of the 'limit'. The relation
between the philosophical categories of finite/infinite
and the literary functioning of the semiotic did not
step out of this abstraction.
The elaboration of symbolization, Kristeva's 'thetic
phase', provides an account of the 'producible'
positing subject. The theory of the 'semiotic' and
'symbolic' attributes to idealist philosophy in general
the theoretical and practical contradictions that
result from the notion of an absolute 'positing
subject' .	 In Revolution in Poetic Language Husserl
stands for philosophical idealism, and represents
Hegel's 'phenomenological descendant' (RPL, p. 116).
Kristeva's 'thetic phase' is a solution to the
practical contradictions which result from placing the
formal 'positing subject' as origin of the
determination of objective existence; and to the
theoretical agnosticism this subject represents when it
leaves on one side the irreducible fact of the external
world. Kristeva's 'thetic phase' reconfigures the
'thetic moment' attributed to Husserl's phenomenology
within a concept of production which does not posit an
absolute 'origin'. The theory of the 'semiotic' and
'symbolic' expounds the possibility of the producible
positing subject.
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The 'thetic phase' also accounts for the transformative
potential of poetic language. The relation between the
emergence of the capitalist mode of production and the
emergence of literature as poetic language, together
with the problematic of the conditions required for the
fulfilment of literature's transformative potential, is
presented by Kristeva as a cycle of determination which
avoids posing any of the terms as a cause or origin.
The following chapter will first address Kristeva's
diagnosis of a 'crisis in our sociality' induced by the
capitalist mode of production, in order to bring to
light the socio-historical dimension of the concept of
poetic language expounded in the early essays. It will
recapitulate her presentation of the 'semiotic' and the
'symbolic', the account of 'symbolization', by way of
its conceptual emergence in the passage from Husserl's
philosophy and through Lacan's return to Freud.
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A. Poetic Language in the Capitalist Mode of
Production
Revolution in Poetic Language presents Kristeva's
notion of the 'signifying process' (signifiance), a
practical concept which arises from the reformulation
of the Lacanian symbolic, and which clarifies the
'logic of the signifier' elaborated in her early
essays. The doctoral thesis situates the notion of the
'signifying process' in a complex relationship to the
development of capitalist society and the modern state
(the latter referred to as capitalism's 'ideological
systems', RPL, p. 210). It therefore illuminates the
socio-historical dimension of Kristeva's concept of
'poetic language' by presenting the 'place' of avant-
garde and modern literature in, respectively, early and
post-industrial capitalist society.
My first chapter has argued that Kristeva developed a
radical materialism out of a reformulation, through
Freud's theory of the drives, of the Marxist inversion
of Hegel. In Revolution in Poetic Language the concept
of 'poetic language' is addressed more profoundly in
social and political terms. Here, the turn to a radical
materialism arises from the perceived failures of
liberal and Marxist political thought in the face of
the power of capitalism to renew itself. Kristeva's
question is twofold: what has the potential to
countervail the power of capitalism to renew itself?;
and what are the conditions for the fulfilment of this
potential as the 'transformation' of those conditions?
First, Kristeva diagnoses the emergence of avant-garde
literature in the late nineteenth-century as an effect
of the development of the capitalist mode of
production. She then argues for the potential of
'poetic language' to transform the conditions of its
own appearance. Subsequently, she assesses the power of
avant-garde, and then modern, literature to fulfil its
potential in the face of 'capitalism's' power to
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marginalize and exploit the results of literature's
work of negativity. Thus 'poetic language' owes its
realization, and limitations, to the capitalist mode of
production: first, because the latter is the condition
of the 'appearance' of poetic language (determination
of the 'subject'); second, because these 'objective
conditions' ,	 including the social and political
relations they reinforce, are the object of
literature's transformative work (determination of the
'object'); but third, 'capitalism' itself proscribes
the 'power' of its offspring, exploiting that power for
its own regeneration.
For Kristeva, the 'crisis of our sociality', which can
be expounded by analysing the relation between
'capitalism' and 'poetic language', is based in the
appropriative operations of a capitalist culture vis-à-
vis the forms of 'negativity' it allows to emerge. The
significance of the development of the capitalist mode
of production for the two major modalities of
'signifying practice' discussed in Revolution in Poetic
Language is therefore double-edged; both for the avant-
garde 'poetic language' (represented by Lautréamont and
Mallarmé), and for the modern (sometimes 'postmodern')
'poetic language' (exemplified for Kristeva by Artaud,
Bataille, Joyce and Céline).2
The substantial point at issue in Kristeva's discussion
of the capitalist culture of late nineteenth-century
France is the 'spectacular nature' of the effects of
the capitalist mode of production on the 'subject', on
'reason', and on 'art'. For Kristeva, these effects are
incomparable with regard to those of previous
transitions in the mode of production:
this crisis represents a new phenomenon. For
the capitalist mode of production produces
and marginalizes, but simultaneously exploits
for its own regeneration, one of the most
spectacular shatterings of discourse. (RPL,
p. 15)
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I will address the effect of this 'shattering of
discourse' on the subject, reason and art in turn.
1. The 'Subject' in the Modern State
At the end of the nineteenth-century, the
deep dissatisfactions of the working classes
- from the peasantry to the petty bourgeoisie
- impoverished by the bourgeois State's
accumulation of capital, erupted in a series
of revolutions from 1848 to the 1871 Commune.
(RPL, p. 210)
Kristeva argues for a crisis - a 'shattering' - of the
subject which takes place at this period owing to the
emergence of the capitalist mode of production and the
complicity between political revolution and political
consolidation. The 'subject' here is the political
subject ('bearer' of rights) and the social subject (in
relations	 of production and reproduction). 	 The
intractability	 of	 the	 concept	 (for	 Kristeva,
'ideology') of right - fundament of the bourgeois
political structures (for Kristeva, 'ideological
systems') - leaves the subject 'shattered'. 'Right' in
Kristeva's thesis does not only express the duplicity
of 'rights and duties' in which the individual's
relation to the state may be compromised by a 'bad'
state. The crisis of the subject lies specifically in
the import of 'capitalism', first, for the subject of
rights and duties (for it permits the subject, beyond
its 'duties', the right to revolt), and second, for the
state (it permits the state, 'beyond' its duties, to
subdue and consolidate revolt). The capitalist mode of
production is therefore held to determine a complicity
betwe.en political revolution and political
consolidation in France in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
Capitalism leaves the subject the right to
revolt, preserving for itself the right to
suppress that revolt. The ideological systems
capitalism proposes, however, subdue, unify,
and consolidate that revolt, bringing it back
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within the field of unity (that of the
subject and the State). (RPL, p. 210)
In Kristeva's view neither the 'political t subject of
liberal thought nor the 'revolutionary' subject of
Marxist thought can think itself in the face of the
capitalist mode of production: each denies its
shattered nature - and is therefore 'ideological'. The
political subject misrecognizes both itself and its
institutions as integral, while the 'revolutionary'
subject misrecognizes the 'truth' of its negativity
(its revolutionary 'agency'). Such a misrecognition
takes place when revolutionary discourse confines
'negativity' to objective contradictions, to which it
then ascribes a 'bearer' for the 'moment' of practice:
'Since it is not a theory of the subject, Marxist
theory does not deal with this moment of practice'
(RPL, p. 202).
Kristeva's demand for a rethinking of the modern
political and the revolutionary subject rests on the
'misrecognition' which is structural to the attempt
both to consolidate and to overturn the bourgeois
state. Kristeva's own response to the aftermath of the
French Revolution - the 'series of revolutions' and
their political outcome - is to discover the source for
rethinking the 'subject' in the transition from
'political' to 'cultural' revolution (the 'avant-garde'
transformation in literature).
When objective conditions were not such that
this state of tension could be resolved
through revolution, rejectiOn became
symbolized in the avant-garde texts of the
nineteenth century where the repressed truth
of a shattered subject was then confined.(RPL, p. 211)
The avant-garde literature of the period is the source
for this rethinking of the subject because it displays
- symbolically - the truth' of the modern, liberal,
political subject and its institutions, and also of the
revolutionary subject. The 'truth' of the subject,
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Kristeva proposes, is repressed both by the late
nineteenth-century 'ideological systems' and by the
theoretical articulations of the dissatisfactions they
reproduce (the mystic positivism of Comte; Marx; the
utopians; the French anarchists, RPL, p. 210).
The repressed is confined to the avant-garde not only
as a result of the 'ideological' representations of the
subject, but because the capitalist mode of production
in its primitive state fails to undermine the
rearticulations of the subject of right (including the
right to revolt). Kristeva's notion of the 'repressed
truth' of the subject argues that it is manifest in
avant-garde literature and attains its scientific
'discovery' in Freud's theory of the unconscious (RPL,
p. 81).
The 'possibility' of a functioning of this repressed
'truth' within the symbolic order is articulated by
means of a reformulation of Lacan which results in a
'drive'-based theory of symbolization. Semiotic
'functioning' in the symbolic is the 'return' of the
process of production of the symbolic. The 'unity' of
the semiotic and the symbolic or reproduction of the
semiotic functioning is called the 'signifying process'
(signifiance) (RPL, p. 24). The latter is the repressed
and unrecognized 'truth' of the political subject and
of revolutionary discourse.
The materialist amplification of 'Hegelian' negativity,
which leads to Kristeva's economic concept of
'rejection', articulates the mode of activity of the
signifying process. These concepts, 'rejection' and
'signifying process' will be fully treated in the later
sections of this chapter and in chapter 3. For the
present, my object is to highlight the social and
political analysis informing Kristeva's thought in
Revolution in Poetic Language.
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Kristeva's demand to rethink the 'subject' embraces the
thought of the subject in the Marxist response to
'bourgeois ideology' . Kristeva sees no potential in a
political science or dialectical materialism which
ignores the significance (for thinking 'negativity':
the 'subject', 'struggle', social transformation) of
the avant-garde 'cultural revolution' . The nineteenth-
century avant-garde is held to be the manifestation, or
'symbolization', of what liberal and revolutionary
discourse cannot grasp: the truth of the 'shattered'
subject.
Revolution in Poetic Language therefore argues that it
is only by combining an analysis of the cultural
revolution represented by the avant-garde with the
Marxist comprehension of the objective determinations
of political revolution that the 'true' determinations
of Marxist 'practice' can be assessed. In default of a
recognition of the import of the avant-garde for the
'crisis in our sociality' instituted by the capitalist
mode of production, the Marxist dialectic will remain
enclosed within the philosophical idealism it claims to
have overturned. Marxism has failed to provide a
materialist theory of the 'subject'
2. The Effect on 'Reason': Science and its Objects
The archivistic, archaeological, and
necrophilic methods on which the scientific
imperative was founded - the building of
arguments on the basis of empirical evidence,
a systernatizable given, and an observable
object - in this case language - are an
embarrassment when applied to modern or
contemporary phenomena. The methods show that
the capitalist mode of production has
stratified language into idiolects and
divided it into self-contained, isolated
islands - heteroclite spaces existing in
different temporal modes (as relics or
projections), and oblivious of one another.
(RPL, pp. 13-14)
78
The emergence of the capitalist mode of production has
an effect on 'thought' in general, out of which emerges
the determination of the avant-garde as a locus of the
symbolization of signifiance. The 'fragmenting' effect
of capitalism holds not only for the social and
political 'subject' but also for the sciences and their
objects, amongst which linguistics with its formalized
object (discussed in chapter 1 above), is exemplary.
the thinking subject, the Cartesian subject
who defines his being through thought or
language, subsumes within that being and the
operations which supposedly structure it, all
trans-linguistic practice - a practice in
which language and the subject are merely
moments. From this perspective, the
philosophy of language and the 'human
sciences' that stem from it emerge as
reflections on moments. ('Prolegomenon', RPL,
p. 14; my emphasis)
In the 'theoretical section' of Kristeva's doctoral
thesis the turn to a radical 'materialism' develops out
of structural linguistics and philosophies of language
and meaning (Saussure, Chomsky, Benveniste, Husserl,
Hjelmslev, Frege). The 'privileging' of the object
'language' means that it is not merely one case in the
diagnosis of the fragmented sciences and their objects.
The same cannot be said, however - despite the
combination 'thought or language' in the passage last
quoted - for 'thought'. Thought, for Kristeva, is
always the 'Cartesian thinking subject'. This has
profound consequences for her deployment of Hegel's
Phenomonology of Spirit in the rest of her book.
It is 'language' which has not only an exemplary but
also a substantial - essential - position in the
rethinking of the subject undertaken in Revolution in
Poetic Language and throughout Kristeva's writings.
Language is where the 'signifying process' - repressed,
confined or exploited by the modern state and
'capitalism' - takes place. This is of course entirely
consistent with Kristeva's identification of the entry
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into language with the constitution of the subject in
social relations (the 'symbolic order'). The
contemporary sciences of language - out of structural
linguistics, to semiotics, structural anthropology and
psychoanalysis - have been able to 'reveal' the
Cartesian subject's subsumption of all 'trans-
linguistic practice' (RPL, p. 14). It is therefore to
these sciences, and above all psychoanalysis, that
Kristeva goes for her rethinking of the 'subject' in
modern social and political relations.
We will make constant use of notions and
concepts borrowed from Freudian
psychoanalytic theory and its various recent
developments in order to give the advances of
dialectical logic a materialist foundation -
a theory of signification based on the
subject, his formation, and his corporeal,
linguistic, and social dialectic. (RPL, pp.
14-15)
The founding distinction between the 'semiotic' and
'symbolic' which emerges from this deployment of
psychoanalysis is discussed below. Kristeva's analysis
of the development of the capitalist mode of production
and its political structures presents the reformulation
of Lacanian psychoanalysis in its historical and socio-
political dimension; that is to say, it expounds the
conception of a 'shattering of discourse' determined by
the capitalist mode of production.
In Revolution in Poetic Language Lacan's language-based
theory of the unconscious represents a crucial step in
the emergence from the positivism of the sciences, and
from their attempt to bring intelligibility into
separate domains without recognizing 'how' their
objects have been determined as indifferent to one
another. Kristeva will build on Lacan's extension of
psychoanalysis into a theory of culture, by way of his
recognition of the function of language in the
unconscious. She will argue that the discoveries of
psychoanalysis enable a disclosure of the tendency in
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the 'textual activity' of avant-garde and modern
literature to confront capitalist culture.
3. The Determination of 'Art'
The capitalist mode of production has a twofold
consequence for 'art' - initially for the 'avant-
garde' , and subsequently for 'modern literature'
First, 'capitalism' produces out of its general effect
(the 'shattering of discourse') the locus in which the
truth of discourse, the signifying process, is manifest
(determination of the subject: avant-garde literature).
The 'shattering of discourse' permits the emergence of
a 'place' for the manifestation of the 'signifying
process' underlying discourse. This is to say that
'capitalism' is the condition of the possibility of the
appearance of the 'avant-garde': it produces a
'transformation in literature' (one of the meanings of
'revolution' in the title of Kristeva's book).3
The second consequence relates to the primitive stage
of the development of the capitalist mode of production
in the late nineteenth-century. The restricted nature
of the forces and relations of production confines the
signifying process'	 to a limited realm, to a
'cultural' revolution. Thus, simultaneously with its
'production' of the manifestation of sign.ifiance in
literature, 'capitalism' confines the 'power' of the
signifying process to the avant-garde, an 'esoteric'
practice. This limitation of the avant-garde was
mentioned in my first chapter when discussing
Kristeva's contrast between the late nineteenth-century
'literary adventure' and Bataille's negotiation of the
'thetic moment'. The avant-garde fails to negotiate the
political developments attendant on the socio-economic
changes of the period.
Kristeva's diagnosis of the condition of the 'avant-
garde' is therefore in brief the following: in the late
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nineteenth-century, consequent upon the developing
capitalist mode of production, literature 'manifests'
the 'process' constitutive of signifying systems,
including the (political, bourgeois) subject and his
institutions (RPL, p. 17); the ('signifying') process
is nevertheless prevented from attacking the political
structures owing to the primitive development of the
forces and relations of production which first
permitted the process to .become 'manifest'. The avant-
garde, necessarily - and not simply because of the
personal disposition of its representatives - neglects
the political. Conversely, the restricted ambitions of
avant-garde literature confines the 'signifying
process' to a subjective realm.
Kristeva deploys Hegel's 'flight from the finite' to
express the limitation of the re-formation of the
'subject' which the avant-garde represents in her
thesis. The avant-garde is a 'cultural' revolution, and
therefore - I here follow Hegel myself - only the re-
formation of subjective disposition in a limited
realm. 4
The text therefore signifies an experience of
heterogeneous contradiction rather than a
practice, which, by contrast, is always
social. The proof may be seen in Mallarmé's
refusal to consider the possibility of a
political activity that would be simultaneous
to textual activity, whatever his well-
founded reasons for criticizing anarchist or
social commitment. (RPL, p. 195)
The subsequent assessment of the role of 'capitalism'
in the emergence of modern literature is similar in
form but substantially different in content and import
to the assessment of the avant-garde.
First of all, the advance from early to post-industrial
capitalism brings about the transition from the avant-
garde 'cultural revolution' to the signifying practice
of 'modern' literature. Second, the power of
'capitalism' to exploit the work of this 'practice'
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counters the potential social and historical impact of
'modern' literature. This is consistent with the
determination of the avant-garde (subjective and
objective genetive). The 'fulfilment' of this potential
for a 'determination of the object' is the Sollen in
Kristeva's 'concept' of poetic language. Formally,
however, 'poetic language' expresses one modality of
art as a signifying practice - albeit its 'achieved'
modality:
the modern text exhibits that which has
always been the disguised mainspring of
'art', hidden behind the appearances of
phantasmatic formations or of exquisite
differentiations in the signifying material.
(RPL, p. 211)
This realization of art - thus also the emergence of
Kristeva's concept of poetic language - permits a
retrospective analysis of art as a 'signifying
practice' throughout the history of western and
monotheist civilization. Kristeva pursues these
analyses in other works.5 Revolution in Poetic Language
expounds the realization of 'art' in avant-garde and
modern literature: 'the modern text already situates
itself outside "art" through "art"' (ibid.).
In Kristeva's thesis the advance to post-industrial
capitalism brings about a renewed modality of 'poetic
language' : 'modern' literature. Nevertheless,
'capitalism' once again restricts the process whose
manifestation in literature it has realized. The
powerful operations of 'capitalism' specific to the
modern period, their source lying in the development of
science and technology in the means of production (RPL,
p. 16), raise difficulties for the socio-historical
impact of modern literature. These difficulties are of
a nature quite different to the limitations of the
avant-garde.
Kristeva presents a more complex structure of the
'determination' of poetic language in its modern form,
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one which resonates throughout her book as the question
of the social efficacy of the 'practice' of poetic
language, or of a 'textual activity' that can
correspond with 'political activity' . This leads - as I
will show - to the Maoism of the later part of the
book, where a 'social' moment, and agent, distinct from
the 'poetic' moment, emerges within Kristeva's notion
of practice.6 Kristeva's Maoism retraverses the
criticism - contained in the presentation of the
'subject in process/on trial' (sujet--en-procês) - of
the 'atomistic subject' of Marxist theory. It
reintroduces a subject of action, whose agency - she
claims - is thrown into a new light by the 'sujet-en-
procês'.
Kristeva's Maoism bears witness to the difficulty of
showing that 'modern literature' both sustains the
practical vocation of the avant-garde cultural
revolution and overcomes its limitations, for the
problematic of modern literary 'practice' achieving a
historical impact is not conceived in terms of the
'flight from the finite'. Mallarmé and Lautréamont
represent the production and presentation of a
revolution in the 'subject', but were unable even more
than unwilling to adopt a political direction,
neglecting the attack on modern political ideology and
institutions. However, it is not this 'flight from the
finite' which is remedied in modern literature. If
modern literature is the potential for a 'determination
of the object', the object has itself undergone a
transition in the conditions of post-industrial
capitalism. The object literature contends with is not
simply, or directly, the 'finite' understood as
capitalism's 'ideological systems' ('the subject, the
State'). The 'shattering effect' of the capitalist mode
of production has itself outreached the 'finite'
systems (which is not to say that it no longer
'proposes' them). The object of the transformative
potential of 'poetic language' cannot be the elements
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('linguistic	 and	 ideological	 norms')	 of	 modern
political 'systems'.
the capitalist mode of production, having
attained a highly developed means of
production through science and technology, no
longer need remain strictly within linguistic
and ideological norms, but can also integrate
their process qua process. (RPL, p. 16)
as to be aware
'e intractable
fragmentation
is not simply
of social and
the capitalist
'Poetic language' in its 'modern' form
of and negotiate a significantly mc
object, the capitalist 'operations' 0:
and integration themselves. Its object
the 'finite' because the undermining
linguistic norms is itself an effect of
mode of production in its late form.
The problem is thus one of introducing the
struggle of signifiance - its process - no
longer just into 'individual experience' -
where, in any case, it already is, since it
is always destroying that experience - but
also into the objective process of
contemporary science, technology and social
relations. (RPL, p. 213, my emphasis)
Nevertheless,	 the level of
	
the	 'shattering of
discourse' in post-industrial capitalism brings
literature as a 'signifying practice' much closer to
its revolutionary potential. It has permitted the
formulation and statement of the second of the
following questions:
at what historical moment does social
exchange tolerate or necessitate the
manifestation of the signifying process in
its 'poetic' or 'esoteric' form? Under what
conditions	 does	 this	 'esoterism' ,	 in
displacing boundaries of socially established
signifying	 practices,	 correspond	 to
socioeconomic change? (RPL, p. 16)
Literature, for Kristeva, is less 'esoteric' in its
modern manifestation. However, there is a third aspect
to the question she poses:
And under what conditions does it remain a
blind alley, a harmless bonus offered by a
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social order which uses this 'esoterism' to
expand, become flexible, and thrive? (ibid.)
Throughout Kristeva's writings the 'theoretical'
response to this question is necessarily in abeyance.
The answer is inseparable from the realization of those
conditions, since Kristeva does not emerge from the the
problematic of determination as a dialectic between
'capitalism' and the 'signifying process' which is
enacted in works of literature.
The capitalist mode of production, then, both fragments
and totalizes, brings about both the shattering of
discourse and the integration of the process whose
manifestation its shattering 'produces'. This poses the
question, for Kristeva's diagnosis, of the
extricability of the 'signifying process' from the
power of capital to renew itself at the expense of the
process.
There must, in Kristeva's thesis, be a 'deeper-seated'
element in the 'economy' of the signifying process if
poetic language is not simply to present this process
where capital's operations permit (on the 'margins'),
and then submit to capitalism's renewed exploitation of
that work. If the 'signifying process' is appropriable
from the integrative and exploitative operations of
capital (from capitalism's regeneration by way of its
repeated process of shattering, fragmentation,
marginalization, integration, and exploitation) two
questions arise:
(i) what 'element' in the 'signifying
process' gives it the necessary margin of
escape from capitalism's recuperative self-
renewal?
(ii) what is specific to literature if it is,
as Kristeva proposes, the 'site' of a renewal
of the 'signifying process' and potentially
an undermining of capitalist culture?
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These questions embrace Kristeva's interrogation of the
possibility of social transformation in modern social
and political relations. They encompass, in the first
case, Kristeva's estimation of the discoveries of
pychoanalysis and, in the second, her estimation of
'art' qua poetic language (most significantly in
contrast to 'thought').
The motivation of the complexity of Kristeva's posing
of the questibn, and of the abstractness of her
concepts	 ('fragmentation',	 'shattering',	 'integra-
tion'), resides in her disillusionment with liberal and
Marxist	 social	 and	 political	 thought.	 The
disillusionment, in turn, rests on Kristeva's
discernment of the poverty of the thinking of the
subject in these traditions, which remain indebted - as
she sees it - to the philosophical tradition in
general, and in particular to a failure in the Marxist
'overturning' of Hegel. Revolution in Poetic Language
demands a rethinking of the possibility of social
transformation beyond the liberal and socialist notions
of the subject: of the 'political' subject ('bearer' of
rights and duties) or the Marxist subject ('bearer' of
objective forces and contradictions). The 'sujet-en--
procês', whose articulation is indebted to
psychoanalysis, is not a 'bearer' but is itself in
process. Kristeva's 'subject in process' is therefore a
response to the perceived atavism of these essentialist
notions of a 'bearer' in the face of the flexibility of
capitalism - of its power to fragment, and to renew
itself.
Her own response to the philosophical tradition, to
Marxist theory, and to the question of what has the
power to countervail the fragmenting and integrating
effects of capitalism, is (as shown in chapter 1) a
dialectical materialism re-formed by Freud's theory of
the drives. Revolution in Poetic Language makes it
clearer why she has	 turned to this	 radical
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'materialism' .
	 The	 emphasis	 in	 'Matière,	 sens,
dialectique' on the logic of matter as fundamental to
the engendering of the 'subject', 'discourse',
'ideology', of 'norms' and 'institutions', and of
'thought' - through to the supposed culmination of
philosophical reason in Hegel's 'system' - stresses the
drive-based ('infinite') element of sigriifiance. The
basis of signifiance in an economy of 'matter'
distinguishes it from the capitalist economy and - in
Kristeva's view - from the development of science and
technology in the capitalist mode of production. It is
an
unlimited and unbounded generating process,
this unceasing operation of the drives
toward, in and through language: toward, in
and through the exchange system and its
protagonists - the subject and his
institutions. (RPL, p. 17)
For those who detect a 'biologism' in Kristeva's route
through Freud's theory of the drives, the relation
proposed between the economy of signifiance and
capitalism's power of self-regeneration is perhaps
unconvincing. The 'biologism' of Kristeva's infinite is
a theme in Kristeva criticism (for example, Culler
1974). Her own thesis claims, however, that the
functioning of the drives is always 'ultimately'
socially and historically determined (passim). It is
the coherence of this argument for a doubly founded
'practice' aiming at socio-historical transformation
which is in question in this chapter. The reduction of
Kristeva's negotiation of the socio-political
problematic to the dimension of its 'biologism' would
pre-empt an interrogation of the implicit return to
Hegel.
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B. The Philosophical and Psychoanalytical 'Bridges' to
the Semiotic: Husserl and Lacan
1. The Philosophical Limit: Limit of Matter
In Revolution in Poetic Language Kristeva solicits
Husserlian phenomenology for the philosophical
presentation of the 'positing' subject. Husserl belongs
within one of two 'trends' in linguistic theory
analysed by Kristeva for their attempt to work out of
the positivist sciences of language and their
formalized object. These trends interrogate what - from
the perspective of the sciences of 'language' - is an
'extra'-linguistic moment	 (RPL,	 p.	 21).	 Husserl
investigates an 'act' of the understanding in
signification and an 'intuition' of matter (hyle).
While hyle comprises 'sensory contents' which include
'impulses' (RPL, p. 33), it is nevertheless - Kristeva
argues - enclosed within the act of the understanding
('omnipresent Meaning and Intention', RPL, p. 31).
The other trend owes its impetus to psychoanalysis and
presents the relation between 'signifier' and
'signified' as not arbitrary but motivated (RPL, p.
22). These two trends exemplify the attempt to emerge
from positivist linguistic theory and are taken by
Kristeva to represent stages on the way to a theory of
language based on a radical materialism indebted to
psychoanalysis.	 Kristeva	 therefore addresses 	 the
substance of this second 'trend' - the discoveries of
psychoanalysis	 -	 rather	 than	 its	 specific
manifestations in theories of language. It is the first
trend, Husserl's philosophy foremost, which is
approached as the 'bridge' to the discoveries of
psychoanalysis.
Kristeva's diagnosis of the 'shattering of discourse'
in the capitalist mode of production has necessitated
this route through linguistics and phenomenology: her
own theory of the 'semiotic' finds its intellectual
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trajectory in the passage from the transcendental ego
in Husserl's philosophy of meaning and signification to
the analysis of the speaking subject which emerges from
the psychoanalytic discovery of the unconscious. This
trajectory is therefore a historical presentation of
the passage from the shattering of the philosophical
'subject' (transcendental ego) to the 'subject in
process' based on the psychoanalytic 'subject'.
In Kristeva's trajectory Benveniste and Husserl are
held to have opened up linguistics to philosophy
through their concept of the 'subject of enunciation'
She will accept and displace the subject of enunciation
in Husserlian phenomenology, arguing for the necessity
- in a theory of intersubjective relations - of
positing the ego 'constitutive' of language acts (RPL,
p. 32), but then following the Lacanian route out of
ego-psychology in order to show that 'communication
with others' is in its turn based on another relation.
Husserl is taken to have 'theologized' the speaking
being by making syntactic competence the product of a
transcendental - 'conscious and intentional' - ego
(RPL, p. 31). Thus, for Kristeva, the transcendental
ego in Husserl's phenomenology represents the 'limit'
of theoretical reason.
The linguistic turn in the work of Husserl and in that
of Lacan leads, respectively, to a theory of language
based on the transcendental ego and a theory of
language based on the subject-Other relation. Lacan's
return to Freud bases the Husserlian relation of
subject, being and meaning (in which the subject is a
'positing' subject) on the subject-Other relation (in
which the subject is 'posited' by the symbolic) (RPL,
p. 41). Husserl's function in this trajectory is to
show how linguistics was opened up to a 'trans'-
linguistic moment by philosophy - by the
phenomenological inquiry into categorial intuition.
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This subject of enunciation, which comes
directly from Husserl and Benveniste,
introduces, through categorial intuition,
both semantic fields and logical - but also
intersubjective - relations, which prove to
be both intra- and trans-linguistic (RPL, p.
23)
Husserl's investigation into categorial intuition draws
the science of linguistics out of the hypostatization
of the object 'language' which had led to an analysis
of signification purely in terms of syntactic position
and predicative relation. The discussion of Husserl's
theory of meaning in Revolution in Poetic Language
addresses his philosophical enquiry into the 'thetic'
or 'positing' moment in signification, i.e. into the
establishment of the 'positionality' necessary to
predication and syntax. It therefore corresponds to
Krjsteva's earlier discussion of the constitutive
activity of the understanding in the 'language act'.
The discussion of Husserl occupies the place of the
earlier discussion of Hegel's treatment of the
'understanding'	 and	 'formal	 proposition'.	 This
substitution has the advantage of facilitating
Kristeva's route to the Lacanian 'symbolic', since the
'linguistic turn' in the thought of both Husserl and
Lacan establishes a correspondence between them.
Husserlian phenomenology is a more fitting 'bridge' to
Lacanian psychoanalysis than Hegel's	 'speculative
proposition', since - although the Cartesianism
informing Kristeva's treatment of 'throught' prevents
her from making the distinction - Hegel is concerned
not with the fixation of the 'object' language but with
the movement of the 'speculative proposition' and its
effect on external reflection, that is to say with the
inhibition 'of thought'
Husserl's 'introduction' of semantic fields and inter-
subjective relations into linguistic theory is
criticized in Revolution in Poetic Language for the
'limit'	 which	 a	 philosophical	 approach	 to
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'consciousness' posits. In Kristeva's view, Husserl's
account of intentional consciousness reduces
'intuition' to intention, and consequently fixes the
'translinguistic', turning it into an origin, a
transcendental ego. She nevertheless discovers in
Husserl's concept of hyle an attempt to articulate a
moment beyond the Cartesian subject's subsumptive
relation to Being,	 a moment independent from
('heterogeneous' to) intentional consciousness.
However, hyle is then denounced as a mere 'projection'
of the positionality of consciousness (RPL, p. 32).
A correlation is made between the hyle
('matter') and the noema: the latter consists
of an 'object', a 'what', a Meaning, and a
'content', a 'development and conceptual
apprehension' forming 'a definite system of
predicates - either formal or material,
determined.., or left "indeterminate"' but
always determinable - of a Signification. The
positing of the glance never loses for a
second its grasp (Meinung) on the always
already detached object for an always already
present subject. (RPL, p. 34)7
For Kristeva, the 'noema' establishes a realm of
signification. The realm of signification 'is always
that of proposition or judgment, a realm of positions'
(RPL, p. 43). Husserl's philosophy of meaning discovers
the condition of the positionality of all
'signification'. lçristeva's argument with Husserl's
philosophy of meaning and concept of hyle is that both
are deduced from 'signification' - resulting in a
circle of 'projection' which makes the thetic character
of 'judgement' absolute. Consequently the investigation
into the 'thetic character' of meaning will indicate an
origin, a positing 'I' (RPL, p. 36) correlative to the
operations of consciousness. The moment of
heterogeneity - intention 'and' intuition - is lost
because the hyle is enclosed within meaning. It is a
'projection of the subject's positionality' (RPL, p.
32).
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There is, further, no 'gap' in consciousness because
meaning is itself a projection. Kristeva's Husserl
introduces intersubjective relations into
signification, but ultimately derives matter and
meaning from signification. The thought of thesis
(naming) and synthesis (predication) attributes both
'activities' to a transcendental ego, an ego which
simply re-presents and unifies the theses within
signifying operations: '.thesis of Being, thesis of the
object, thesis of the ego'.8
Husserl therefore never deviates from a Cartesian
framework. Restricting the functioning of language to
sign and syntax, he fails the investigation of the
thetic moment.
The positing of the subject of understanding
as subject of the sign and of syntax (of
meaning and signification, which is that of a
proposition [Satz], in Husserl's terms)
determines the positing of a hyle or a
noesis, and hence of a nature which has been
set aside but returns as 'such' in what has
been posited. The Ego and the object's
evasion of each other, which then unfolds on
the terrain of this meaning as matter,
nucleus, or content, is preserved within
projections's specular enclosure but does not
in any sense represent a gap in the actual or
collective unified individual and implies no
eventual loss of object or Ego. (RPL, p. 35)
The perceived failure to investigate the thetic moment
collapses Husserl's attempt to introduce 'intra'- and
'inter'-subjective relations into linguistic theory.
His 'matter' is not heterogeneous but a moment of an
appreheniing consciousness. Husserl thus forfeits a
possible route out of 'idealism' to a radical
materialism.
Kristeva's own gesture towards a rethinking of the
positing ego 'on another - dialectical and
psychoanalytic - horizon' (RPL, p. 32) turns Husserl's
'translinguistic' moment into the 'liminary moment' of
the signifying process. Husserl's restriction of the
93
thetic moment to a mere limit (Grenze) does not proceed
to a recognition that it is the liminary moment of a
'process' (limitation, Schranke), and consequently
reinforces his confinement of linguistic functioning to
'meaning and signification'.	 The phenomenological
bracketing (Einklammerung) thus led to a
Reflexionsbestimmung, an identification of the thetic
moment with the subject's positionality: 'The positing
of the glance never loses for a second its grasp
(Meinung) on the always already detached object for an
always already present subject'
2. The Lacanian Limit: Limit of the 'Subject'
/
There is, in Kri
in consciousness
transition from
Lacanian return
operating consci
Husserl's trans
;teva' view, no account of 'separation'
in Husserl's philosophy. Kristeva's
Husserl to Lacan therefore makes the
to Freud into an 'overturning' of the
ousness which remains fundamental to
endental theory of language. Lacan
proposes that
it was necessary to question oneself
regarding the function that supports the
subject of the unconscious, to grasp that it
is difficult to designate that subject
anywhere as subject of a statement, and
therefore as the articulator, when he does
not know that he is speaking. (E, p. 314)
Husserl's attempt to open up theories of language to a
'translinguistic' moment is therefore substantiated in
the Lacanian thesis of the subject-Other relation. In
the context of Husserlian philosophy, Lacan responds to
Rristeva's demand for an investigation of the
'producible thetic and subject' (p. 36, my emphasis).
The 'thetic' and the 'subject' are no longer identified
in Lacan as they are in the 'Reflexionsbestimmung' of
Husserl's transcendental ego.
The 'subject' is now considered as the 'posited'
subject: the subject posited - as absent from the sign
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- 'by' the symbolic. The 'absence' or absenting of the
subject at the moment of its constitution, on the
'entry into language', holds both for the diachronic
structuration of the subject and for the synchronic
structuration of signification: it is a truth of the
'entry into language' whether the latter is viewed as
the transition from the mirror stage to the discovery
of castration, or as 'enunciation' within the symbolic
(the order of language)..
Kristeva's argument with Lacan arises from the latter's
realignment of the relation of dominance in which the
subject is situated. While drawing the lessons for the
concept of the subject of enunciation from Freud's
discovery of the unconscious, Lacan simply inverts the
relation of mastery which held between subject and
meaning/being, leaving the subject subordinated to the
symbolic (the place of the Other). Her own route out of
the Lacanian symbolic, establishing the concept of the
'semiotic', is taken through a 'second' return to
Freud, supplementing the return to The Interpretation
of Dreams (the discovery of unconscious processes in
the 'dream logic') with a return to Beyond the Pleasure
Principle (the theory of the drives).
Kristeva's aim is thus not 'simply' to follow the
Lacanian return to the Freudian 'unconscious' which,
Lacan recalled, is:
that part of the concrete discourse, insofar
as it is transindividual, that is not at the
disposal of the subject in re-establishing
the continuity of this conscious discourse.
(E,p. 49)
For the separation out of the moment of the 'subject'
and 'the thetic' which arises thanks to Lacan's concept
of the symbolic also opens the way to Kristeva's
relativization of the mastery of the 'symbolic'. She
will reformulate the thetic moment in Husserl as a two-
stage 'thetic break', which simultaneously turns
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Lacan's 'imaginary' and 'symbolic' into a 'thetic
phase' (RPL, p. 43). The dependence of the 'thetic' on
a pre-thetic network of drives and their ordering (the
'semiotic chora') is what permits Lacan's 'imaginary'
and 'symbolic' to be articulated as a phase or
engendering of the 'symbolic', as will be shown.
It is Lacan's division of the constitution of the
subject into the 'mirror stage' and the 'Oedipus
complex' (discovery of castration) which separates out
the thetic or 'positing' and the 'subject' as such. The
'mirror stage' is the moment of the establishment of
space (of 'positionality').
the mirror stage produces the 'spatial
intuition' which is found at the heart of the
functioning of signification - in signs and
in se tences. (RPL, p. 46)
The disco ery of the 'mirror stage' reveals that the
production of 'positionality' is pre-linguistic in the
sense of pre-sign. The argument that the thetic phase -
mirror stage and castration - 'produce' the subject
reverses the relation between subject and positing, and
overturns Husserl's deduction of a positing subject
from the theses in signification. Synchronically, this
production is a 'break' in the signifying process (the
latter encompassing the semiotic and symbolic
modalities) through which the identification of subject
and object are established 'as preconditions of
propositionality' (RPL, p. 43). The thetic moment in
enunciation - the 'identification' - requires the
production of space:
the subject must separate from and through
his image, from and through his objects. This
image and objects must first be posited in a
space that becomes symbolic because it
connects the two separated positions. (RPL,
p. 43)
There are three moments: the 'production' of space; the
two separated positions ('identification' of subject
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and object); and space as - 'topological' - connection,
or signification (emergence of the symbolic). The
'relation between' positions is not produced by a
positing subject, but through a separation, and this
attributes the possibility of 'connection'
(predication) to a pre-symbolic (pre-linguistic) stage.
Kristeva's deployment of psychoanalysis discovers the
'producibility' of the subject in the thetic phase of
mirror stage and castration. While the question of the
producibility of the 'thetic' will require a turn to
the theory of the drives, the debt to Lacan lies in
Kristeva's elucidation of the producibility of the
subject.
Positing the imaged ego leads to the positing
of the object, which is, likewise, separate
and signifiable.
Thus the two separations that prepare the
way for the sign are set in place. The sign
can be conceived as the voice that is
projected from the agitated body (from the
semiotic chora) onto the facing imago or onto
the object, which simultaneously detach from
the surrounding continuity. (RPL, pp. 46-7)
Kristeva's mirror stage articulates the separation from
and of semiotic motility in which the corps morcelé is
set up before the imago. The connection instituted
thereby - 'captation of' and 'drive investment in' the
image - is the prototype for the institution of the
'sign', since the separation of a not-yet-body and a
not-yet-object is the condition for the constitution of
objects (RPL, p. 46). The 'mirror stage' therefore
designates the path to signifiability (to subject,
object, nd sign). It is a prelinguistic 'separation'
without which there could be no 'symbolic'.9
In Lacan's doctrine the mirror stage proposes a
fundamental and irreducible alienation in
subjectivity: 'the imaginary alienation of the ego'
(Seminar II, xix, p. 247). The ego is constructed
through a separation, thus instituting a primary
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narcissism in which the constitutive factor is an image
or 'form':
the important point is that this form
situates the agency of the ego, before its
social	 determination,	 in	 a	 fictional
direction, which will always remain
irreducible for the individual alone. (E, p.
2)
In Kristeva's thesis the mirror stage is a process of
'detachment' from semiotic motility, which both
institutes primary narcissism and lays the ground for
the entry into language. The second point in Lacanian
theory where Kristeva locates the 'thetic phase' is
therefore the discovery of castration which structures
the subject as a subject of 'lack'.
Castration puts the finishing touches on the
process of separation that posits the subject
as signifiable, which is to say separate,
always confronted by an other: imago in the
mirror (signified) and semiotic process
(signifier). (RPL, p. 47)
The inversion of Husserl which appears in Kristeva's
deployment	 of	 Lacan	 therefore	 divides	 the
transcendental ego' into a process of separation and
an entry into separation, which latter institutes the
subject as absent from the sign - 'always confronted by
an other'. The entry into language divides the subject
out from the thetic phase, and posits it as absent from
the latter, which is itself now posited (it is Lacan's
'place (lieu) of the Other'). The distinction between
the 'subject' posited by the symbolic and the 'thetic
phase' turns Husserl's 'transcendental ego' into a
limit, something dependent on another relation, the
'relation to the Other'.
The two 'elements' of language taken from structural
linguistics - signified and signifier - are the trace
in language of the process of its formation. The
signifier is the trace of semiotic motility, and
therefore the subject is posited as absent from the
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signifier. The signified is the trace of the not-yet-
object - the imago - and therefore where the 'ego' is
posited.
For there to be enunciation, the ego must be
posited in the signified, but it must do so
as a function of the subject lacking in the
signifier; a system of finite positions
(signification) can only function when it is
supported by a subject and on the condition
that his subject is a want-to-be [manque- a-
être]. Signification exists precisely because
there is no subject in signification. (RPL,
p. 48)
The entry into language is the structuring moment in
which, 'aprês coup', the ego is posited through the
positing of the subject as 'lacking': definitive
separation of the subject from semiotic motility
(posited in the signifier); the thetic 'moment' posits
the subject as absent from the - place of - the
signifier.
The subject conceived as absent, as a subject of 'lack'
(rnanque-à-être) is the basis for the key Lacanian
thesis that the subject is divided from itself. Lacan's
attention to the gap in language between signifier and
signified therefore receives in Kristeva's thesis a
precise correlation with the stages of child
development, in order to show how the 'subject' comes
to be a subject of lack (absent from the sign):
The gap between the imaged ego and drive
motility, between the mother and the demand
made on her, is precisely the break that
establishes what Lacan calls the place of the
Other as the place of the 'signifier'. The
subject is hidden 'by an ever purer
signifier', this want-to-be confers on an
other the role of containing the possibility
of signification; and this other, who is no
longer the mother (from whom the child
ultimately separates through the mirror stage
and castration), presents itself as the place
of the signifier that Lacan will call 'the
Other'. (RPL, p. 48)
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The subject of lack is hence a desiring subject:
'desire divides the subject from itself'. The
'structuration' of the subject institutes the realm of
misrecognition in the subject's relations. This is
expressed in an early seminar of Lacan's: 'the ego gets
confused with the subject and the ego is turned into a
reality' .10 The 'want-to-be' implies this confusion,
which itself represents a misrecognition of the
subject's desire, or more specifically of the 'place'
of desire: 'man's desire is the désir de 1'Autre (the
desire of the Other)... it is qua Other that he
desires' (E, p. 312). The subject misrecognizes where
he desires - the place of the Other - in an object of
desire: the 'other' which presents itself as the place
of the Other. Lacan remarks: 'the first object of
desire is to be recognized by the other'. This
misrecognition in the 'desire for recognition' is the
real basis of psychoanalytic experience. Psychoanalysis
is the scene of its reenactment in the transference.11
The emphasis on the thetic as a phase of separation and
identification turns to the pre-Oedipal relations
opened up by Klein. The thetic phase, completed in the
thetic or structuring 'moment' of the discovery of
castration, is a process of separation from the mother:
As the addressee of every demand, the mother
occupies the place of alterity. Her replete
body, the receptacle and guarantor of
demands, takes the place of all narcissistic,
hence imaginary, effects and gratifications;
she is, in other words, the phallus. (RPL, p.
47)
This interpretation of the 'pre-Oedipal' relation to
the mother sees it less as the dyad which the Oedipal
complex interrupts than as an imaginary identification
within a separation (as 'narcissistic'). The mother's
replete body is the phantasmatic guarantor of
gratification. The mother is, before the Oedipal
complex, the 'phallus', occupying the site of alterity.
On this account the 'phallus', as identification-in-
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separation, functions prior to the Oedipal complex, at
which point this identification-in-separation is
transformed into a 'lack' and a 'law': the subject,
once constituted, is divided from itself through
'alterity'. The posited subject is a desiring subject.
The psychoanalytic concept of desire therefore
articulates the establishment of the subject in the
symbolic by way of two 'separations' - the mirror
stage and the discovery of castration. In the first
case, the mother occupies the site of alterity (the
phallus); in the second case, the phallic function is
the symbolic function: the Other to which the subject
is subordinated, the law to which he submits.
Dependence on the mother is severed, and
transformed into a symbolic relation to an
other; the constitution of the Other is
indispensable for communicating with an
other. In this way, the signifier/signified
break is synonymous with social sanction:
'the first social censorship'. (RPL, p. 48)
Kristeva's	 questioning of the subject-law relation
which the 'symbolic' institutes goes to the
'presymbolic' moment of the thetic phase primarily in
order to reconfigure the import of the 'alienation' at
the basis of being represented by the 'mirror stage'
Her re-interrogation of the corps morcelé in this
separation (in the first stage of the 'thetic break')
introduces into Lacan's 'imaginary' - situating the
agency of the ego 'in a fictional direction' - a
connection between the import of the primary processes
and that of primary narcissism (the relation to -
separation from and connection with - the mother, who
is, diachronically, the 'first' other). The return to
the theory of the drives invests the pre-linguistic
stage with a new significance which it does not
evidently have in Lacan's writings.
This is where Kristeva's turn to Klein differs from
Lacan's. The diachronic account of the signifying
101
process is indebted in content to Freud's discovery of
the primary processes (condensation and displacement),
to Klein's focus on the place of the mother in pre-
Oedipal object-relations, and to Lacan's correlation of
the primary processes with the operations in language
disclosed by structural linguistics (metaphor and
metonymy). It is Kristeva's return to the theory of the
drives which recasts the contributions of Freud, Klein
and Lacan in order to provide a way out of the
dominance of Lacan's symbolic order. The 'semiotic',
constitutive of the 'symbolic', designates not only
pre-Oedipal relations, but an articulation,
specifically, of the drives in the processes of
condensation and displacement. The exposition of the
'drives' gives Kristeva's presymbolic its materialist
foundation.
Kristeva thus proceeds from the debt to Lacan to a
revision of two elements of the Lacanian doctrine.
First, she introduces the 'drives' as a factor in the
subject's relation to the signifier. The signified, as
the trace in language of the 'mirror image', is where
the 'ego' is posited; the signifier, as the trace of
the 'semiotic process', is where the drives are
posited. The subject is posited as absent from the
signifier, and 'is' a manque-à-être. However, if the
signifier is where the drives are posited the subject-
signifier relation (which, for Lacan, means that the
subject is 'always' confronted by an other) can become
a - 'heterogeneous' - contradiction. Kristeva's subject
- contra the Lacanian subject of lack - is, under
certain ' conditions, a subject put in process by the
signifier in its 'semiotic' operations.
Second, Kristeva's reading of Beyond the Pleasure
Principle introduces 'social determination' prior to
the symbolic. The two elements of the 'semiotic chora',
drive motility and social determination, are in a
dialectical relation which would repudiate the charge
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that the material 'presupposition' of the semiotic
chora introduces a fundamental biologism into the
thesis that the 'semiotic' generates the 'symbolic'
The presence of 'social determination' in the semiotic
implies that both orders are unities of 'semiotic' and
'symbolic'
The revision of Lacan simultaneously addresses the
second question posed in Kristeva's departure from
Husserl's subject of enunciation. Kristeva has put a
thetic phase (mirror stage and castration) at the heart
of the symbolic function, whose exposition articulates
the 'precondition of signification' and the
'producibility of the subject' . The semiotic chora -
the pre-thetic ordering 'of' the drives - is now
expounded in response to the question: 'How is the
thetic, which is a positing of the subject, produced?'
(RPL,p. 36, my emphasis). The reformulation of Lacan
thus elaborates a pre-symbolic (now pre-thetic) realm
of drive motility and ordering which sets in process
the thetic phase. Kristeva's analysis of pre-Oedipal
relations opens up the problematic of the 'producible
thetic' as the question of the 'possibility' of
separation, which is to say the possibility of space or
intuition, which has itself been expounded as the
precondition of the positing of subject and object
(identification), and hence of predicative judgement.
While Kristeva places repeated emphasis on the Kleinian
aspect of the 'semiotic' (notably, RPL, pp. 28, 167),
the aspect which introduces presymbolic social
determination, this emphasis also serves to highlight
the differentiation between 'drive charges' and the
connections which the relation to the mother sets up: a
connection 'to "external" "objects" and "subjects",
which are not yet constituted as such' (RPL, p. 28).
The 'semiotic' does - always - designate an 'ordering
of the drives' from which the drives cannot be
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extracted as origin - at one moment a 'rhythmic
totality' (RPL, p. 40). This provisional 'totality' is
crucial in Kristeva's use of the term 'chora', taken
from Plato and, in her view, predominantly expressing a
'receptacle.., nourishing and maternal' (RPL, p. 26) -
not unified but regulated. Nevertheless, Kristeva's
elucidation of the place of the drives in condensation
and displacement stresses the dependence of the primary
processes on the 'splitting of matter'. Matter in
scission is a presupposition of the psychosomatic
functioning of the drives. Their psychosomatic
'articulation' presupposes, further, the relation to
the mother's body. It is the combination of these two,
symmetrical, 'presuppositions' which comprises the
semiotic chora. I will first address the question of
the 'social determination' introduced into the
presymbolic by the notion of an 'ordering' of drive
behaviour, and then draw the link between Kristeva's
semiotic/symbolic distinction and her typology of
signifying practices. Chapter 3 will present the logic
of drive rejection which is what makes Kristeva's
notion of negativity (re-jection) a materialist
concept. The success of Kristeva's argument that
'heterogeneous contradiction' is a practical concept is
dependent on the negative force claimed for drive re-
jection in the sphere of social relations, and
therefore also on her rendering of the semiotic 'unity'
of semiotic and symbolic (the chora).
3. The Semiotic Chora
The chora is a modality of signifiance in
which the linguistic sign is not yet
articulated as the absence of an object and
as the distinction between real and symbolic.
We emphasise the regulated aspect of the
chora: its vocal and gestural organization is
subject to what we shall call an objective
ordering (ordonnancement) which is dictated
by natural or socio-historical constraints
such as the biological difference between the
sexes or family structure. We may therefore
posit that
	 social	 organization,	 always
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already symbolic, imprints its constraint in
a mediated form which organizes the chora not
according to a law (a term we reserve for the
symbolic) but through an ordering. What is
this mediation? (RPL, p. 27)
The major consequence of the diachronic account of the
'signifying process' is that it poses both the relative
autonomy and the inseparability of the semiotic from
the symbolic. The semiotic is not pre-symbolic in the
sense of pre-social:. object-relations theory is
deployed by Kristeva to reveal the mother's function as
'mediating' a connection with the symbolic 'family and
social structures'. It is nevertheless pre-symbolic in
the definitive sense for Lacan and Kristeva of the
entry into language: 'the linguistic sign is not yet
articulated' . It is by means of the elaboration of pre-
Oedipal 'object'-relations that Kristeva can argue for
the relative autonomy of the 'semiotic'. The chora is
both pre-symbolic and not pre-symbolic. It designates a
'network' that is both prior to the structuring moment
which the 'symbolic' represents (it is pre-symbolic in
the sense of pre-sign) and connected with the symbolic
- not 'outside' it, given the indirect role in the
ordering of the drives of the symbolic qua social
organization.
Lacan's account of what will become the 'chora' in
Kristeva's thesis does not ignore the concept of
'drive' in Freud's theory:
it was necessary to question oneself
regarding the function that supports the
subject of the unconscious, to grasp that it
is difficult to designate that subject
anywhere as subject of a statement, and
therefore as the articulator, when he does
not even know that he is speaking. Hence the
concept of drive, in which he is designated
by an organic, oral, anal, etc., mapping that
satisfies the requirement of being all the
farther away from speaking the more he
speaks. (E, p. 314)
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The notion of mapping can be aligned with Kristeva's
emphasis on the 'ordering' of the drives in which the
mother plays the mediating role: 'The oral and anal
drives, both of which are oriented and structured
around the mother's body dominate this sensorimotor
organization. The mother's body is therefore what
mediates the symbolic law organizing social relations
and becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic
chora' (RPL, p. 27). However, Lacan's notion of the
'function that supports the subject of the unconscious'
does not designate a functioning autonomous to the
'symbolic', but one coextensive with it insofar as the
'symbolic' and the 'unconscious' are synonymous in
their significance for the subject. He does not propose
a presymbolic 'logic' of drive activity which makes the
'sensorimotor organization' an independent factor in
the make-up of the speaking subject. The relative
autonomy of the semiotic - in which the reformulation
of Lacan consists: pre-sign but not pre-social -
insists on a dialectic between the drives (energy
discharges) and their 	 'mapping'	 (orientation and
structuring 'around the mother's body'). It is,
further, this reformulation which provides the elements
necessary for Kristeva's theory of poetic negation.
Kristeva's exposition of the semiotic chora first
follows Lacan's deployment of structural linguistics in
his return to Freud's analysis of 'dream logic'. The
claim that the unconscious is structurea like a
language relates the primary processes to the processes
in language - analysed by structural linguistics - of
'metonyrny' and 'metaphor' . As is well known, it was -
for Lacan, and ironically so - owing to a 'defect of
history' that Freud failed to posit what Lacan took
upon himself to remind the institution of
psychoanalysis of.
'Geneva 1910' [Saussure] and 'Petrograd 1920'
[Jakobson] suffice to explain why Freud
lacked	 this	 particular	 tool....	 [T]he
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mechanisms described by Freud as those of the
'primary process', in which the unconscious
assumes its rule, correspond exactly to the
functions that this school believes
determines the most radical aspects of the
effects of language, namely metaphor and
metonymy - in other words, the signifier's
effects of substitution and combination on
the respectively synchronic and diachronic
dimensions in which they appear in discourse.
(E, p. 298)
Lacan's reminder to his peers in psychoanalysis bears
constantly on 'the agency of the letter in the
unconscious':
from the outset I have alerted informed minds
to the extent to which the notion that the
unconscious is merely the seat of the
instincts will have to be rethought. (RPL, p.
41)
Kristeva's return to the function of the drives doesn't
mitigate her acceptance of this Lacanian lesson. She
seeks in the 'signifier's effects of substitution and
combination' a motivation which undermines the
subjects definitive absence from (subordination to)
the signifier. She discovers the source of this
motivation in the theory of the drives in Freud's
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Furthermore, although
her return to the theory of the drives introduces a
thinking of 'matter' which is alien to Lacanian theory,
Kristeva - at one moment in Lacan - glimpses the
possibility of such a thinking, and - at another -
turns a statement on the drives to her own purposes:
'drives divide the subject from desire'.l2
In the first case, Kristeva discovers in Lacan's
treatment of the signifier a hint of the significance
that the drives come to have in her thesis, claiming
that
Indeed, even Lacanian theory, although it
establishes the signifier as absolute master,
makes a distinction between two modalities of
the signifier.... On the one hand, the
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signifier as	 'signifier's treasure, t	as
distinct from the code. (RPL, pp. 244-5)
On the other,
the signifier is not just a 'treasure' or a
'battery' but a place [lieu]. (RPL, p. 245)
Kristeva's analysis of this moment in Lacan where two
'modalities' of the signifier emerge, detects a
categorial error in Lacan's reference to the 'treasure'
as the signifier's treasure.
One cannot speak of the 'signifier' before
the positing or the thesis of the Other, the
articulation of which begins only with the
mirror stage. But what of the previous
processes that are not yet 'a site,' but a
functioning that the thetic phase will
establish as a signifying order (though it
will not stop the functioning) and which will
return in this order. (ibid; translation
amended)
She discovers in the 'signifier's treasure' Lacan's
misrecognition of a presymbolic (prethetic) moment -
which she calls the 'semiotic' - whose 'functioning' in
the symbolic is located in the signifier, a functioning
which may be more or less repressed, or more or less
dominant. 'Repression' refers here to the integrative
capacity of the symbolic vis-à-vis the process of its
production: 'the semiotic network... will be more or
less integrated as signifier' (RPL, p. 47).
The psychoanalytic discovery of the 'more or less' of
this integration provides the conceptual framework for
Kristeva's theory of poetic language. It supports
Kristeva's typology of signifying practices based on
the dialectic of semiotic and symbolic in the
'phenotext' and in the 'genotext'. The phenotext
denotes language in its communicative function,
signification together with either an 'axial' or a
'transcendent' subject (RPL, p. 87); the genotext
comprises the semiotic and the thetic moment: 'semiotic
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processes but also the advent of the symbolic' (RPL, p.
86).
The dialectic of phenotext and genotext bears on the
relation to the 'thetic moment'	 (advent of the
symbolic).	 Kristeva's	 distinction	 recalls	 the
comparison made in 'L'expérience et la pratique'
between avant-garde writing and Bataillean fiction,
where the latter was appreciated for the socio-
political dimension of its negotiation of the 'thetic
moment', a dimension abdicated in the avant-garde
text's 'negativist-fetishist' exploration of the
semiotic. The same claim is made in Revolution in
Poetic Language.
in the texts of a Lautréamont or a Nallarmé,
heterogeneity... is gathered up within the
most condensed discursive structure of a
contradiction - the lyric. Or it appears in
the experimental evocation of its own
emergence as that of the subject within the
immobility of death. (p. 189)
the kind of representation Bataille calls
'the onanism of a funereal poem'. (RPL, p.
195)
The failure of a signifying practice fully to negotiate
the 'advent of the symbolic' means here, as before,
that the 'revolutionary potential' is lost, since the
thetic moment is the liminary moment of the 'relation
to others' (social community).
The four signifying practices outlined in Kristeva's
doctoral thesis - narrative, metalanguage,
contemplation! theoria, the text - are therefore
differentiated according to the fate of or relation to
the 'thetic moment' in each.
1. 'Narrative' confines the signifying process to
family and social structure, permitting psychoanalysis
to recognize in 'narrative' a 'display of neurosis': in
the confrontation with family structure the phenotext
or linguistic 'structure' is dominant, constricting the
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drive charges' traversal of the thetic moment. For
Kristeva, this is correlative with the function of the
'author' as an axial position: 'a projection of the
paternal role in the family' (RPL, pp. 91-3). The
position of the 'author' places the 'reader' as the
addressee, in a position correlative to that of the
author, and therefore in a position of identification
with the 'axial' subject of narrative.
2. 'Metalanguage' converts the negativity of the drive
charge into an affirmation: the axial position becomes
a transcendent subject reflected in its addressee, and
both are combined in an indifferent fixed totality -
'the State' (RPL, pp. 93-5). The traversal of the
thetic moment is not renewed.
3. In 'contemplation' the materiality of the drive
charges emerges but is not approached:
instinctual dyads are knotted in a
nonsynthetic combination in which 'plus' and
'minus' interpenetrate like the ends of a
magnetized chain; they close up a ring that
has no outside but can be endlessly
dissected, split, deeper and deeper, ever
boundless and without origin, eternally
returning, perpetually trapped. For this
ring, materiality is a hole, a lack [manque].
(RPL, pp. 95-6)
Kristeva's account in 'Matière, sens, dialectique' of
idealist dialectic and its systematic reclosure
reappears here as a 'Hegelian' circle of circles, for
which the materialist moment takes place 'behind its
back'. The system therefore presents an eternal return
of the same: 'the identity and difference of opposites,
implying the endless excavation of the Idea on the path
of self-consciousness' (RPL, p. 98).
4. It is poetic language - the 'text' - which enacts
the genotext. The 'semiotic' is dominant but the thetic
moment is negotiated - traversed rather than failed,
arrested or played out in a systematic closure.
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To have access to the process would therefore
be to break through any given sign for the
subject, and reconstitute the heterogeneous
space of its formation. This practice, a
continuous passing beyond the limit, which
does not close off signifiance into a system
but instead assumes the infinity of its
process, can only come about when,
simultaneously, it assumes the laws of this
process: the biological-physiological and
social laws which allow, first, for the
discovery of their precedents and then for
their free realization. That this practice
assumes laws implies that it safeguards
boundaries, that it seeks out theses, and
that in the process of this	 earch it
transforms the law, boundaries and
constraints it meets. (RPL, pp. 100-101; my
emphasis)
The reintroduction of drive charges into the linguistic
elements (grammar, syntax, authorship) does not break
with the phenotext but puts it (syntax, subject,
communication) in process. The transformative potential
of poetic language therefore bears on this traversal
and rebinding (Kristeva calls it an Aufhebung, p. 99)
of the advent of the symbolic.
The 'text' may, however,	 'seek out theses' and
'discover the precedents' of the laws of the process
without approaching their 'free realization', or
'transforming the law' . In this case the traversal and
rebinding of the thetic moment bears on the 'subject'
but not on social laws. Despite such a restriction, a
signifying practice of this type - represented by the
avant-garde - is held to comprehend the practice of
'theoria'. Thus, when Kristeva presents Mallarmé's poem
'Igitur' as an exemplification of the 'discovery of the
precedents' of the familial social subject (the poem
discloses the 'the underside of the learned family', p.
227), she simultaneously claims that it symbolizes the
Aufhebung of the subject of absolute knowledge.
The traversal of the thetic moments of 'the subject' is
presented in Mallarmé's character 'Igitur', who
symbolizes 'logic become madness'. Mallarmé's text
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traverses madness without identifying with it; it
discloses the real determinations of symbolic
transformation.
to 'personify' signifying infinity is an act
which, as such, not only includes but also
binds chance: that 'drop of nothingness
lacking in the sea,' the impossibility of
completing, circumscribing, harnessing, and
assimilating signifying infinity. This is why
only the act (by which we mean the poetic
act) can bring about the expenditure of
infinity through chance and prevent infinity
from turning in on itself, knowing itself,
making itself logical as an insane Igitur.
Igitur is, then, the truth behind the
Hegelian subject of absolute knowledge:
madness is what the syllogism stumbles
against on its way toward mastering the
infinite. (RPL, pp. 226-7)
Mallarmé's symbolization - in the 'person t Igitur - of
'logic' and madness is articulated by Kristeva as the
'poetic act' which enacts the limit of philosophy (the
subject of absolute knowledge), the passing of the
limit (madness), and the binding of this passage.
Literature 'reverses' philosophy and the familial
social subject by enacting the passage to infinity:
'Mallarmé calls madness useful because it foils the
piracy of a certain logic whose order is dependent upon
the social order' (RPL, p. 226). This - poetic - 'act'
is what philosophy and revolutionary discourse are
unable to undertake, for they reproduce the 'piracy'
protective of the social order. A revolutionary
discourse can only counter this 'piracy' if social
practice is met by literature's disclosure of what lies
beneath the 'revolutionary subject's' illusion about
its place in practice.
The 'avant-garde' text, while it represents an
experience of the expenditure of the subject,
nevertheless does not fulfil the conditions which bring
about a 'practice' . These conditions, outlined in the
passage above distinguishing the 'genotext' from the
'phenotext', demand the 'Aufhebung' not only of the
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'subject' but of social laws. Implicit in the account
of the 'assumption' (traversal and rebinding or
Aufhebung) of these laws is the claim that social law
(the 'social censorship' instituted in the second
moment of the thetic phase, in the Oedipal complex) is
not a definitive imposition, but a position. The limit
(Grenze) which social censorship presents for the
subject is passable (Schranke), not by the subject, but
by the signifying practice which traverses and re-forms
the thetic moments of the subject and the laws to which
it is subjected. A 'practice' bears on the social
censorship to which the subject submits at the moment
of its constitution or 'being-posited', on the moment
of entry into the symbolic order. 'Subject' and 'law'
are transformable by the genotext since the latter
'sublates' the moment of their 'being-posited' (the
thetic moment): their 'position' becomes a 'liminary
moment' of the signifying process.
Kristeva's characterization of the traversal of the
thetic moment as a mechanism of drive rejection - a
reintroduction of drive charges - therefore insists
that, as a negotiation of the thetic moment, it both
dissolves previous theses (the negative, destructive
moment) and 'rebinds' (the positive, thetic moment).
Although the negative, aggressivity, anality
and death predominate, they nevertheless pass
through all the theses capable of giving them
meaning, go beyond them, and in so doing
convey positivity in their path. (RPL, p. 99)
The semiotic 'in' the symbolic is therefore a
functioning of the presymbolic which is both violent
and sustains a connection with the the object of its
destruction. Kristeva's logic of drive rejection has
presented the possibility of this transformation as
residing in the nature of the 'thetic moment' as a
positing of the 'thetic phase'. Her return to the
theory of the drives introduced a social determination
into the mechanism of their behaviour prior to their
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integration on the entry into the symbolic. In the
elucidation of the pre-Oedipal relation to the mother,
the mother's body appears as 'principle' of the
ordering of the drives, mediating family and social
structures. The socio-historicizing of the 'external
disturbing forces' which results (of the forces which
introduce a 'detour' (Umweg) into the compulsion of the
death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle) places
the 'principle' not only of subjective but also of
socio-historical transformation on a stage other than
that of the appearance of social change.
The insistence on the socio-historical determination of
drive 'conflict' is the point at which Kristeva's later
writings on love finds their connection with the early
revolutionary work at this point: no death drive
without libido, no aggression without love, no violence
without the 'mediations' of the social moment in which
primary narcissism is set up. Nevertheless, the earlier
- certainly critical - position on transference in
analysis is consistent with both the deployment then of
the writings of Klein's 'middle period' and the
insistence on the predominance of the death drive.l3
The reappraisal of transference in the later works
presents transformative potential as the 'renewal of
love' . The key note of the doctoral thesis is the
renewal of violence, and its key problematic the
possiblity of renewal through violence. The parenthesis
is a question because, as will be shown in the
following chapter, it is dependent on the Sollen in
Kristeva's thought of 'heterogeneous contradiction',
which expounds the correspondence of the poetic and
social subject.
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Chapter summary and conclusion
Chapter 2 has established that the theory of
symbolization is a diachronic account of the 'unity' of
drives and social determination in the maturation of
the individual. The abstract account of the logic of
the	 signifier	 in	 the	 early	 essays	 presented
difficulties for understanding the infinite 	 'in'
language. The exposition of	 'symbolization'	 has
presented the possibility of the signifier's
functioning as the infinite 'in' language, by locating
it as the site of drive re-jection. The logic of drive
re-jection expounds the negative force which
destabilizes and is held to renew the symbolic.
Kristeva rewrites the 'mirror stage' and entrance into
language as a 'thetic phase' which undermines the
structural fixity of the Lacanian concepts.
The return to Freud thus combines a relatization of the
subject's subordination to the 'symbolic' with an
overturning of the primacy of the subject of the
understanding, both as the fundamental moment of the
'speaking subject', and as the basis of 'practice'.
The notion of the 'thetic phase' has, further,
expounded the production of 'space' as the separation
of the 'subject' from and through his image in the
'mirror stage' . In Kristeva's later writings, where the
pre-thetic structure of 'narcissism' is shown to be
crucial to the separation of the 'subject', the concept
of the 'production' of space is fully elaborated.
Furthermore, the concept is introduced as the basis for
a way out of the seemingly untranscendable reappearance
of the Grenze (subjective enclosure) within the
Schranke (signifying practice). The elaboration of the
infinite possibility of the renewal of the release from
finitude which poetic language enacts, is crucial to
Kristeva's thesis, since without it her theory of
poetic language will only present the renewal of the
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subjective	 limitation.	 It	 will,	 however,	 be
demonstrated that Kristeva's ?infinityt of the
signifier (discussed chapter 4) only makes evident the
truth of Kristeva t s 'infinite' as it appears from the
beginning: the impossibility of the union of finite and
infinite owing to the way in which that union is
claimed and deferred.
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CHAPTER THREE
REVOLUTION IN POETIC LANGUAGE 'AND' IN SOCIETY
Introduction
This chapter will demonstrate how Kristeva's response
to her question of what has the potential to
counterveil capitalism's reinforcement of dominant
political structures, itself undoes the prospect it
holds out for social transformation. The question she
posed demands a treatment of social practice. However,
this treatment remains tied to the logic of drive
rejection and to the concept of 'heterogeneous
contradiction' which, respectively, present the
material and social preconditions for 'revolution in
poetic language'. The concept of 'practice' in its full
sense, combining the 'signifying process' and the
subject in social and political relations, presents the
moment of transformation of human law as the renewal of
violence; but it is not established that the renewal of
human law through violence is an outcome of Kristevan
'practice'. This is not simply because of the default
of the objective conditions necessary for the
transformation held out by the theory of 'revolution'.
It is because the portrayal of 'heterogeneous
contradiction' through which it would take place
contains a Sollen. The latter can be comprehended as
the outcome of a premature departure from Hegel. The
exposition of a specific tendency of 'poetic language'
to confrontation with capitalist culture posits another
world to the world of social and political relations:
the qualitative change to a renewed 'law' is infinitely
deferred, and is construed as a 'leap' on the basis of
the economy of drive re-jection. On the one side, there
is what is in effect an unknown inner ('matter'), on
the other side an endlessly projected transformation
(the end of the dominance of 'abstract right' and
'paternal law').
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A. The Material and Social Dimensions of the
'Semiotic'
1. Positing Rejection
In Revolution in Poetic Language language 'at work' is
a traversal of the 'advent' of the symbolic, and takes
place as the re-jection of language. Re-jection may,
and must, include a social moment but it is ultimately
a violent negation: • an economic return of the death
drive which makes the logic of the signifier - the
'effects of substitution and displacement', in Lacan's
words - dependent on the dominance of a tdestructive
wave' . The semiotic chora
is on the path of destruction, aggressivity
and death. For although drives have been
described as disunited or contradictory
structures, simul-taneously 'positive' and
'negative,' this doubling is said to generate
a dominant 'destructive wave' that is drive's
most characteristic trait. (RPL, p. 28)
The precondition and prototype of the 'doubling' which
characterizes drive activity is found in 'the objective
laws of living matter' (RPL, p. 174). The 'scission and
constancy' , or repeated splitting, of matter is a
precondition of the mechanism of drive rejection in
both its presymbolic and its signifying function (even
though, as will be seen, these functionings, and hence
the operativity of the drives, presuppose the
intervention of a 'social' determination). The
dominance of the 'death drive' in Kristeva's account of
the drives in Revolution in Poetic Language is the
basis of her emphasis there on the 'violence' of both
signifying and political practice.1 However, the
equivocality of the death drive (built into the notion
that it is a tendency to take its logic of 'scission'
to the end) means that it is never the death drive 'as
such' which is the condition of practice. The two
tendencies of drive rejection in its signifying
function as a practice, either its renewal or its
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blocking, is thus itself built into and referred by
Kristeva to the characteristics of drive rejection's
material foundation.
We stress once again that these two opposing
tendencies are found in biology, in the way
living matter functions: in its division and
stoppage and in the principles of
multiplication and constancy, the latter
ensuring the preservation of the organic
cell. Not only does drive rejection follow
these objective , laws of living matter, they
are its indispensable precondition. (RPL, pp.
173-4)
While the 'death' and 'life' drives of Freud's Beyond
the Pleasure Principle can be referred, respectively,
to the biological principles of multiplication and
constancy, each contains the dual import of the 'laws'
of living matter. Drive behaviour presents not a binary
opposition of two forces 'in conflict' but a
'tendency'. On the one hand, the death drive is the
principle of 'multiplication' and the 'life' drive is
the principle of constancy (ensuring the preservation
of the organic cell). On the other, the death drive is
bent on taking its 'logic of scission to the end' and
'external disturbing forces' are the condition of the
productive 'detour'. The tendential nature of the
drives makes them 'the doubly differentiated site of
conflict and rejection' (RPL, p. 171).
Kristeva attributes a clarification of Freud's theory
of the drives to modern genetic theory. The latter has
presented the mode of 'repetition' of the doubling
which characterizes drive behaviour, a mode which can
account for the possibility of 'new structures'.2 This
provides Kristeva's concept of drive re-jection with
the prototype for its logic of self-positing: not
mechanistic repetition, but 'renewal' (RPL, p. 171).
Without this prototype, the notion of the dominance of
death drive, as the 'most instinctual' drive (RPL, p.
28), would seem to posit a univocal and original force
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whose	 'dominance'	 over the	 life drive remains
inexplicable.
The perceived shortcoming of genetic theory's
clarification of the 'doubling' process of drive
behaviour pertains to the moment of 'reversal' in the
process of splitting and multiplication. The disclosure
of the 'path' from drive behaviour (the path of the
'becoming' of 'desire') to intersubjective relations
(identifications as relations of 'desire') makes up for
this shortcoming. In Kristeva's terms-, genetic theory
has failed to account for the social mode of
determination of drive re-jection. The biological
process of self-multiplication is a process of
'displacement' and renewal (RPL, p. 171): the renewal
of rejection 'displaces boundaries'.
Repeated drives or the shocks from energy
discharges create a state of excitation.
Because it remains unsatisfied, this
excitation produces, through a qualitative
leap, a repercussion that delays, momentarily
absorbs, and posits that excitation. Repeated
rejection thus posits rejection. (RPL, p.
171)
The repercussion or 'countercharge' produced by the
accumulation of the attack of drive charges is the
principle of qualitative change and simultaneously the
'delay' of drive rejection. Kristeva presents a logic
of the 'positing' and 'being-posited' of drive
rejection, attributing the condition of the renewal of
the destructive force of drive rejection to the second
moment:
Although repeated rejection is separation,
doubling, scission, and shattering, it is at
the same time and afterward accumulation,
stoppage, mark, and stasis. In its
trajectory, rejection must become positive:
rejection engrammatizes, it marks One in
order to reject it again and divide it in two
again. As a step toward the development of
the signifier, the engram is rejection's
self-defense, its relative immobilization,
which, in turn, allows the reactivation of
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drives:	 re-jection.	 (RPL,	 p.	 171;	 my
emphasis)
Kristeva's notion that the mechanism of re-jection -
the economy of drive behaviour - is a precondition of
the differential character of the 'signifier' is
signalled here. Nonetheless, the entry into language
which posits the signifier requires a precondition
complementary to that of drive activity: the
presymbolic social determination which, together with
the drive economy, sets up the presymbolic as a
semiotic 'network'. The reference to language contained
in the above passage will therefore be addressed below,
where the social determination of Kristeva's
presymbolic scene is reapproached in its relation to
this logic of positing rejection.
Kristeva claims for self-positing 'rejection' the
character of a process of renewal, whose 'principle' is
the stasis or mark - 'delay' - of rejection: 'The mark
is the re- in rejection and is the precondition of its
renewal' (RPL, p. 169). It is the precondition of the
movement of differentiation - of rejection's dis-
placement of boundaries. The relation of the drives,
not positive 'and' negative but 'doubly
differentiated' , attributes dominance to the death
drive because the negative posits and is renewed by the
positive, generating a 'dominant "destructive wave"'
(RPL, p. 28).
Drive	 facilitation,	 differentiated	 'in	 itself',
attacks, which is to say redivides, the stasis that its
own 'self-defence' has posited: 'rejection
engrammatizes, it marks One in order to reject it again
and divide it in two again'. The stasis or mark denotes
the stoppage (arrét) or 'delay' of rejection by way of
its repercussion or 'countercharge'. The 'engram' then
designates a transition from 'delay' to relative
immobilization, and the term suggests the role which
the 'positive term' plays in the generation of the
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symbolic: 'The quantitative accumulation of rejections
nevertheless upsets the mark's stability: the mark
becomes an unstable engram which ends up being rejected
into a qualitatively new space, that of the
representamen or the sign' (RPL, p. 172). This 'ending
up' of the engram can only take place under the
regulating process of the semiotic, which adds another
dimension to the self-positing or 'countercharge' of
rejection.
Kristeva's alignment of the signifier with the economy
of drive differentiation is therefore consistent with
the stress on the primacy of the signifier in Lacan's
exposition of the 'place of the Other' . Her
foundational distinction between the 'semiotic' and the
'symbolic' is a further attempt to address the aporia
emerging from the necessity to posit both the
differential nature of the signifier and the connection
of signifier and signified without which there would be
no fixation, or 'localization', of the differential
movement, and hence no signification. The foundational
distinction proposes the 'generation' of identity by
way of differentiation; and the danger that this may
lead her 'to ontologize the unconscious as the
precondition of language' is avoided by making a
dialectical, and not economic, moment pivotal in the
'process'	 of	 generation:	 'heterogeneous	 contra-
diction' .3
The entire 'sequence' is a logic of doubling as self-
positing whose 'principles' are quantitative
accumulation of the drive charge and qualitative leap:
on the one hand, repeated rejection, on the other its
self-defence. The notion of semiotic 'regulation'
introduces the second dimension of the process of re-
jection, that genetic theory's account of drive
behaviour fell short of: not only 'doubling' but
heterogeneity of the drives:
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This duality (both heterogeneity and the
doubling of the drives) allows us to account
for a heteronomous conflictual process;
without it, we would be unable to situate
psychotic experience or any kind of renewable
practice. (RPL, p. 169)
The second precondition of the generation of the
symbolic is, 'ultimately', the symbolic: 'the social
apparatus and the social practice in which the subject
is led to function' (RPL, p. 173). Semiotic regulation,
mediation of the socio-symbolic, bears on the positive
moment of the 'self-defence'. The principle of this
determination of drive rejection, of this qualitative
leap - which 'doubles' the countercharge (now
'engrammatic and symbolic') - is the mother's body,
mediating symbolic structures: 'social organization,
always already symbolic, imprints its constraint in a
mediated form which organizes the chora not according
to a law (a term we reserve for the symbolic) but
through an ordering' (RPL, p. 27).
It is this 'precondition' of the generation of the
symbolic, the pre-Oedipal relation to the mother, which
makes the chora a pre-linguistic modality of
'signifiance' (ibid.), or establishes the connection
between the biological and the symbolic by imprinting
the constraints of the latter on the 'effects' of
drive-rejection, on its 'being-posited'
rejection generates thetic heterogeneity
under very precise biological and social
conditions: 'humanity'. (RPL, p. 171)
While the mechanism of drive rejection is the
generating principle of the symbolic, generation
conceived as renewal (rather than simple constitution)
is	 dependent	 on	 the	 'heterogeneity'	 of	 the
positing/being-posited relation. Heterogeneity is
determined by the order of being-posited, the symbolic
order, that rejection produces. There is no first
principle: Kristeva proposes an 'anti'-metaphysical
dialectic of the nature/culture relation.
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The generation of the semiotic modality of signifiance,
leading into the 'thetic phase' of mirror stage and
castration, is a process of stabilization and
destabilization. Its 'final' stage, instituting the
'symbolic', will separate out this tendency to
(de)stabilization into an asymmetry whose principle is
absence: absence of the subject from the signifier;
positing of the real object as a lost object; the 'gap'
in the signifier/signified structure of the sign.
[Rejection's] tendency toward death is
deferred by this symbolic heterogeneity: the
body, as if to prevent its own destruction,
reinscribes [re-inarque] rejection and,
through a leap, represents it in absentia as
a sign. (ibid.)
'In absentia' designates the qualitative change which
takes place in the leap which the 'thetic moment'
denotes. Henceforth the thetic phase is the 'place of
the Other', the unconscious: the sign understood, not
in terms of a metaphysical notion of representation,
but as a differential relation which accords primacy to
the signifier. Nevertheless, the 'in absentia' produces
or posits the subject in a - necessarily
misapprehending relation to the Other. 'Metaphysical'
oppositions (subject/object, ego/being) are
misrecognitions which aim definitively to stabilize the
heterogeneity underlying the asymmetry in which they
are inscribed. The precondition of misrecognition, of
the	 oppositional	 relation	 of	 consciousness	 to
otherness, is the differential character of the Other.
The 'symbolic' qua social structures which are
supported by and re-present a logic of opposition and
identity (of the 'same'), is therefore exceeded by the
differential movement of 'semiotic functioning'. The
heterogeneous contradiction of semiotic and symbolic
(One: other of one) is then the condition of a renewal
of the signifying process as a 'signifying practice'.
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'Metaphor and metonymy' owe their significance as the
infinite operations of signifiance to the 'place' of
the primary processes - condensation and displacement:
the latter are a 'middle' between the biological and
the symbolic. Condensation and displacement are the
modes of articulation of drive rejection.
Drive facilitation, temporarily arrested,
marks discontinuities in what may be called
the various material supports {matériauxj
susceptible to semiotization: voice, gesture,
colors. Phonic (later phonemic), kinetic, or
chromatic units and differences are the marks
of these stases in the drives. Connections or
functions are thereby established between
these discrete marks which are based on
drives and articulated according to their
resemblance or opposition, either by slippage
or by condensation. Here we find the
principles	 of metonymy	 and	 metaphor
indissociable	 from	 the	 drive	 economy
underlying them. (RPL, p. 28; my emphasis)
Metaphor and metonymy, the infinite operations of
'language', have their material principles in the
articulation of the drives. Hence, 'signifying
practice' or 'poetic language' denotes the return of
the drives into language, or the re-jection of a
signifying 'device'.4 Re-jection is thus the return of
the drives as the redivision of a divided language: not
only of signifier/signified, but of signifier/subject.
With regard to the latter, therefore, it puts the
subject of lack 'in process'; 're-jection' denotes the
operation in which 'drives divide the subject from
desire'. This operation contains the two preconditions
of the transformation of the subject: the 'doubling' of
the drives and the 'heterogeneity' which is introduced
by the relation to the mother and which turns the
process of 'renewal' of rejection into a semiotic
functioning.
2. Structuring Rejection
when it operates as the signifying function,
the mechanism of rejection is situated at a
qualitatively different level. It produces
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separations and renewed stases, but also
brings about heterogeneous relations between
scission and material constancy, on the one
hand, and its binding through a leap on the
other. Indeed to speak of the scission and
stoppage [arrêt] that organize the struggle
characteristic of rejection, we must consider
this logic in its connection with the social
milieu in which the representamen manifests
itself. For identification with the other or
suppression of the other are locked within
family structures; it is in the family that
relations of rejection become inter-
subjective: they become relations of desire.
(RPL, p. 174)
The importance of the discoveries of psychoanalysis,
for Kristeva, is that they have shown the manner of
emergence of intersubjective relations through
separation and self-defence: the (de)stabilization of
rejection sets up relations of identification and
desire, whose arrangement is determined by family
'structures'. 'Identification' and 'desire' are
conditions of intersubjective relations but also
represent their fixation.
The identification and subjective unification
carried out in opposition to the process
depend on the relation to the parent of the
same sex, who appears as a logically thetic
unity. In a society governed by paternal law,
this unity is the Name-of-the-Father, but,
practically, it can be assumed by any power-
wielding protagonist or structure (father,
mother, the family, the State). (RPL, p. 176)
It is this primacy of family structure in the formation
of intersubjective relations which lies behind
Kristeva's thesis that the late nineteenth-century
avant-garde manifests the expenditure of the 'subject'
The writings of Mallarmé and Lautréamont exemplify this
self-witting 'textual' transformation. Mallarmé's
'Igitur' discloses the 'underside of the learned
family'; Lautréamont's text presents 'a second birth, a
self-engendering eliminating the family and usurping
all its roles', by means of the complementary
opposition of his two texts Maldoror and Poems.
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Naldoror is pseudonymous and dominated by the semiotic,
Poems is signed by the father's name and dominated by
the symbolic. Together, in their 'complementary
opposition' they display the 'transition' from semiotic
to symbolic: 'the scission in the process of the
subject') (RPL, p. 220).
The identifications and relations of desire structured
by the family is analysed as one of society's
'defensive structures', corresponding to the appearance
of logically thetic unity in the 'same'- sex). Avant-
garde literature 'expends' the fixation of the symbolic
family 'structure'. Nevertheless the re-jection of the
defensive structure may itself remain locked in a
'self-defence'.
The narcissistic moment tends to attach the
process of rejection to the unity of the ego,
thus preventing rejection's destructive and
innovative vigor from going beyond the
enclosure of subjectivity and opening up
toward a revolutionary ideology capable of
transforming the social machine. (RPL, p.
186)
Bataille's 'advance' over the avant-garde, presented in
chapter 1 above, was his negotiation of the ideology of
state power when that power was confused with the
'subject who knows'; Bataillean fiction disclosed the
'unity' of the knowing subject and jouissance, and in
Kristeva's interpretation this was tantamount to
showing that bourgeois ideology fixed the unity of the
'split' subject into an opposition of 'state power' and
'religion'. Notwithstanding this 'advance' Kristeva has
also maintained that it is insufficient in the
conditions of the spread of capitalist society. The
passage above indicates the imporatance of
psychoanalysis in Kristeva's thought, as the science
which comprehends the structure in which the process of
rejection becomes blocked (narcissism, whose
elaboration in the later writings is the core of
Kristeva's ethics of psychoanalysis).5
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The avant-garde 'lacked' the discoveries of
psychoanalysis, the scientific exposition of what
poetic language practices. It is Klein's work on the
psychoanalysis of children which has opened up the
potential for comprehending the connection between pre-
Oedipal	 relations	 of	 desire	 (that	 are	 not
'identifications'	 as	 such)	 and	 transformative
practices. Quoting from The Psychoanalysis of Children
('at this stage of child development children of both
sexes believe that it is the body of the mother which
contains all that is desirable') Kristeva remarks:
Without 'believing' or 'desiring' any
'object' whatsoever, the subject is in the
process of constituting himself vis-à-vis a
non-object. He is in the process of
separating from this non-object so as to make
that non-object 'one' and posit himself as
'other': the mother's body is the not-yet-one
that the believing and desiring subject will
imagine as a 'receptacle' . ( RPL, p. 241, n.
21)
Klein's analysis of	 'aggression'	 and	 'super-ego
formation' maps out the terrain of a tendency in which
transformative practices become restricted to
regressive struggles with repressive social structures,
and thus only serve to underpin the hold (or 'self-
defence') of those structures.
Rejection and sadism, which is its
psychological side, return and disturb the
symbolic chains put in place by the Oedipal
complex. Melanie Klein interprets the
'behaviour disturbances' that result as the
organism's 'defenses' against the danger of
aggressivity. But she recognizes that 'this
defence... is of a violent character and
differs	 fundamentally	 from	 the	 later
mechanism of repression', which symbolism
establishes.	 These	 'defenses'	 are
resistances,	 thetic substitutes for the
'violent' drive process, which, far from
having a psychological value of prevention,
arrange the 'sadistic' drive charge,
articulate rejection in such a way that it is
not assumed by the construction of a superego
(as is the case in the Oedipus complex). The
distortion of words, the repetition of words
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and syntagms, and hyperkinesia or stereotypy
reveal that a semiotic network - the chora -
has been established, one that simul-
taneously defies both verbal symbolization
and the formation of a superego patterned
after paternal law and sealed by language
acquisition. (RPL, pp. 151-2)
The moment of 'self-defence' - 'arrangement' of the
sadistic drive charge - has a manifold implication for
the 'renewal of violence' owing to its situation with
regard to the death drive and to the symbolic order.
First, it represents a self-defence against the
violence of the death drive, a 'refuge of the subject's
unity' (RPL, p. 186). Second, it is a condition of
separation from the mother and hence of entry into the
symbolic: the self-defence is in a relative distinction
from 'fusing orality' (the sadistic and oral drives
together represent the separation-in-relation of the
pre-Oedipal relation to the mother); as the tendency to
separation, self-defence is a precedent for 'the
subject' posited on the entry into language. Third, as
presymbolic the 'defence' is prior to Oedipal law.
Consequently, and fourth, it is a passage for
rejection's renewal of violence or attack on symbolic
systems. Fifth, it represents, by reason agains of it
situation, the potential for a foreclosure of rejection
in its signifying function - the defiance of 'verbal
symbolization' . This is the ambiguity of the
functioning of the 'defense': it is the subjective
passage for the renewal of violence because of its pre-
Oedipal situation, but as presymbolic it represents a
pre-empting of the mechanism of rejection in its
signifying modality through its fixation within
subjective narcissicism.
The avant-garde signifying practice represents a trans-
formation of the subject in conditions where family
structure has primacy in intersubjective relations, but
locks the signifying process within a subjective
enclosure. It enacts the expenditure of the subject, or
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is a 'signifying experience' rather than a 'signifying
practice' (RPL, p. 195). It is, further, an atavastic
practice if reproduced in conditions in which family
structure's primacy in intersubjective relations has
been undermined. The passage through the 'underside of
the learned family' will then create 'thetic
substitutes' for the renewal of the 'violent' drive
process.
The notion of experience shall be reserved
for practices in which heterogeneous
contradiction is maintained, sought after,
and put into discourse, thereby forming the
essential economy of the text, but one in
which heterogeneous contradiction invests,
during the thetic phase, in a strictly
individual, naturalist, or esoteric
representation, reducing rejection to the
presence of the ego. (ibid.)
Midway between, and in a struggle with, both the
violence of drive rejection and the repression of
symbolic law, subjective narcissism represents a
condition and foreclosure of social transformation in a
society whose structures are patterned on 'paternal
law' .6
Kristeva views the social configuration in which
'modern' literature has emerged as one in which the
primacy of 'family structure' is not sustained, but is
'in the process of dissolving and being overrun by the
totality of social relations that exceed it and will
even eliminate it' (RPL, p. 177). In this configuration
the 'identificatory illusion' which the primacy of
family structure renders tenacious, that is to say the
identifications with and suppressions of the other, is
loosened. 'Desire' (understood in terms of the familial
identifications which set up intersubjective relations)
is now fragile, and hence no longer the affirmative
moment (or self-defence) which forms the passage for
re-j ection.
Rejection acts through a negativity that no
longer restrains a desire. This negativity
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restrains only the signifying stasis and
thesis within the process of practice, that
is, only the positing and positive moment,
which opens the way to a realization-in-
practice, a production: the entire range of
social practices, from aesthetics to science
and politics. Hence what provides the
affirmative moment of rejection and ensures
its renewal is not the object that is
produced, i.e., the metonymic object of
desire; it is, instead, the process of its
production or, let us say, its productivity.
Within this process the object is not a
boundary to be reached [my emphasis] but
merely the lower threshold allowing rejection
to be articulated as social practice. (RPL,
p. 177)
If in the social configuration of capitalism the
primacy of family structure is in the process of being
overrun, and the metonymic object of desire 'is not a
boundary to be reached' but merely a lower threshold,
rejection or the dis-placement of boundaries cannot be
a direct attack on 'paternal law' . There is thus a
suggestion in Kristeva's thought that re-jection as a
'practice' in the conditions of advanced capitalism
cannot be the re-jection of the 'Name-of-the-Father' as
such, since the latter is only the object of attack -
the logically thetic unity on which relations of
identification are dependent - in a society 'governed
by paternal law' (RPL, p. 176).
This is not to say that 'capitalism' no longer proposes
political structures patterned on 'paternal law', or
that their repression of the 'process' may not re-
present the assimilation of logically thetic unity to
the 'Name-of-the-Father' . Nevertheless, power-wielding
structures may be beyond the re-presentation of
strictly 'paternal' law. Thus the substantial elements
of Kristeva's theory of social organization are, first,
the structural basis of power in the 'piracy' of the
thetic moment, and second the consequent 'defenses'
sustaining that piracy: both the 'defensive structures'
of social institutions and regressive struggles against
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their repression. Her discussions of forms of practice
- poetic, feminist, musical, etc. - may suggest an
across the board 'plurality' of local practices.
However, these forms always relate to specific moments
of Kristeva's theory of symbolization, and are subject
to historical relevance (thus the exemplifications of
poetic language in 'modern' literature never exemplify
'signifying practice' in its full sense as an entire
recasting of the 'symbolic').
Kristeva's thesis that the semiotic chara's mediated
connection with the symbolic introduces heterogeneity
into the 'doubling' which characterizes drive activity,
will turn 'drive rejection' into an economic notion of
- signifiable - negativity. The crux of a signifying
practice is the 'heterogeneous contradiction' with a
previous signifying device - neither its mere
repetition nor a renewed repression of the process. The
idea of a signifying practice which has the potential
for a historical impact stresses the negotiation of the
'thetic moment' because the latter presents the
heterogeneous contradiction out of which social
organization develops ('advent' of the symbolic). In
the thetic moment - dialectical and not economic - the
tendency to (de)stabilization becomes a heterogeneous
contradiction in which neither the potential 'drift' of
the semiotic (as in psychotic discourse) nor symbolic
'unity' predominates. Neither semiotic nor symbolic
works to foreclose the other. Heterogeneous
contradiction produces - through a 'leap' - the
transformation of subject, object, and signifying
device.
It is the success of this claim that is crucial for
assessing Kristeva's social and political thought. The
theory of poetic language represents Kristeva's
endeavour to disclose a site of practice in which the
possibility of the undermining of the dominance of
'abstract right' in social and political relations.
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However the idea that the 'symbolic order' is posited
through a leap means that the moments of 'abstract
right' can never be investigated as such. Kristeva's
refusal of Hegelian 'mediation', and her concept of
heterogeneous contradiction, has as its outcome a
conception of 'law' which leaves it as the outcome of a
negation which contains an unknowable moment (a
'leap'). Symbolic law thus becomes a sphere of social
and political structures without their own mediation. I
will go into the detail of this limitation of her
thought at the end of this chapter, where it will be
shown that her 'sublation' of Hegel re-presents a form
of transcendental philosophy whose moments Hegel
comprehended. Kristeva's 'advent' of the symbolic
cannot present the basis of objective existence as a
social organization (see Intertext).
Kristeva's analysis of the forms of foreclosure of
either semiotic or symbolic presents them as 'relative
identities' of the two terms of the thetic moment, a
settlement with one of the heterogeneities through the
dominance of the other: a 'logically thetic unity' or
repressive law (for example, abstract 'right',
'paternal' law); or an esoteric confinement of the
process (the avant-garde); or an immobilization of the
ego in its struggle with the law (for example, in
Cline's anti-semitism, to be discussed below in
section C2), and so on. These relative identities are,
on the symbolic level where they take place, fixations
which repress the heterogeneous contradiction at the
heart of the relation to otherness: for example,
'suppression of the other' or 'identification with the
other' in intersubjective relations based on family
structure (RPL, p. 174).7
For this reason, a key proposition of Kristeva's thesis
is	 the	 claim	 that	 'maintaining	 heterogeneous
contradiction	 is	 essential'	 (RPL,	 p.	 189).
Heterogeneous contradiction is a condition of drive re-
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.jection's effectivity, an essential factor in its dual
tendency: either arrested movement owing to various
forms of its	 'blocking'	 or the reproducing of
heterogeneous contradiction. The 'fate' of
heterogeneous contradiction - at what point, and how,
it is blocked or renewed - thus determines the forms of
(mis)recognition at every stage and within every
exemplification	 of	 'signifying'	 and	 political
practice.8
The fixation in Kristeva's thought of the concept of
'heterogeneous contradiction' has consequences for her
formulation and exposition of (mis)recognition, and for
the potential added to revolutionary discourse by the
contribution of 'poetic language (and, by implication,
for her estimation of 'art' and 'philosophy'). The
following section recovers the explicit return to Hegel
in Kristeva's thought, showing how the deployment of
both the Phenornenology of Spirit and the Science of
Logic appears, subsequent to the theory of
symbolization which has arisen from the reformulation
of Lacan's 'symbolic'.
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B. The 'Reversal' of Hegelian Moments:
Force, Negativity, the Practical
1. The Reversal of 'Force'
Drive Rejection's Material Basis
In Kristeva's view Hegel's dialectic - in contrast with
Husserl's phenomenology - opened up the philosophical
treatment of consciousness to a moment of separation in
consciousness. Kristeva discovers this moment of
separation in the earlystages of the Phenomenology of
Spirit and then - repeating the analysis of Begierde
from the earlier Bataille essay - finds that it
succumbs to the 'constitution of self-consciousness'.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, separation in
'consciousness', while dramatized in its 'immediacy' in
the dialectic of 'The "This" and "Meaning"', is never
in abeyance but intrinsic to consciousness:
Consciousness, however, is explicitly the
concept of itself. Hence it is something that
goes beyond limits, and since these limits
are its own, it is something that goes beyond
itself. (Phen., #80)
Kristeva, however, posits an 'instant' of separation
approached in the first configuration of consciousness,
in sense-certainty, but then conflates sense-certainty
with	 'perception'	 in order to construe	 'direct
experience' of the object as an 'apprehending
consciousness' . This will permit her to connect
Hegelian 'experience' with Maoist experience through
their	 'common'	 characteristics:	 'immediacy'	 and
'determination of external being'
On Kristeva's reading sense-certainty is equivocal,
both an apprehending 'consciousness of' the object and
containing an 'instant' of separation. It is posited as
the 'first moment' of Hegelian experience, upon which a
'second moment' is then appended. The latter is 1-legel's
'self-consciousness', construed as the 'moment' in
which self-consciousness is 'realized'. The relation to
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the object in sense-certainty is configured as a
'direct experience' of the object, an experience on the
'border' of heterogeneity (RPL, p. 201), and one
definitively abandoned in the proposed 'second' moment:
'in which immediate certainty will be introduced into
the presence of consciousness' (RPL, p. 196). The
division of the mediations comprising the movement from
'Consciousness' to 'Self-consciousness' into a 'first'
and 'second' moment leads Kristeva to refer to the
former as a 'first mysterious movement'. This 'mystery'
is where she will place her own concept of experience,
drawing out the 'instant' of separation in sense-
certainty, and recasting the latter as direct
experience 'of the new heterogeneous object' (RPL, p.
201)
This construction of the 'first' configuration of
consciousness collapses the separation in Hegelian
sense-certainty, and is possible only as a result of
Kristeva's interpolation into the dialectic of an
abstract statement on the experience of consciousness
taken from Hegel's 'Introduction'. The statement on an
'uprooting' of consciousness in the movement of
experience is deployed against Husserl:
there emerges an instant of 'uprooting'
(Hinausgerissenwerden) or of 'death' in the
Hegelian conception of experience, an instant
apprehended by consciousness as the cause
producing the immediate shape and translating
it into a Noiion. In our view this negativity
- the suddent interruption of conscious
presence and its finitude - is what makes
Hegel's idea of experience radically
different from Husserlian phenomenological
experience. (RPL, pp. 196-7)
Kristeva uses the statement on 'uprooting' to locate
'true' experience in sense-certainty versus the turning
back of consciousness upon itself: versus a movement
which turns 'immediacy' into the 'concept', which
designates the advent of thetic consciousness, and
supposedly sets up Hegelian experience as the
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experience 'of' a realized self-consciousness. The
deviation from sense-certainty in which self-
consciousness is taken to be 'realized' permits
Kristeva's claim that the 'instant' of death is posited
as	 an	 uninvestigated	 'cause'.	 The	 instant	 of
'uprooting' becomes, on the advent of self-
consciousness, a void for self-consciousness. On this
reading, the Phenomenology is held, not to dramatize
the experience of the failures to realize the
adequation of 'concept' and 'object', but to be the
trajectory of that adequation, closing in on 'absolute
knowledge' as the successful outcome. Kristeva's view
that henceforth Hegelian experience is reduced to
'nothingness' (RPL, p. 196) is a truth of her own
reading.
The proposed 'constitution' of self-consciousness
determines the 'finitude' of Hegelian experience. For
Kristeva, therefore, the 'mediations' of the system
imply the materialist truth of the Hegelian 'infinite',
glimpsed but not approached in the 'instant' of
uprooting in sense-certainty. Unapproached, the 'truth'
of sense-certainty functions in the restricted manner
of a logical ideality:
	 'negativity', the Hegelian
infinite, is the principle of mediation, and unfolds
finitude as 'system'. On this account Hegelian
mediation only re-presents the subjective reclosure of
the infinite which takes place in the transition to
'self-consciousness'. 'Mediation' presents a systematic
reclosure of the dialectic within the movement of
oppositional differentiation.
Hence it is the opposition of finite (self-presence of
consciousness) and infinite (idealist 'negativity')
which is taken to permit the mediations Kristeva fails
to address. This perceived opposition informs her
characterization of the 'circle of circles' which
Hegel's 'system' presents: 'the identity and difference
of opposites, implying the endless excavation of the
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Idea on the path of self-consciousness' (RPL, p. 98).
Kristeva will discover the moment of the greatest
differentiation in the dialectic of 'force' . She will
intrigue the repression there - the subsumption under
the unity of thought - of the materialist notion of
force: biological material rejection.
'Force and the Understanding' is Hegel's presentation
of the moment in which consciousness misrecognizes its
development hitherto in a 'reflected object' (#132).
The configuration of the 'understanding' is this
misrecognition of itself in the determinations of
'force' : 'consciousness shrinks away from what has
emerged, and takes it as the essence in the objective
sense' (#132). Consciousness 'shrinks away' from the
failures to turn the separation in its experience into
an essential moment over against an inessential moment:
into either the singular object of sense-certainty
(which 'wants to apprehend the this', #111) or self-
identity (the unity of the act of perceiving and the
object perceived, universal being #111-16). (It is in
the initial movement of 'perception' (#116-17) that
pure apprehension of the object - of the 'thing' - is
to be found, and not in Hegel's configuration of the
experience of the 'object' in 'sense-certainty' (which
'wants to apprehend the this'). Kristeva would
assimilate apprehension to sense-certainty by not
addressing the 'separation' in consciousness which it
re-presents and which provokes the movement from sense-
certainty to perception.9
The failure to address the mediations from 'sense-
certainty', through 'perception', and on to the
master/slave dialectic permits Kristeva to posit sense-
certainty and self-consciousness as 'two' distinct
moments, and to expound a mediation from the first to
the second which is held to establish Hegelian
experience as 'signifying apprehension' (RPL, p. 202).
'Signifying apprehension' implies a repression of the
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unconscious since it has abandoned the radical moment
of 'direct experience' of the object, which - although
iteif an apprehension - 'includes the border on which
the subject may shatter' (RPL, p. 202). Kristeva's
reading of 'Force and the Understanding' as a
configuration of consciousness which stands between her
'two moments' is therefore illuminating for the
relation to Hegel informing her concept of 'rejection'.
In Hegel's Darstellung the 'understanding' is the
consciousness which does not recognize its involvement
in the outcome of sense-certainty and perception; an
outcome which Hegel calls 'the concept of the true',
implying the untruth of certainty and its object and of
perception and its 'thing', the emergence of the 'true'
for consciousness, and the (mis)recognition of the
'concept'.
The following paragraphs both recapitulate the
configuration of 'force' as expounded by Hegel, and
show how Kristeva rewrites the moments of force in
order to present the contradictions of the 'play of
forces' as the material process of scission or
'doubling' which underlies drive rejection. Hegel
presents the emergence of the 'true' for consciousness:
The play of forces is consequently the
developed negative; but its truth is the
positive, viz, the universal, the object
that, in itself, possesses being. The being
of this object for consciousness is mediated
by the movement of appearance, in which the
being of perception and the sensuously
objective in general has a merely negative
significance. Consciousness, therefore
reflects itself out of this movement back
into itself as the true; but qua
consciousness, converts this truth again into
an objective inner, and distinguishes the
reflection of things from its own reflection
into itself; just as the movement of
mediation is likewise still objective for it.
(#143)
The understanding lets 'the concept of the true'
(implying the comprehension of the development
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hitherto) 'go its own way t , while it 'looks on' (#133).
Its repudiation of the 'being of perception' as
'appearance' disowns its involvement in the
abstractions of perception, the movement which produces
them, and their outcome: the concept of the true. The
understanding's 'reflection into self' is therefore the
(mis)recognition of the 'true' since the repudiation of
perception brings about the conversion of this truth
'into an objective inner'. It fails to grasp itself as
the 'true' (as the result) but turns away from 'the
concept of the true' to an 'objective' result. The
positing of the 'inner' represents the movement of
(mis)recognition which consciousness is at this point.
Since the 'conversion' into an objective inner is the
specific work of the 'understanding' the expression the
'concept	 of	 the	 true'	 also	 stands	 for	 the
understanding's misrecognition.
This inner is, therefore, for consciousness,
an extreme over against it; but it is for
consciousness the true, since in the inner,
as the in itself, it possesses at the same
time the certainty of itself, or the moment
of its being-for-self. But it is not yet
conscious of this ground or basis, for the
being-for-self which the inner was supposed
to possess in its own self would be nothing
else but the negative movement. This,
however, is for consciousness still the
objective vanishing appearance, not yet its
own being-for-self. Consequently, the inner
is for it certainly concept, but it does not
yet know the nature of the concept. (#143)
The understanding's (mis)recognition cannot be
abstracted from the movement from sense-certainty to
the master-slave dialectic without turning the
situation 'for consciousness' - its possession of
certainty in the concept of the true - into the 'truth'
of the idealist dialectic; and then extracting - once
again - the 'negative movement'. This is Kristeva's
position. Her interpretation of 'force' misrecognizes
the nature of the dialectic: reading the text
normatively, she fails to see that the moment of the
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'for itself' is not the self-presence of consciousness
but the emergence for consciousness of its own implicit
positing and a reconfiguration of that positing (the
meaning of 1-legel's 'in and for itself'). Since 'in the
inner, as the in itself, [consciousness] possesses at
the same time the certainty of itself', the sublation
of the possession of certainty in the 'objective inner'
doesn't introduce certainty 'into the presence of
consciousness' and thereby constitute self-
consciousness. This would turn the outset of the
dialectic into its outcome ('it does not yet know the
nature of the concept') and would forego the mediations
of consciousness in which the relation of truth and
certainty takes on further shapes. The 'possession' of
certainty implies the acknowledgement of separation
(thus the 'necessity' of the movement of the shapes of
(mis)recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit).
What, then, takes place in the revision of the
dialectic of force which informs Kristeva's concept of
'rejection'? Claiming that 'for the idealist dialectic,
the reality of force is ultimately the thought of it'
(RPL, p. 115) she turns Hegelian 'thought' into
abstract self-reflection, and posits an 'objective
inner' again, one which which reproduces its 'doubling'
and reformulates the negative movement purportedly
foreclosed by the Phenomenology in the 'thought of'
force:
the idealist dialectic deprives itself of
negativity's powerful moment: the scission
that exceeds and precedes the advent of
thetic understanding. (RPL, p. 115)
Having decided that the treatment of 'force' in Hegel
presents - as do all the configurations of
consciousness she turns to - the repression of
heterogeneity through its conversion into 'difference'
subsumed under unity, Kristeva reverts to the 'play of
forces' and recategorizes its movement as 'scissions,
impulses, collisions, rejections' (RPL, p. 116). The
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material foundation of the Lacanian 'subject' and
'symbolic', which is simultaneously the basis of her
critique of 'monotheist civilization' presents the
objective inner of Kristeva's own thought (her concept
of the true).
In Hegel, the misrecognition of separation in
consciousness configured in the 'understanding' leads
to an opposition for it: 'on the one side, a universal
medium of many subsistent "matters", and on the other
side a One reflected into itself' (#135). Kristeva
presents such an 'opposition' in the account of
symbolization. On one side is the economy of drive
rejection, on the other is the constancy and unity of
the sign - 'prefigured' in the positive moments of
drive re-i ection.
The discussion of 'stasis' and 'engram' in Revolution
in Poetic Language recalls Hegel's presentation of the
/ movement of 'matters' in the dialectic of force.
'Matters' are differences which are both 'superficial
vanishing moments' (or the negative movement - in
Kristeva, 'rejection attacks stases') and 'enduring
being' (in Kristeva the generation of the sign, by way
of the 'relative immobilization' of the engram where
the representamen will 'affix itself', p. 72). Kristeva
re-presents the moments of the 'play of forces' as the
objective process which the understanding takes it to
be, and whose transitional moments are a 'leap'. The
'leap' presents the becoming of desire, in contrast to
the mediations in Hegel' Darstellung, which provoke the
configuration of 'desire'.
The 'return' to the dialectic of force underlies the
following criticism of the Hegelian dialectic:
since it does not recognize an objective
material agency, one that is structured
independently of consciousness, the idealist
dialectic cannot specify objective, material
relations. In a logical sense, the
contradictions in those relations are what
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generate 'sensecertainty' before the latter
becomes an object of knowledge. (RPL, p. 197;
the first emphasis is mine)
This criticism may be turned back on to Kristeva's own
thought, on to the retention of the notion of the entry
into the 'symbolic', whose logic of positing and being-
posited returns in and as the process of its
production. Kristeva provides an 'economy' of the
movement of negativity, but in no way specifies or
expounds	 'objective,	 material	 relations',	 only
retaining	 the	 Marxist	 account	 of	 historical
materialism.10	 Although	 she	 proposes	 that	 a
revolutionary discourse - the 'narrative' of a
revolutionary project with its ideological 'agency' -
is 'tested' in the moment of practice, Kristeva
provides no exposition of a recasting of a
revolutionary discourse through such a 'practice', and
only refers to the 'existing historical process (the
structures of capitalist society, for example)' (RPL,
p. 205; my emphasis).
2. The Reversal of 'Negativity' Re-jection
Kristeva turns from the 'nullity' of experience in the
Phenomenology of Spirit in order to discover Hegel's
'infinite' where is is presented in the Science of
Logic, and calls it 'the fourth "term" of the
dialectic' (RPL, p. 109). The chapter by this title
repeats the argument of 'Natière , sens, dialectique'
and again removes 'negativity' from the movement of
negation in the first book of the Logic. Kristeva's
approval' of the treatment of 'nothing' in the first
sections of this book brings out the movement of
'nothing' there. She turns the movement (becoming) into
a 'law of contradiction', an unknown and self-
referential structuring of mediation. The supposed
'law' of contradiction is therefore fixed as an
infinite which is 'not itself negated'.
143
The extraction of 'Hegelian negativity' from the
doctrine of being thus leads to its institution as an
'infinite' vis-à-vis the finitude of self-presence (an
infinite that is held to be the principle of the
movement of the dialectic, and without which there
would be no Hegelian 'experience 1 ). This infinite is in
truth derived from the 'in itself' of Kristeva's own
thought - drive rejection. The latter then emerges as
'Hegelian' negativity's materialist sublation
(rejection is not negativity): 'the Hegelian conception
of negativity already prepared the way for the very
possibility of thinking a materialist process' (RPL, p.
110).
Kristeva's isolation of sense-certainty at the
beginning of the Phenomenology of Spirit proceeds to a
tying together of the supposed beginning (immediacy of
experience) and completion of the 'Hegelian edifice',
in a sweeping avoidance of all mediation. The
Phenomenology is integrated into a teleological path:
'experience pulls away from externality in order to
produce logical unity within consciousness' (RPL, p.
198). With the advent of self-consciousness there is
only a 'moving away' from the real. The Science of
Logic breaks up this integration at the 'summit' of the
system: 'the practical idea returns to externality by
distancing itself from self-knowledge, without having
reached consciousness per se' (ibid.) . The 'practical
idea' is the return to the real (following Lenin's
reading of the Logic) .11
3. The Reversals of 'the Practical'
the Subject, Subjectivity, Heterogeneity
'Direct' and 'personal' experience is perhaps
stressed here [in 'On Practice'] more than
anywhere else in Marxist theory and Mao's
emphasis on it tends to bring to the fore a
subjectivity that has become the place of the
'highest contradiction' - the subjectivity
Hegel calls for in the absolute idea. (RPL,
p. 200)
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Kristeva's Hegelian Naoism posits an intellectual
history of the overturnings of Hegel from Feuerbach to
Mao, one corresponding to a history of the 'subject':
Hegelian 'unity of consciousness', Feuerbachian
humanism, Marxist historical process (and consequently
proletarianism), Maoist 'practice'. Each successive
'overturning' of Hegel is said to retrieve more of the
dialectical import of Hegel's thought, and more of the
import of the 'concept' in the third book of the
Science of Logic. This section recapitulates the
intellectual history of the 'subject', since it is
Kristeva's approach, first, to the poetic recognition
that 'the subject never is' (following Mallarmé's
'nothing will have taken place but the place', p. 215),
and second, to the Freudian discoveries illuminating
the limitations of poetic practice.
Feuerbach stands as a pre-Hegelian figure whose
absolute is 'human' unity: the subject in Feuerbach is
'the man of desire and of lack', the ground of the
state that 'realizes' human essence (RPL, pp. 37-8).
This overturning of the authoritarian state attributed
to Hegel by Feuerbach delivers an 'anthropo-
morphization' of Hegelian negativity, which finds its
Marxist determination in the
	 'proletariat' (RPL, p.
138).
Marxism nevertheless recovers the dialectic in Hegel,
and specifically the presumed qualification of 'unitary
consciousness' at the end of the Science of Logic.
Finally, with Mao, the limitation of the Marxist-
Leninist overturning of Hegel is overcome: Lenin had
derived the priority of practice over (theoretical)
knowledge from the emergence of the 'practical idea' at
the end of the Science of Logic ; but had failed to
negotiate the import of the absolute idea, 'when the
concept returns within the practical idea' (RPL, p.
199). Hegel's absolute idea represents the 'highest
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contradiction' in Kristeva's thesis because it does not
- as does 1-lusserl, and similarly the path of Hegelian
self-consciousness - 	 present the 'object' as a
nullity, determinable only within subjective
'apprehension'. The absolute idea posits actuality as
'being in and for itself', and is therefore the basis
for a materialist dialectic.
However, the 'absolute idea' is failed in Marxist
theory since it makes the 'practical idea' the basis of
its overturning of Hegel, and therefore abandons the
contradiction of subjective activity (apprehending the
object) and actuality ('the activity of the objective
concept', p. 198). Hegel's 'highest contradiction' is
found to be appropriable for a materialist theory of
the objective determinations of 'practice' . Marxist-
Leninism, however, while it adopts the overturning of
the dominance of 'self-consciousness' which the
'practical idea' represents, and so produces a theory
of the primacy of practice in knowledge, does not
question the moment of 'practice' because it is not a
theory of the subject (RPL, p. 202).
Human relations, and essentially relations of
production are, then, what take on the
heterogeneity determining this practice.
(RPL, p. 199)
The uninterrogated subject of Marxism is therefore an
atomistic subject, a 'bearer' of objective relations.
Mao in part overcomes this failure of Marxism by
addressing the 'practical concept', returning therefore
to the questfons of experience and 'knowledge'. He
represents an advance towards a materialist thinking of
the 'highest contradiction' which embraces knowledge
and experience, and implies the 'shattering' of the
subject.
While affirming that the activity of
production determines all practical action,
he adds class struggle, political life and
scientific and aesthetic activity to the
range of possible practices. The moment of
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practice is represented according to
'reverse' Hegelian logic: the 'apprehension'
of an 'externality' in its 'external' and
'approximate connections' . Only the
repetition of phenomena within the objective
continuity of social practice produces a
qualitative leap - the emergence of the
concept establishing internal connections.
(RPL, p. 200)
Kristeva's appreciation of Mao therefore rests on two
tendencies in his dialectic: the retrieval of
experience - contra Hegelian self-consciousness - as
'direct', and the introduction of knowledge into
practice as a moment in the dialectic. Direct
experience is the moment of sense-certainty, 'implying
the subject and presence as its key moments' (RPL, p.
187). Knowledge is a return of scientific knowing: it
is 'knowledge about' not 'knowledge of' since it
represents a distancing from self-knowledge or 'logical
unity within consciousness' (RPL, p. 198). The relation
posited between practice and knowledge is an
'oscillation' from one to the other.
Mao is therefore taken to have combined the 'beginning'
and 'end' of the 'Hegelian edifice' - experience and
the 'practical concept'. The qualification of the
'signifying apprehension' of the object (Kristeva's
Phenomenology) that results turns the moment of
apprehension into the apprehension of (Kristeva's) 'new
heterogeneous object', the materialist 'truth' of
sense-certainty (RPL, p. 202). The dialectic of the two
moments - practice as the emergence of the 'true
object' and scientific knowledge as the rendering of
its truth (ibid.) - is attributed to Mao:
He posits a triple process (practice-truth-
practice) that implies a different status for
the 'apprehended objects' and the
'consciousness' apprehending them in each of
these three phases. (ibid.)
The Maoist dialectic outreaches Marxist-Leninism since
it not only removes the concept of practice from its
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subordination to self-consciousness, but reintroduces
the moment of self-reflection, or the 'theoretical
element' without losing the 'primacy' of the practical,
but indeed recovering the moment of 'experience'.
Practice encloses and brings to knowledge,
the direct experience of reality - an
immediacy Lenin notes only in passing - which
incorporates	 the	 stage	 of	 Erfahrung
(experience),	 that	 of	 the	 signifying
apprehension of the new heterogeneous object.
By	 implication	 [my	 emphasis],	 direct
experience includes the border on which the
subject may shatter. This shattering is not
the same as the impenetrable and atomistic
subject of the
	 'practical concept';	 it
constitutes instead the precondition of his
renewal. (ibid.)
This passage expresses the exigency for Kristeva's
theory of 'revolution' of a Maoist subject which takes
on the 'agency' proposed in revolutionary discourse.
The 'shattering' of the subject, a shattering whose
economy is drive rejection - and which the 'social'
subject does not 'know', indeed represses - is a
condition of the renewal of revolutionary discourse,
and therefore of the agency in social transformation.
This 'social' subject, however, misrecognizes itself in
the place it occupies in revolutionary discourse. This
is to retain (indeed insist on) an 'atomistic',
'misrecognizing' subject as the precondition for
action.
The Maoist moment of 'direct experience' (reformulating
Hegel's sense-certainty) is therefore, for Kristeva, an
experience that disturbs the unitary consciousness. It
implies the 'key moments' of the subject and presence
(not self-presence). As direct experience of the object
this subject is on the border of its 'shattering' in a
heterogeneous contradiction; the 'subject' is put in
process by a heterogeneous contradiction rooted in
objective contradictions: 'the moment of struggle
exploding the subject toward heterogeneous materiality'
(RPL, p. 25). 'Heterogeneous contradiction' presen.ts
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the logic of the connection of social subject (in the
risk of a social combat) and poetic subject (signifying
process appearing in a signifying practice).
Since the moment of practice is a violence for
consciousness, destructive of it, the moment of
knowledge - modelled as it still is on 'consiousness' -
is situated 'after' the moment of practice, in relation
to the new object produced. It returns through the
'leap' in which pratice renews the object: 'a
qualitative leap - the emergence of the concept
establishing internal connections' (RPL, p. 200). It is
therefore the concept of 'heterogeneous contradiction'
which presents the possibility of the transformation of
human law, of the 'symbolic' qua social organization.
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C. Heterogeneous Contradiction: the Sollen in
Kristeva's Thought of the Re-jection of Human Law
1. Heterogeneity and (Mis)recognition
Kristeva has exposed two forms of misrecognition in
Marxist theory, each of which takes place in the
respective overturnings of Hegel. The overturning of
Hegel by way of the 'practical idea' leads Marxist-
Leninism to relinquish the 'theoretical element' (there
is no self-reflective moment); furthermore, its failure
to acknowledge the teleology of the Good implemented by
the primacy of the 'practical idea' forces the
retention of a Feuerbachian subject, 'the proletariat'
(there is no 'theory of the subject'). The 'subject' of
Marxism misrecognizes itself in the 'practical idea'
the dominance of the unitary consciousness is
dissolved, but the consequent articulation of the
objective determinations of practice makes the subject
a 'bearer' of objective relations.
The Maoist overturning of Hegel, by way of the
'practical concept', takes place without questioning
further the 'moment' of practice. Maoist 'subjectivity'
retains the atomism of the Marxist-Leninist subject.
For Kristeva, Maoism implements the subjectivity Hegel
is held to have 'called for' at the end of the Science
of Logic (RPL, p. 200). Nevertheless, this overturning
of the 'primacy' of self-consciousness through the
'practical concept' posits a subjectivity which
misrecognizes itself in the practical concept: 'une
sujétivité qui se connait, mais sous la forme du
"concept pratique".'12 Maoist 'subjectivity' remains
'atomistic and impenetrable' as a result of this
misrecognition, failing to discover the 'precondition'
of the 1-legelian practice and experience which it brings
together in the three-stage dialectic.
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Kristeva has claimed that a 'new light' is thrown on
the revolutionary subject, and its concept of social
'practice', by the practice of 'poetic language' whose
truth is discovered in psychoanalysis. This claim must
proceed to an account of the 'correspondence' of the
poetic and social subjects. The final chapters of
Revolution in Poetic Language expound this
correspondence as dependent upon a 'heterogeneous
contradiction' between the subject in social and
political relations and a 'nonsymbolized outside'
rooted in objective contradictions. 'Heterogeneous
contradiction' presents the nonsynthetic connection of
the signifying process and the 'objective social
process' . It is here that the socio-historical
dimension of Kristeva's concept of 'revolution' is
foregrounded.
the moment of practice objectifies the
signifying process since it sets drive
rejection against material contradictions
(class struggle, for example), but at the
same time it introduces these material
contradictions into the process of the
subject. Heterogeneous contradiction here
lies between the signifying process and the
objective social process: it is the excess of
one by and through the other. (RPL, p. 205)
Kristeva presents a - heterogeneous - contradiction
which both puts the subject in process as a social
subject and sets that process against 'natural and
social structures', which is	 to say,	 following
Kristeva's logic, against previous theses: 'those
systems of representation that defer and delay the
violence of rejection' (RPL, p. 203). The heterogeneous
contradiction therefore determines 'practice' (pp. 203-
4). It is the precondition of the re-jection of the
thetic moment which is subject to a fixation by a logic
- of the 'same' - dependent on the social order (RPL,
p. 226). When it lies between the 'signifying process'
and the 'objective social process' the former has a
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historical impact or, conversely, political practice is
revolutionary practice.
The 'moment' of practice is broken down as follows.
'Heterogeneous contradiction' first puts 'the subject'
in process. The subject is not a 'bearer' but 'in
process', a passageway for the productive activity of
drive rejection or 'the signifying process'.
Practice is determined by the pulverization
of the unity of consciousness by a
nonsymbolized outside, on the basis of
objective contradictions and, as such, it is
the place where the signifying process is
carried out. Out of these objective
contradictions, drive rejection will bring
forth the new object whose determinations
exist objectively in material externality,
which means that this moment of practice is
not simply an 'apparition', within the
presence of consciousness, of the laws of
'being'. (RPL, pp. 203-4)
The heterogeneous contradiction of social subject and
nonsymbolized outside is a precondition of the practice
which will in turn re-ject revolutionary discourse and
its social 'agency'. This passage reveals the 'in
itself' and 'for itself' of Kristeva's 'subject t : on
the one hand, the 'signifying process', repressed truth
of the symbolic order; on the other 'signifying
practice', the appearance of the subject 'in' the
symbol ± c:
The subject never is. The subject is only the
signifying process and appears only as a
signifying practice, that is, only when he is
absent within the position out of which
social, historical, and signifying activity
unfolds. (RPL, p. 215)
'When he is absent', implies the subject in process;
when he is absent 'within the position out of
which...', the subject in process is not a negativist-
fetishist avoidance of the political relation but
traverses the thetic moment. When he is absent within
the position 'out of which social, historical and
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signifying activity unfolds' then the signifying
process (Kristeva's subject 'in itself') appears as a
signifying practice in its full sense (the subject 'for
itself'). The subject 'for itself' implies an 'entire
recasting of subjective and social structuration' (RPL,
p. 205).
Kristeva's distinction between the 'symbolic' and
'signifying practice' (the latter in its full sense,
denoting the effectivity of the 'semiotic' as a
recasting of 'the' symbolic) corresponds to two orders
which take up their place within the logic of positing
which unfolds the process of symbolization. The
symbolic (comprising social 'structure', 'the' subject,
and the object) is an order of 'being-posited' (the
Gesetztsein of German idealism); and the semiotic (in
principle, drive re-jection; in effect, the
objectification of the signifying process) is an order
of 'positing' (Setzen).
The 'subjective' moment (textual practice: the return
of drive rejection 'for the subject') therefore
requires the 'objective' or social moment if the
'poetic act' is to have an historical impact:
transformation of the symbolic. The exposition of
'heterogeneous contradiction' presents the 'consummate'
stage in Kristeva's concept of revolution. Drive
rejection is brought into confrontation with the
totality of the 'previous' symbolic thesis, and hence
denotes the effect of the signifying process on the
social order: 'what then occurs is the entire recasting
of subjective and social structuration' . This claim
expresses Kristeva's concept of the transformation of
the symbolic order, the 'correspondence' of the poetic
and (revolutionary) social subject. The
'correspondence' is set out as a dialectic of renewal
dependent on the 'objective social process' or
'nonsymbolized outside'.
153
The 'realization' of Kristeva's revolution therefore
requires the confrontation of drive rejection and the
symbolic order. The default of this confrontation is
equivalent to the default of signifying practice.
Nevertheless, the mediation implied by the 'in itself'
and 'for itself' of signifying process and signifying
practice actually only takes place within the
'subjective enclosure' of poetic language. The idea of
the entire recasting of subjective and social
structuration cannot be actually located. The location
of signifying practice in its full sense (the subject
'for itself') is in truth held off by the theory of
symbolization out of which the concept of 'revolution'
emerges. Kristeva's presentation of the moments of
'symbolization' and of 'practice' leave the object to
be transformed as the consequence of the transformation
(symbolic law is always reposited).
This has implications for the distinction Kristeva
makes between • the 'potential' of poetic language and
the 'fulfilment' of this potential. The analysis of
Céline's writings presents these implications. Céline
can be taken as one of the forms of (mis)recognition in
the 'stages' of poetic language; but the insistence
with which his writings reappear in Kristeva's thought
suggest that there is a difficulty in marking the
different stages of the renewal of poetic practice.
2. Céline: 'Obscene Words' and 'Crudely Exhibited
Phantasms'
The default of signifying practice began with its
manifestation as practice in the avant-garde: the
political dimension of 'art' is undermined owing to the
confinement of the 'process' to a limited realm. The
avant-garde is both political (where the signifying
process manifests itself) and 'not' political 	 (where
the process is confined), which is to say, it is 'not'
the 'appearance' of the signifying process.
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The equivocality of the transformative potential of
'modern' poetic language is most evident in Kristeva's
1975 essay on Céline ('D'une .identité l'autre). On the
one hand, Céline's poetic language posits or 'releases'
the infinite from the finite (from the 'sign'):
Obscene words. Semantically speaking, these
pivotal words in the Célinian lexicon
exercise a desemanticization function
analogous to the fragmentation of syntax by
rhythm. Far from referring, as all signs do,
to an object exterior to discourse and
identifiable as such by consciousness, the
obscene word is the minimal mark of a
situation of desire where the identity of the
subject, if not destroyed, is exceeded by a
conflict of instinctual drives linking one
subject to another.. .. [The obscene word] is
neither object, transcendental signified nor
signifier available to a neutralized
consciousness: around the object denoted by
the obscene word, and that object provides a
scanty delineation, more than a simple
context asserts itself - the drama of a
questioning process heterogeneous to the
meaning that precedes and exceeds it.13
On the other hand, this 'drama' cannot be addressed
separately from the question of Céline's anti-semitic
tracts:
A reading of any one of Céline's anti-semitic
tracts is sufficient to show the crudely
exhibited phantasms of an analysand
struggling against a desired, castrating and
sodomizing father; sufficient also to
understand that it is not enough to allow
what is repressed by the symbolic structure
to emerge in a 'musicated' language to avoid
its traps. Rather, we must in addition
dissolve its sexual determinations.
Céline represents the persistence of the 'subjective'
limitation of poetic language, or the persistence of
'misrecognition' within the (poetic) recognition of the
drive-related subject. If the Marxist-Leninist project
exemplifies a subject which misrecognizes itself in the
'practical idea' (failing to address the 'teleo1oy of
the Good'); and if Maoist practice exemplifies a
subjectivity which misrecognizes 	 itself in the
155
'practical	 concept'	 (failing	 to	 negotiate	 the
'unconscious'); Céline's writings stand for a
subjectivity which - notwithstanding the exposition of
the 'situation of desire' that is 'marked' in the
obscene word - misrecognizes itself in the moment of
'defence' and thus stands opposed to the 'Law'.
Céline therefore stands for a renewed foreclosure of
the 'political' dimension of the signifying process,
hence of the subject 'for itself' or signifying
practice in Kristeva's full sense. He exemplifies, in
Hegelian terms, the 'limit' of poetic language's
'passing of the limit': the Grenze within the liminary
boundary or Shranke. Given that the signifying practice
capable of transforming the conditions of its own
appearance (the fragmenting power of 'capitalism') has
not appeared, Céline stands as a question mark not only
over the 'fulfilment' of the transformative potential
of poetic language, but over its very potential.
Kristeva's discussion of the exemplification of poetic
language in the writings of Céline leads to her
statement that poetic language may be the 'catharsis'
but not the 'working through' of the drive-related
subject repressed by the symbolic structure.l4 This
appraisal of the Célinian 'text' implies that 'modern'
literature involves misrecognition and not only the
recognition it presents in Revolution in Poetic
Language, in contrast to the misrecognizing ideological
ego of social revolt.
The analysis of Céline might suggest a reenquiry into
the separation of 'recognition' and 'misrecognition
that Kristeva's subject-in-process and ideological
agency present, and of her abstract reception of the
distinction between Hegelian (mis)recognition and
knowledge (anerkennen and Wissen). Instead it leads to
a reappraisal of the 'theoretical function', and an
argument for the 'knowledge' of psychoanalysis. The
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reappraisal starts out in opposition to the 'abstract
and pretentiously universal law' of modern political
structures - whose logically thetic unity is taken to
be justified by 'philosophical' reason when it posits
the transcendental limit. The relation to modern
abstract law brings about a statement of the necessity
'not to renounce theoretical reason but to compel it to
increase its power by giving it an object beyond its
limits' .15 The profound consequences for the subject of
the 'self-defence' of capitalism's political structures
are to be met by an ethics beyond the transcendental
'limit' (the political and philosophical piracy of the
thetic moment): 'it is not enough to allow what is
repressed by the symbolic structure to emerge in a
"musicated" language to avoid its traps. Rather, w
must in addition dissolve its sexual determinations'
(my emphasis). The site of the knowledge which founds
this ethics is to be psychoanalysis.l6
In Revolution in Poetic Language - where Kristeva's
problematic is political in the 'strict' sense - the
difficulty which Céline exemplifies brings about a
reversion to the question with which her doctoral
thesis begins: the question of the 'appearance' of the
objective conditions which will bring forth 'signifying
practice' in its full sense. There can be no answer to
this question, but Kristeva outlines its implicit
Sollen the correspondence of a signifying practice
with the historical process. It is noteworthy that
Revolution in Poetic Language closes with a discussion
of the avant-garde texts of Lautréamont and Nallarmé.
The question that their oeuvre brings to the fore still
holds:
at what historical moment does social
exchange tolerate or necessitate the
manifestation of the signifying process in
its 'poetic' or 'esoteric' form? Under what
conditions	 does	 this	 'esoterism',	 in
displacing boundaries of socially established
signifying	 practices,	 correspond	 to
socioeconomic	 change'?	 And	 under	 what
157
conditions does it remain a blind alley, a
harmless bonus offered by a social order
which uses this 'esoterism' to expand, become
flexible, and thrive? (RPL, p. 16)
This question still holds because Kristeva's concept of
the transformative potential of poetic language, while
it presents the Sollen in her concept of social
transformation as a unity of possibility and
impossibility, defers the fulfilment of the potential
of poetic language. This implies a failure to grasp the
Sollen as, in Hegel's terms, a 'formalism of
possibility and impossibility '. As argued in chapter 1
above, the formalism of possibility implies a direct
self-contradiction within the Sollen itself: the latter
contains a Nicht-Sollen. This 'contradiction' can be
further unfolded.
3. The Sollen: the 'Two Unities' of Semiotic and
Symbolic
The diachronic account of symbolization in Revolution
in Poetic Language has supplemented the synchronic
account of 'poetic language' in the early writings. It
is now clearer how the treatment of 'finite' and
'infinite' succumbs to a problematic presented in
Hegel's Science of Logic, and addressed prematurely in
chapter 1. Kristeva may insist that the 'drive', if
constitutive of stases and ultimately of the symbolic,
is not an agency or an origin. Nevertheless the drive
is an 'in itself' in Kristeva's doctoral thesis.
Kristeva's foundational distinction of the semiotic and
symbolic expounds two unities of 'finite and infinite',
in one of which the 'infinite' is not negated. The
'semiotic chora' comprises the infinite of drive
facilitation and the finite of social organization, not
as 'law' but 'mediated' as 'constraint'. The symbolic
comprises the finite of (Oedipal and social) law and of
signification (communication with others), but also the
infinite of a semiotic functioning (repressed or
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otherwise): 'poetic language' enacts the release from
finitude ('signifying process') in the symbolic
order. 17
The distinction between 'semiotic' and 'symbolic' is -
as I have claimed - foundational because of the
different modes in which the unity of finite and
infinite function in each 'order' . The passage from the
Logic on the understanding's 'falsification' of the
double unity, quoted in chapter 1 above, finds its
place here. The understanding falls into a
'falsification' of the double unity when it does not
negotiate the 'absolute contradiction' which informs
the concept of the Sollen. The 'double result'
discussed in chapter 1 above is an outcome of
taking the infinite in one of the two unities
not as negated, but rather as the in itself,
in which, therefore, determinateness and
limitation should not be posited, for these
would debase and ruin it. (SL, p. 145)
Determinateness - as ordering, chora - is implicit in
Kristeva's 'semiotic' but 'not posited t : 'social
organization, always already symbolic, imprints its
constraint in a mediated form which organizes the chora
not according to a law (a term which we reserve for the
symbolic) but through an ordering' (RPL, p. 27). One
of the two unities reserves the infinite as an 'in
itself', not negated; the drive attack is functional in
transformation but not itself transformed. It is the
negative moment of differentiation, an 'objective
inner' distinguished from the positive moment,
initially the 'mark' which 'prefigures the sign's
constancy and unity' (RPL, p. 172). 'Stasis' is the
principle in Kristeva's logic of rejection which, as
representing a qualititative change, is taken to
distinguish it from negative force from 'a merely
mechanical rejection of an undifferentiated "identity"'
(RPL, p. 171). The other principle, 'repeated drives',
however, is merely quantitative and represents a return
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of the same moment: biological material rejection -
division/stoppage, 'marking One' (p. 171). Biological
material rejection is the 'in itself' of Kristeva's
infinite, even if there is no semiotic functioning
without the psychosomatic formation ultimately
determined by 'familial and social structures'.
Hegel shows that a Sollen is contained in the double
unity when in one of the unities the infinite is an 'in
itself' or not negated; or, conversely, when
'determinateness and limitation should not be posited'
in one of the unities. The dialectical relation of
Kristeva's two 'unities' - whose condition is
'heterogeneous contradiction', the qualitative leap or
the 'thetic moment' - carries the default of negation
of the infinite in the first unity (the semiotic chora)
over to the second (the symbolic order), and reverses
it. The 'infinite' in the 'symbolic' unity presents a
seeming mediation, a movement from 'in itself'
(signifying process) to 'for itself' (signifying
practice). However, if drive rejection, the 'infinite'
in the semiotic chora, sustains an objective inner that
is not negated; the 'infinite' in the symbolic unity
does not negate: the finite (abstract right, paternal
law, 'capitalism's political structures') are not
negated. Indeed Kristeva's 'leap' to symbolic law can
only be a (re)positing of abstract right and 'paternal'
law, since it is never expounded as anything but the
confusion of the 'subject who knows' with 'state
power' Many commentators have stressed the default of
negatiort or transformatidn of the symbolic in
Kristeva's writings, although without ever questioning
Kristeva's double unity - which would require
rethinking,	 not	 revising,	 the	 concept of the
'symbolic' .18
Kristeva's second (symbolic) unity comprises a finite
(the symbolic order) which is infinitized by a process:
not negated but put into play. The renewal of violence
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in poetic language does not carry with it renewal
through violence. Kristeva herself is hardly unaware of
this limitation, as is evident in Revolution in Poetic
Language when she comes to the proposition that textual
practice must correspond with a revolutionary discourse
(RPL, p. 191). The revolutionary project may, in turn,
block the process - as is consistent with the concept
of 'tendency' informing all the dimensions which
combine to produce 'practice'. This is why
'heterogeneous contradiction', the dialectical and not
economic moment of the process, is crucial as the
precondition of 'practice'. She proposes a materialist
theory of practice which combines 'cultural' and
'political' transformation, but the 'not yet' of this
practice, while acknowledged and presented, represents
an infinite deferral of the union of finite and
infinite which has already been claimed for 'poetic
language'.
The above clarification of Kristeva's foundational
concepts of the 'semiotic' and the 'symbolic' provokes
the question whether her thought does not in fact
remain 'idealist' in Hegel's sense: subject to the
latter's critique of Kant and Fichte, since the
'materialist' sublation of idealist dialectic proposes
a logic of 'two worlds' that do not come into the
correspondence which would bring about the social
transformation whose prospect they hold out. The
confrontation of the 'semiotic', enacted in poetic
language, and the 'symbolic', the modern social and
political relations continually reinforced by the
'operations' of capitalism, is projected into an
unthinkable future: 'a beyond which cannot be reached
for the very reason that it is not meant to be
reached'.19 Kristeva does not return to rethink this
limitation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 'heterogeneous
contradiction' but puts it down to 'objective
conditions' (ultimately, to the spread of capitalist
society). Nevertheless, her abandonment of the Maoist
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dialectic, and the reassessment of the 'theoretical
function' on the terrain of psychoanalysis represent
her awareness that the materialist dialectical logic
has not been able to present a theory of social
transformation, even after the exposition of
'symbolization' has endeavoured to overcome some of the
difficulties arising from the abstract return to
logical categories in the early essays.
The reassessment of the 'theoretical function' on the
terrain of psychoanalysis implicitly departs from the
methodological position from which the theory of the
'semiotic' and 'symbolic' is expounded. The moment of
'knowledge' - in contrast to its place in the
sequential movement of the Maoist dialectic - is now
inseparable from the moment of 'experience'. It is
Kristeva's exposition of the 'dynamic' of the
transference which will establish this inseparability,
and which contains a claim to a renewed concept of the
'infinite' subsequent to the disclosure of the 'ethic'
of psychoanalysis, and consequential for sustaining the
meaning and value of 'modern literature'.
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Summary of and Conclusion to Part I
There are two points to be emphasized in conclusion to
the above discussion of Kristeva's doctoral thesis. The
first is the success or otherwise of the claim made for
'poetic language' as a 'practice' in modern capitalist
societies. The second, from which the former is
inseparable, is the difficulty which lies within the
construal of social and political relations in terms of
symbolic 'law'.
In Kristeva's thesis the spread of capitalist society
undermines linguistic and ideological norms, but also
favours the reconsititution of modern political
structures based on 'abstract and pretentiously
universal law'. In these conditions, there is only a
'practice' where it is possible to maintain the
'heterogeneous contradiction' which attacks and renews
symbolic law. The primacy in these conditions of the
practice of poetic language rests on its capacity to
engage with the 'thetic' or structuring moment of the
symbolic order (which is inseparable from the entrance
into language and 'representation'). The thetic moment
is the dialectical moment of the process, and only by
way of engagement with it will a 'previous thesis' be
overcome. 'Poetic language' thus remains the potential
for the renewal and binding of the infinite process
that capitalism integrates and appropriates 'qua
process'
Kristeva's presentation of 'stages' of poetic language
is crucial to her claim that the truth of 'literature'
is a historical materialist 'practice'. The stages
present advancing modes of the re-jection of the
'symbolic': the attack on family structure (the avant-
garde); the attack on the seats of power (Bataille);
the sustained engagement with the very structure of
language (Joyce); and the disclosure and recomposition
of the 'truth' of monotheism (Céline).
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All these stages nevertheless contain and re-present
the fundamental moment of what is a general theory of
transformation, whose possibility derives from the
'reversal' of Hegel's dialectic of force. The inversion
of the 'thought of force' reposits the 'objective
inner' of matter: an objective material agency
structured independently of consciousness. The notion
of 'heterogeneous contradiction' explains the
possibility of a link b.etween the independent material
foundation and the realm of representation (the
symbolic order). However, since 'heterogeneous
contradiction' is a 'leap' it always presents an
unknowable transition.
It therefore remains a difficulty in Kristeva's thought
to show just how 'matter', this fixed basis of drive
re-jection, could either account for the different
stages in 'poetic language', or achieve a connection
with the systems of representation at all. The
difficulty of distinguishing the advances in signifying
practice becomes evident with the analysis of Céline.
His 'fiction' seems to present the highest 'stage' of
poetic language because it discloses and recomposes the
truth of the most deep-seated power of western
civilization: 'monotheism'. Céline's oeuvre is the
subject of Kristeva's Powers of Horror (which will be
discussed further in chapter 4). It figures there as
the strongest example of the narcissistic enclosure,
precisely where he presents the recognition of the
'truth' of monotheism.
Kristeva holds that Céline's anti-semitism is
inseparable from the meaning of his fiction, since it
is a direct consequence of his 'practice'. The unity of
the two, the political stance and the practice, present
the symptom of the civilization of western monotheism.
Anti-semitism is the outcome when the impact of
symbolic power on the speaking being is manifested in a
practice; and when, within that practic, the 'ego' is
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clung to as a security against the violence entailed in
the passage through monotheism's 'strategy' of
identity-formations. What is re-jected (monotheism) is
reconfigured as a hated object; through the opposition
to that object an 'ego' protects itself against the
dissolution of 'subject' and 'object' which the death-
dealing force of drive re-jection threatens. This will
be returned to in chapter 4 below. What is important
here, is that even at the 'summits' of signifying
practice, poetic language presents a subjective
enclosure (the Grenze returns within the Schranke or
release from finitude that literature practices).
The difficulty within Kristeva's theory of
transformation of the 'symbolic' is intrinsic to the
way in which she has set up what is to be transformed
('Law'), and consequently what is to transform
('signifying practice'). 'Drive re-jection' and
'hegerogeneous contradiction' respectively explain the
materialist economy and the founding moment of the
'symbolic'. The logic of the displacement of
boundaries, presented in the diachronic account of
symbolization, is sustained in the synchronic dimension
(where	 the	 producible	 'subject'	 is	 a	 given).
Nevertheless, the 'law' - whose renewal is held out as
the ultimate outcome of (the qualitative change
resulting from) the accumulating displacement of
boundaries (of linguistic structures) - is itself
incomprehensible. The moment of the foundation of
existing 'law', as also the moment of its 'renewal',
contains a 'leap' in which the symbolic order is
posited, but as a result of which social and political
relations cannot be comprehended. The traversal and
reaffirmation of the 'thetic moment' can only (re)posit
the structure which is the content of existing symbolic
law (abstract right, 'paternal' law); and as a
structure it cannot be known, precisely because it is
subject to a purely theoretical analysis alone.
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Kristeva treats social and political relations, insofar
as they are knowable, as a realm of systems of
representation beoause the positing, and repressive
structure, of the 'sign' (suppressing the 'semiotic')
is considered to be fundamental to the structure of
human 'law'. It is impossible to divest the knowledge
of social and political relations from the consequences
of the primacy of the 'entrance into language'. What is
posited in the thetic. moment, and what is to be
transformed in signifying practice, is always construed
in terms of 'systems of representation'.
The point will be made clear in the 'Intertext' below,
but it is important to emphasize that it will not be
affected by the abandonment of the revolutionary
standpoint, but carries over to the 'ethics' of
psychoanalysis, since Kristeva never requestions the
concept of 'symbolic law' or the 'sublation' of Hegel
which led to her conception of the finite-infinite
relation.
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INTERTEXT
'Intertext': this expression is used to suggest that
Kristeva's concept of the 'text', given its
implications for the knowledge of social and political
relations, represents a loss of the philosophy of law
which developed in the debates of German idealism from
Kant to Hegel. Kristeva's identification of all 'forms'
of transcendental philosophy is the point of departure
for her insistence on the value for social and
political theory of psychoanalysis' knowledge of the
'split' subject. The scope attributed to this knowledge
gives rise to a concept of 'negation' (re-jection)
which posits a fundamental agnostic moment in the
comprehension of social and political relations.
'Intertext' therefore suggests that the resources of
German idealism for the problematic of the subject in
social and political relations fall out of Kristeva's
concept of the 'text' because of this agnostic moment,
and that this preempt an acknowledgement of the
implicit return to Hegel in the return to Freud. The
placing of the 'Intertext' here, between the discussion
of Kristeva's early and that of her later writings,
also points the fact that the abandonment of 'Maoism'
and 'turn' to psychoanalysis in the later writings
represent an acknowledgement of the implications of the
use of the theory of the unconscious on social and
political terrain, even though the philosophical
problematic is not followed through by Kristeva. Part
II, below, will present Kristeva's deeper engagement
with psychoanalysis, and her substitution of a
'typology of discourses' for system in philosophy.
Chapter 5 addresses the difficulties which emerge with
the attempt to negotiate the utility of psychoanalytic
references beyond the 'boundary' of psychoanalysis on
social and political terrain.
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1. Negation unknown
Part I above has recapitulated Kristeva's reformulation
of the Lacanian 'symbolic', and set out the fundamental
moments in Kristeva's exposition of 'process' and
'structure' (ultimately drive re-jection and thetic
unity). The reversals of Hegelian and Marxist thought,
on the basis of the psychoanalytic discovery of the
'split' subject, present a theory of historical
transformation whose key features are comparable with
the idealist comprehension of subjective and objective
spirit. The comparison, undertaken here, exposes the
implications of the fundamental agnosticism in
Kristeva's thought: Kristeva's 'sublation' of idealist
thought poses an opposition between the 'signifying
process' and symbolic structures, and places an
absolute restriction on the knowledge of social and
political relations.
The exposition and thesis of Revolution in Poetic
Language can be summarized in five points which permit
the implicit relation to Hegel to emerge.
First, Revolution in Poetic Language expounds the
concept of the signifying process and presents the
sites of 'signifying practice', and then elaborates the
problematic of the 'subjective enclosure' of signifying
practices. Second, it postulates the 'objective social
process' . Third, the condition of release from the
'subjective enclosure' of the process is presented as a
'heterogenous contradiction' between the signifying
process and the objective social process. Fourth, a
'social agent' emerges as condition of the historical
impact of the signifying process: 'a module by which
the mechanism of rejection in question invades the
social realm' (RPL, p. 205). The social agent is
situated in an 'immediate experience' with the
objective social process (with 'objective
contradictions'). Fifth, and finally, Kristeva presents
an ineluctable opposition between that 'immediate'
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social experience ('struggle') and the moment of
'knowledge' of the 'new object' which results from the
introduction of drive re-jection into the social realm
by way of social 'struggle'.
On the one side, there is a 'subjective' totality which
is a self-mediation of signifying process and
signifying practice; on the other side an objective
totality which embraces the unitary subject and
society, and the scientific knowledge of their 'laws'
('structures'). The objective totality has no self-
mediation: its unity with the 'objective social
process' is mediated through the signifying process,
ultimately drive re-jection. The 'objective social
process', the 'in itself' of the objective totality, is
never 'for itself' since consciousness and the
structures of a society only 'return renewed' by way of
the negative force of the signifying process: drive re-
jection posits the 'new object'. Only the latter (the
renewed objective totality) and not its 'in itself'
(the objective social process) is 'known'.
On the subjective side, therefore, there is the self-
mediation of the 'in itself' and 'for itself' of
signifiance. On the objective side there is an
unknowable in itself, an unknowing social agent, and a
(re)posited objective totality 'for us'. The 'for us'
is the moment of scientific knowledge: 'we intervene,
writes Hegel' according to Kristeva (RPL, p. 203). The
restriction of the meaning of 'scientific knowlege',
and its conflation with Hegelian 'Wissen' is evident.
The double articulation of the	 'process'	 (bio-
historical on the subjective side, 'socio-historical'
on the objective side) presents a materialist
comprehension of subjective and objective spirit, and
of their mutual pervasion in the 'moment of practice'.
Nevertheless, the 'subjective' and the 'objective'
totalities (process and structure) are radically
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divided owing to the 'leap' in the moment of social
practice. It is only within its subjective enclosure
that subjective spirit is a self-mediation of
signifying process (the 'in itself') and signifying
practice (the process 'for itself'). It loses self-
mediation in the 'moment' of its objectification or
historical impact - as a direct consequence of the
fact that the objective side (social process and
structural totality) is not a self-mediation.
The 'agnostic' core of the historical impact (the
'leap') stems from the fact that in their moment of
correspondence the objective side retains the character
it has when in opposition to the subjective side. It
has no 'negativity' of its own but borrows it from the
subjective side. Consequently, the subjective side is
infected by the non-mediation of the objective side.
Its own negativity no longer presents a self-mediation
of 'in itself' and 'for itself' but a mysterious (re-
)positing of the objective totality: the 'new thesis',
the new object 'for us' (RPL, p. 204).
Since the force of the negative belongs to the
subjective side only, and since the moment of practice
inscribes that negativity within an unknowable
'rupture', the 'heterogeneous contradiction' of
signifying and social process invests the totality
('unity' of subjective and objective spirit) with a
fundamental agnostic moment. 'Heterogeneous
contradiction', the correspondence of subjective and
objective spirit, turns the 'negating activity' of
drive re-jection into a leap into a new objective
totality (consciousness, socio-symbolic order and
scientific knowledge of their 'laws').
The severance of the 'moments' of subjective and social
structuration consequent upon the agnostic core of
socio-historical structuration is displayed in
Kristeva's description of the social struggle. The
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correspondence of the signifying process and the social
process, out of which a new object arises, has as its
'middle' the ideological social ego; an agent situated
as an 'immediate experience' of objective
contradictions (the 'nonobjectifiable' externality).
The new object is a moment of the process
whose conflict constitutes the most intense
moment of rupture and renewal. Consciousness
tends to repress this struggle within
heterogeneity, which takes the subject into
an 'externality' he rejects only to posit
again, renewed. (RPL, p.204)
The social agent (the 'revolutionary') arises in a
clash with the objective process, in which the
objective is not known but only 'immediately'
experienced. The moment of social struggle is a
Fichtean Anstoss, the unknowable impact of a 'subject'
(Kristeva's 'ideological ego') and an unknown outside.
Furthermore, this 'subject', in order to act, is cut
off from the 'poetic' re-cognition of the violence of
drive re-jection which pervades it; in order to act it
wittingly undergoes that violence without needing to
know its mechanism (RPL, p. 206). Further again, as
subject of an 'immediate' experience of objective
contradictions the social agency cannot 'know' the
objective contradictions (social process) but only
undergoes their violence. The social agent is the
unitary subject 'put in process' by objective
contradictions and carrying drive re-jection into the
social field.
Practice of whatever kind - but revolutionary
practice in its explicit content - knows this
moment in which the race toward death -
implicit jouissance - is never far behind the
contradictions confronted by the subject,
since he supersedes himself there, first as a
unity and finally as a living being, if the
objective law of struggle demands it. (RPL,
p. 206; my emphasis)
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Kristeva's argument against 'idealist' mediation,
presents a social 'subject' who is but a sacrifice to
the historical process because the latter has no self-
mediation. In Kristeva's materialist dialectic the
moment of the 'most immediate violence',l is elevated
into its 'socio-political' moment since 'after' the new
thesis there are but new laws or norms of society
analysable only theoretically as posits, or
'structures' . The root of this elevation lies in the
status of the 'objective social process' as a postulate
of thought: an 'in itself' of the objective totality to
which 'contradictions', known only from their effects,
are attributed.
Despite the Fichtean moment in Kristeva's inversion of
Hegel, the materialist dialectic is an attempt to
overcome the agnostic moment in subjective idealism and
its tyrannous consequences when it expounds a politics
and an ethics. Nevertheless, an agnosticism returns
into the dialectic of drive re-jection. The 'moment of
practice' reconfigures negativity as a moment of
'positing' in which there is an absolutely unknowable
term: the socio-historical 'in itself', the very term
which is claimed to unite Kristeva's 'independent
material agency' (drive) and her idealist moment (a
signifying determination). The mediating term is merely
postulated. The dialectic is frozen by appending it to
an unknowable moment within materialist 'negativity',
and consequently fixed to an unsublatable 'concept' of
negativity: 'heterogeneous contradiction'. There is no
knowledge of the negation which is claimed for
heterogeneous contradiction as an 'entire recasting of
subjective and social structurations' (RPL, p. 205),
and the dialectic remains fixed to that agnosticism
from the start. The atomistic subjects of the social
order know nothing; the social and poetic subjects are
estranged; scientific consciousness is only ever last
on the scene and can but analyse the 'result' of the
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negation: the objective totality or the laws (qua
structures) of consciousness and of society.
Even though oppositions of drives/language or
nature/symbol are 'sublated' in the notion of the
'split subject', once this 'splitting' is posited as
the truth of intersubjectivity, Kristeva's analysis of
the subject in social and political relations remains
within the dichotomy it starts out from. The opposition
of 'drives' and 'language' turns into the opposition of
the subjective and the objective. The dichotomy is
sustained, and absolutely divides from one another the
actors, objects and aims of signifying and social
'process'
The fundamental agnosticism with which the
unknowability of the objective 'in itself' invests the
whole of Kristeva's theory of subjective and social
transformation is determined by her construal of
Hegelian mediation. The 'need' for a theory of the
subject demands an overturning of the idealist
dialectic, if the subject is to be recognized as a
'unity' of material and symbolic determinations rather
than as the thetic 'self-consciousness' of Hegelian
'mediation', supposedly cut off from 'immediacy' from
the outset.2
2. The 'need' for a theory of the subject
The purpose of the exposition of the 'semiotic' in
Kristeva's writings is to retrieve a 'theory of the
subject', deemed to be missing from the Marxist
dialectic; to be available to a materialist rethinking
of the idealist dialectic, but not approached there;
and to be lost in the Kantian fate of the Lacanian
'symbolic'
Kristeva's 'return to Freud' inherits the Lacanian
expansion of psychoanalysis as a 'theory of culture',
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but the theory of the 'semiotic' and 'symbolic' goes
further than Lacan by developing psychoanalysis into a
'knowledge of the practical' . Kristeva presents the
distinction between the 'semiotic' and the 'symbolic'
both as an 'opposition' necessary for the purposes of
theoretical description, and as a recognition of the
'semiotic' dimension of the 'symbolic' without which
the practical implications of the Lacanian 'symbolic'
cannot be overcome.	 -
the semiotic that 'precedes' symbolization is
only a theoretical supposition justified by
the need for description. It exists in
practice only within the symbolic and
requires the symbolic break to obtain the
complex articulation we associate with it in
musical and poetic practices. In other words,
symbolization makes possible the complexity
of this semiotic combinatorial system, which
only theory can isolate as 'preliminary' in
order to specify its functioning.
Nevertheless, the semiotic is not solely an
abstract object produced for the needs of
theory. (RPL, p. 68)
The 'theory' of the subject retrieved from Freud,
without which the 'knowledge of the practical' cannot
be disclosed, leads to the privileging of the
diachronic expositions of the 'unity' of semiotic and
symbolic in both early and later writings; it
'isolates' the semiotic system as preliminary 'in order
to specify its functioning'. Revolution in Poetic
Language presents the 'thetic phase' in which the
subject ('self-consciousness') and 'symbolic' are
generated. The later writings present the pre-thetic
psychic drama of narcissism that explains the
possibility of the 'mirror image' and the Oedipal
structure. In both cases, Kristeva is attempting to
elaborate a 'separated subject' which retains the
Lacanian subject of 'lack' while overturning its
practical implications: the subject's subordination to
the symbolic. The social and political ambition of
Kristeva's thesis lies in the fact that while the
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'need' for a theory of the subject leads to diachronic
expositions of psychosexual individuation (in order to
specify the semiotic functioning), the implication of
the 'semiotic' thus expounded is the retrieval of
spheres of 'practice' within modern social and
political relations.
The basic dichotomy which Kristeva perceives as
intrinsic to both modern social and political relations
and to their sciences (political sciences and modern
philosophy) is the dichotomy nature/culture - to be
'sublated' through the intelligibility to
psychoanalysis of the unconscious, the unity of
'drives' and 'language'. 'Drive re-jection' is the
negative force in the materialist dialectic and, since
it is expounded as a renewing and renewable
'negativity', Kristeva claims that the overturning of
the idealist dialectic does not replace the primacy of
intelligence (Husseris' 'transcendental subject') with
a materialist 'absolute'.
'Drive re-jection' is expounded diachronically as a
presymbolic process which constitutes the 'subject'
('self-consciousness'). Nevertheless its 'truth' lies
in its synchronic status both as the negativity which
posits the two orders (posits the 'symbolic', or
objective totality plus its semiotic lining, a 'complex
combinatorial system'), and as the negating activity
determined by both orders. As the latter, drive re-
jection puts 'in process' the oppositions of the
'symbolic' consequent upon its being-posited
(nature/symbol; body/language; the feminine/'paternal
law') . Kristeva's 'negativity' takes up the position
of 'how reason presents itself' in the following
statement from Hegel 's Differenzschrift:
Reason presents itself as the force of the
negative absolute, and hence as negativity
that is absolute; and at the same time it
presents itself as the force that posits the
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opposed objective and subjective totalities.
(DifTf., pp. 94-5)
The purported 'truth' of the distinction between
'semiotic' and 'symbolic' is the unity of their
identity and difference. The 'signifying process'
expresses their identity and the symbolic order their
difference - the realm of their 'appearance' as
oppositions. The 'moment' of their unity ('negativity')
is in Kristeva's view not an abstraction of the
understanding, since drive re-jection - as Kristeva's
coinage conveys - is itself 'renewable', determined by
the opposites it posits. 'Drive re-jection' is the
negativity (heterogeneous contradiction) which posits
the two orders which determine negativity (drive re-
jection). The circle is, at least explicitly, complete,
since the 'principle' of the dialectic does not stand
outside it. The apparent truth of Kristevan 'process'
is not that the infinite posits the finite -
(re)constitution of the objective totality - but the
positing	 of	 the	 infinite	 in	 the	 finite	 -
(re)structuration	 of	 subjective	 and	 objective
totalities .3
The agnostic core of the 'moment' of heterogeneous
contradiction, exposed above, nevertheless affects
Kristeva's 'circle'. The distinction between negativity
as 'drive re-jection' and as 'heterogeneous
contradiction' is symptomatic of this problem. The
question is not whether the materialist dialectic fails
to complete itself. The failure of its completion
corresponds to Kristeva 1 s caution in not positing a
resolution to the aporiae of the subject in modern
social and political relations. The 'agnostic moment'
in Kristeva's presentation of the heterogeneous
contradiction of the subjective and objective
totalities corresponds to her care not to turn
'restructuration' into an ideal to be realized. The
question is therefore not the 'noncompletion' or
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'openness t of the dialectic, but whether or not it gets
off its ground. Kristeva's materialist dialectic can
therefore be assessed in the light of Hegel's rewriting
of the Fichtean and Schellingian systems.
3. 'The need of philosophy'
Hegel's abstract presentation, in the Differenzscrift,
of 'the need of philosophy' assessed the 'various forms
occurring in contemporary philosophy' in the context of
the separation of the sciences (the isolated
'knowledges' or Erkenntnisse of culture and of nature)
(Diff, pp. 85-9). The title of his essay, 	 'The
Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of
Philosophy', announces Hegel's review of the
'transcendental turn' in philosophy after Kant, and its
outcome: a system of 'intelligence' (Verstand) on one
side and a system of 'nature' on the other. Fichte had
presented a transcendental philosophy of the subjective
unity of	 subject and	 object	 (the	 'subjective
subject=object') and Schelling had provided its
counterpart,	 a	 philosophy	 of	 the	 'objective
subject=object'.
Hegel rewrites the Fichtean and Schellingian 'forms' of
philosophy in order to show their 'difference'
(relation). He expounds the outcome of the responses to
pre-critical dogmatism when transcendental philosophy
reduces 'reason' to a reflective position. The
reflective or methodological position leads to an
absolute opposition between the 'subjective' and the
'objective' in which one side only is a 'unity' of
finite and infinite; in which, consequently, that side
re-presents a sphere of limitedness while the 'release'
from finitude, or force of the negative absolute, is
reserved to the other side alone; and in which,
therefore, as an absolute identity opposed to the
finite, the infinite is reduced to a finite infinite.
Despite the sublation of the opposition of the
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subjective and the objective on one level, the
transcendental turn only raises one side to the
'absolute' standpoint, and therefore leaves it as a
'standpoint'.
In the following passage Hegel lays out the 'relapse'
of philosophical reflection into a methodological
position which posits an 'absolute' opposition between
finite and infinite.
The understanding copies reason's absolute
positing, and through this form gives itself
the semblance of reason even though what are
posited are in themselves opposites, and
hence finite. The semblance grows that much
stronger when the understanding transforms
and fixes reason's negating activity into a
product. The infinite, insofar as it gets
opposed to the finite, is a thing of this
kind, i.e., it is something rational as
posited by the understanding. By fixing it,
the understanding sets it up in absolute
opposition to the finite; and reflection
which had risen to the plane of reason when
it suspended the finite, now lowers itself
again to being understanding because it has
fixed reason's activity into an opposing.
Moreover, reflection still pretends to be
rational, even in its relapse. (Diff, p. 90)
1-legel's criticism of the endless 'opposing' to which
reason is reduced corresponds to his assessment of the
'relapse' between Fichte's 'grasp' of the absolute and
its exposition or system. In 1801 Hegel's main
criticisms are addressed to Fichte's
Wissenschaftslehre, and are extended into the latter's
political and moral philosophy in order to show the
consequences of subjective idealism when it comes to
elaborate the 'rational'	 state and the ethical
dimension of the individual in such a state.
It is common ground for [Fichte's] Ethics and
his Natural Law alike, that the idea must
dominate over drive, that freedom must
dominate nature. What distinguishes them is
this: in the Natural Law, the subservience of
free beings to the concept is strictly the
absolute end in itself so that the fixed
abstraction of the general will must here
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subsist apart and far from the individual,
and have coercive authority over him. In the
Ethics, on the other hand, concept and nature
must be posited as united in one and the same
person. In the State, Right alone is to
govern, while in the realm of morality, duty
will only have power insofar as the
individual's reason acknowledges it as law.
(Di.ff., p. 149)
Hegel's criticisms of Fichte's system embrace the
implications of the fundamental distinction between
'theoretical' and 'practical' reason and their
respective realms in the critical and transcendental
philosophies. Either this distinction leads to relative
identities of infinite and finite being posited in
their respective realms (Kant); or the attempt to
overcome the consequent limitation of the 'infinite'
grounds theoretical in practical reason without
overcoming the limitation, but only producing an
absolute opposition of legality and morality, and
drawing out the most tyrannous consequence of their
separation (the Fichtean state).
Kristeva's theory of the 'subject' is emphatically
distinguished from any concept of the 'will'; but her
notion that the actual modern state represents a
confusion of the 'subject who knows' with 'state power'
belies this apparent dispensation with the concept of
the 'will'; it re-presents and sustains the concept of
the state understood as a law which subsists 'apart and
far from the individual' . Nevertheless, the purpose of
her theory of the 'subject' is to show that the
psychoanalytic knowledge of the 'split' subject, as
unity of 'idea' and 'drive', overcomes the limitations,
and effects, of a social and political thought based on
the transcendental turn in philosophy. However, the
foundational	 distinction	 between	 'semiotic'	 and
'symbolic',	 and	 the	 materialist	 concept	 of
'negativity', do not step out of the movement of the
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'understanding' whose forms Hegel distinguishes and
sublates.
Hegel's assessment of Fichte in the Differenzschrift
addresses the primacy of practical reason as a
restriction of 'reason' within the one-sided 'negative
absolute', the 'absolute subject'. I will rehearse the
elements of this argument in order to draw out the
dimensions of the fixation of the 'negative absolute'
as they emerged in the debates of German idealism; and
subsequently	 to	 reinterrogate	 the	 residual
structuralist distinctions (semiotic/symbolic;
synchronic/diachronic) imposed on Kristeva's thought by
the fixation of her 'concept' of negativity.
In 1801 Hegel appraises the proposition expressing
Fichtean reason (the '1=1') as 'the authentic principle
of speculation boldly expressed' (Diff, p. 81). He
criticizes the fate of Fichte's speculative grasp of
'reason' when it comes to its 'exposition'. The
'subject=object' (unity of identity and difference) is
abandoned, and Fichte's system develops in the element
of the 'understanding' owing to the primacy of
practical reason. It is a system of 'oppositions' : 'as
soon as speculation steps out of the concept that it
establishes of itself and evolves into a system, it
abandons itself and its principle and does not come
back to it again' (ibid.). The 'principle' remains a
principle in opposition to the manifold deduced:
identity and difference, concept and nature are
radically sundered; nature is dominated either by a
fixed abstraction of the general will to which
individuals, as such, are subordinated; or it is
dominated by the 'individual's reason'. The F±chtean
natural 'law' of freedom, the self-limiting I, makes an
enemy of its source. It is a 'concept that commands'
(Diff, p. 145). Kristeva's theory of the subject
searches out, first, a concept of negativity in which
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freedom ('practice') does not present the self-
opposition of freedom to nature; and, later, an
intrapsychic 'law' of intersubjectivity whose
acknowledgement would counter the dominance of Fichtean
'right' and 'ethics'.4
The movement of philosophical reflection which produces
an absolute opposition between 'identity' and
'difference' in Fichte (on the one side 'intelligence'
on the other 'being' or nature) is expounded in Hegel's
early essay in the Kantian terms of 'concept' and
'intuition'. These are terms which Fichte himself used
in the second of the two 'Introductions' to the
(unfinished) Attempt at a New Presentation of the
Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge (1797). In the
'second' Introduction Fichte turns from the speculative
'truth' of the 1=1 (subject=object) to the primacy of
an intellectual act as the foundation of the system.
Fichte was arguing with the philosophical 'dogmatism'
that places a 'thing-in-itself' as the ground of the
totality of representations, embracing not only the
'feeling of necessity' but the 'feeling of freedom'.
Against and out of this position, repudiated as
'fatalist-materialist', Fichte propounds the subjective
foundational 'act' which grounds representation. He
calls this act an 'intellectual intuition' in which the
'original procedure of reason' is grasped (SK, p. 33).
Intellectual intuition discovers how self-consciousness
and consciousness of something which for it is
something external to it 'are necessarily connected'
(5K, p. 33). It is an act out of which the unity of
self-consciousness and consciousness (the existence for
it of an object) arises 'for' consciousness.
The precedence of this 'intellectual' act presents the
relapse into the primacy of the 'subjective' moment.
The loss of intuition or of the objective moment in
reason is discernible within Fichte's account of the
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movement of that act, which combines the following
moments. There is an activity of the intellect in which
it turns back into itself to make itself its own
object; and an activity whereby a being arises for it
outside of it. These activities are inseparable and out
of them arise, simultaneously, both 'self' and
'object'. Nevertheless, the movement of turning back
[Zurückkehren], which Fichte calls 'intuition', is a
modification of consciousness which does not come
before it. Only in the opposition to it of the not-self
is the original intuiting a comprehending: no self
without a not-self.
The self cannot come to be without a being arising for
it in opposition to (outside) it, but the condition of
their emergence is the 'intuition'. The movement from
intuition to consciousness, comprehending, and concept
takes place as the movement from the 'in itself' of
intuition to the 'for itself' of the concept of self
through the emergence of the object. Consequently,
intuition, the possibility of and what will be the
'self' remains unknowable: 'The acting in question is
simply the concept of the self, and the concept of the
self is the concept of that acting' (SK, p. 35). It is
this movement and what it suppresses that Kristeva
criticizes in the supposed transition from Hegelian
sense-certainty to self-consciousness, where she argues
that the 'immediate unity' of consciousness and object
in experience is left behind in the 'constitution' of
self-consciousness.
Fichte's genetive, concept of act denotes, but cannot
comprehend, the movement in which it comes forth - its
own history. The movement of becoming - which embraces
the leap from intuition to concept - is transformed in
the very 'moment' of object- and self-consciousness
into an identifying grasp of 'self' and 'acting'. As a
consequence an absolute opposition is set up between
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the 'self-acting' and 'being'. The subject=object that
the Fichtean philosophy intrigues, and that is
expressed in the principle '1=1', is collapsed because
the movement in which it is grasped (intuition and
concept) is sundered into an unknown modification of
consciousness and an elevation of the concept of self
to an absolute beginning as act [Tathandlung].
Fichte's system develops out of the absolute opposition
of self-consciousness • and consciousness because it
begins with the 'loss' of intuition. The whole system
resides in the realm of being-posited (Gesetztsein),
the opposition of the subjective and the objective. The
system therefore unfolds in abstraction from its
'principle'; the arriving of 'self' and 'object', which
Fichte calls Setzen, is an absolute 'I' and an absolute
unknown, without a history. In Hegel's terms, on the
one side there is the abstraction of identity (absolute
I) and on the other side there is the realm of
opposition of what is posited; both 'self-
consciousness' as identity, and 'object' as identity
and non-identity or conscious and nonconscious.
In 1801 Hegel is largely appreciative of the
Schellingian philosophy of nature, which represents the
necessary 'complement' to Fichte's system of
intelligence since it readdresses 'intuition' and
presents the 'objective subject=object'.
this subjective subject=object needs an
objective subject=object to complete it, so
that the absolute presents itself in each of
the two subject=objects, and finds itself
perfected only in both together as the
highest synthesis that nullifies both insofar
as they are opposed. As their point of
absolute indifference the absolute encloses
both, gives birth to both and is born of
both. (Diff., p. 155; my emphasis)
Kristeva's recovery of the	 'semiotic' makes the
philosophical move from Fichte to Schelling. The
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materialist dialectic re-cognizes the 'moment' of
intuition lost in Fichte's primacy of the practical
concept (identity of 'self' and 'act'). It overturns
the idealist doctrine of scientific knowledge which had
imposed limitations on knowledge. The 'knowledge of the
practical' opened up by psychoanalysis permits a
science of what in the Fichtean system remained
'unknown'; a science of the determination of the
transcendental subject •which had been abstracted from
its socio-historical dimension; a science of the
'unconscious' (unity of drives and language: the
objective subject=object).
Fichte's recovery of the 'practical' had turned the
thetic moment into an unknowable act of an absolute
subject without a history. Kristeva is thus a critic of
the agnosticism fundamental to Fichte's primacy of the
practical concept as much as she is of the Kantian
agnosticism which creeps back into determinist
interpretations of Lacan.
The Kantian moment in psychoanalysis, for Kristeva, is
the reduction of the meaning of the 'Other' to a
subject-Other relation restricted within the
consequences of the 'thetic moment' or 'entrance into
language'. When Lacan's (re)discovery that 'desire
divides the subject from itself' is made into the
absolute principle of psychoanalytic theory, the
subject is fixed within an ineliminable opposition of
'subject' and 'symbolic', an 'opposition' whose
principle is 'lack'. The subject is subordinated to the
symbolic:
the negativity characteristic of the Hegelian
dialectic which emerged through the
analytical theory of desire, ends up yielding
before a Kantian agnosticism when the subject
psychoanalysis has in view proves to be
either the subject of Kantian understanding
or that of science. More precisely and
concretely, the subject's desire is founded
on drives ('the psychosomatic articulation')
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that remain unsatisfied, no matter what
phantasmatic identifications desire may lead
to because, unlike desire, drives 'divide the
subject from desire'. Desire's basis in
drives will thus be dismissed and forgotten
so that attention may be focused on desire
itself, reactivated by the reiteration of
castration. (RPL, p. 131)
Kristeva believed that the Hegeliam dialectic expounded
the movement in which self-consciousness is
constituted, the determination of the subject's desire
by a 'lack' (void) grasped by philosophical
consciousness. She inherits Lacan's return to a
'dialectical' Freud. Furthermore, she acknowledges the
Hegelianism informing the differentiation between, in
her terms, the metonymic object and the metaphoric
'nonobject'; which is to say, between, on the one hand,
the structural misrecognition which Lacan called the
'objet petit a', the metonymy of the impossible quest
or desire for recognition 'reactivated by the
reiteration of castration'; and, on the other, the
relation to the Other. 'The subject's desire is founded
on drives', once it is grasped that the 'drives' status
as articulation' refers to the 'site of the Other' and
repudiates the positivism of biology.5 l<risteva then
diagnoses Lacan's failure to approach the heterogeneity
of drives as the reason behind the Kantian fate of
Lacan's 'subject': a fixation of the subject of 'lack'.
The loss of the negativity 'characteristic of the
Hegelian dialectic' results in a restriction of the
meaning of the 'desire of the Other'. The subject-Other
relation is reduced, for the subject, to an absolute
opposition between subject and Other. The consequent
'reiteration of castration' is only to be qualified by
a retrieval of Hegelian 'negativity', as disclosed
within a (Freudian) materialist rethinking of Hegel.
Kristeva's 'return to Freud' contra Husserl and the
Kantian fate of the Lacanian symbolic aimed to re-
cognize the subjective subject=object as the subject in
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process, by way of the 'acting' of its objective moment
(the drives' status as articulation). The objective
moment is therefore re-cognized as an objective
subject=object. The return to Freud aimed, then, to
disclose a negative force which prioritized neither the
subjective nor the objective moment, and hence to avoid
either a return to an absolute subject, or positing an
absolute object as 'origin' or founding 'principle' of
the dialectic.
Kristeva's implicit criticism of the divided 'Kantian'
subject and of the Fichtean 'absolute' subject
therefore proposes a negativity 'characteristic' of the
Hegelian dialectic and recognized by a materialist
recovery of the unity of the material 'and' symbolic
foundation of the dialectic. First, there is
the negativity articulating two orders and
positing the never saturated subject in
process/on trial between them - the drives'
status as articulation. (RPL, p. 131)
This might prioritize the objective subject=object (the
drives' status as articulation) if, second,
'negativity' were not itself determined by the two
orders it 'articulates', and operative only by way of
the subject in process posited by both orders.
'Negativity' articulates and is renewed by the symbolic
and the semiotic, identifiable with neither a material
nor a symbolic foundation.
However, as has been shown, there is an agnostic moment
at the core of Kristeva's presentation of, in the
language of German idealism, the Indif.ferenzpunkt
('heterogeneous contradiction') of the subjective and
objective sides of the 'process'. Kristeva's subjective
side is a self-mediation of 'in itself' and 'for
itself'; but on the objective side the socio-historical
'in itself' is utterly divided from the realm of
objective	 'appearance'.	 The	 'symbolic order'	 or
objective totality of thetic unities 	 - self-
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consciousness and the laws (structures) of society) -
is an isolated realm of opposition. Kristeva's
materialist dialectic presents an objective
subject=object (the drives' status as articulation),
but at the point of its 'historical impact', negativity
as 'thetic moment' takes on the mantle of Fichte's
absolute. Hegel writes:
The subject=object does not get away anymore
from difference and reflection. It remains a
subjective subject=object to which appearance
remains absolutely alien and which does not
succeed in intuiting itself in its
appearance. (Duff, p. 133)
The thetic moment of the signifying process does not
succeed in intuiting itself in the objective totality
(self-consciousness and societal structures) since it
is a 'rupture'; the knowledge of the new thesis is a
strictly analytic comprehension of the laws of
appearance. There is no 'knowledge' of symbolization,
only a theory of it as what makes possible the complex
intrasymbolic functioning of the semiotic. Despite
Kristeva's references to the unity of biology and
culture (the bio-historical on the subjective side, the
socio-historical on the objective side), their is no
knowledge of the historical 'middle' since all
transformation is a leap.
The exposition of 'negativity' seems to re-present the
abstract formulation in 1801 of the Hegelian absolute:
the 'point of absolute indifference' where subjective
and objective are nullified 'insofar as they are
opposed', and where 'the absolute encloses both, gives
birth to both and is born of both'. Kristeva's
'absolute', her materialist 'negativity' seems not to
be abstracted as a subjective or objective 'principle'
of the dialectic, but her very repudiation of
'mediation' undercuts the significance for 'negativity'
that she aims at. 'Heterogeneous contradiction' is a
reflective determination: the 'thought' of the unity of
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semiotic and symbolic which are (re)posited as op-
posites in th objective totality. In the objective
totality the opposition of 'subject' and 'law' is
sustained, the latter subsisting 'apart and far from'
the individua1
Kristeva's materialist 'negativity' does not re-present
Hegelian reason but re-presents, in 1-legel's terms, 'the
understanding [which] copies reason's absolute
positing, and through this form gives itself the
semblance [Schein] of reason even though what are
posited are in themselves opposites and hence finite'
(Diff, p. 90). The semiotic and the symbolic are in
themselves opposites because of the retention of the
drives as an 'objective inner' and of the entrance into
language as boundary of the symbolic order which sets
it up as a realm of appearance (for the poet, a
'boundary to the infinite'). The concept of the thetic
moment, 'heterogeneous contradiction', is a reflective
determination of semiotic and symbolic which 'copies
reason's absolute positing'; in themselves semiotic and
symbolic are finite opposites. Signifiance is their
unity 'in itself', and the dialectic leaps to a further
opposition of 'in itself' and appearance (objective
totality). The dichotomy, infinite/finite, is always
'the	 same' :	 drives/socio-symbolic	 order.	 While
Kristeva's theory of the subject posited the 'unity' of
idea and drive, the concept of heterogeneous
contradiction sustains a logic of essence: the infinite
posits the finite, for the 'boundary to the infinite'
is infinitely (re)traversed as the essence of the
(same) socio-symbolic order.
When the dialectic of signifiance is supplemented with
a 'social agent' in order to ensure the correspondence
of the signifying process and the objective social
process, the absolute opposition of semiotic and
symbolic comes to the fore. The dialectic cannot get
off the ground, since it collapses at the point of its
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historical impact. The 'Maoist dialectic', which is
brought in to turn the logic of re-jection into a logic
of restructuration rather than the logic of essence
which prevails in the 'subjective enclosures' of poetic
language, fails and is abandoned. Kristeva's turn to a
deeper engagement with psychoanalysis is a consequence
of the need to readdress the nature and efficacy of the
'infinite'
The abandonment of the Maoist dialectic is an
abandonment of the problematic of the political
dimension of the materialist dialectic. The turn to
psychoanalysis does not, however, alter Kristeva's
fundamental categories: the principle of drive re-
jection remains as does the thought of 'heterogeneous
contradiction' and its implications for social and
political relations. However, the concept of
'heterogeneous contradiction', because it is developed
in abstraction from the political dimension, changes
the significance of Kristeva's 'return to Freud'. The
materialist practical 'infinite' based on the
'heteronomy' of the drives no longer presents a
'dialectic' of subjective and objective spirit that
sustains a 'politics'; instead it provides the basis
for an ethics, one which ultimately requires a
'political sociology' to complete it as practical
beyond the 'subjective enclosure' of psychoanalysis.6
The following chapter will show how Kristeva's 'ethics'
is formulated out of the practice and knowledge of
psychoanalysis. The return to Freud for a 'separated'
subject (drive-related and desiring) argues for a
mediated 'subject' contra the Lacanian subject of lack.
The theory of the mediated subject is derived from the
p sychoanalyti c knowledge of the dynamic of the
'transference': Kristeva presents the 'ethic' of
p sychoanalysis on the basis of a concept of infinity
derived from knowledge of the transference. This
concept of 'infinity' reinforces Kristeva's estimation
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of literature as the presentation of social and
political contradictions, notwithstanding the 'limit'
(subjective enclosure) discovered in every form of
poetic 'signifying practice' analysed hitherto.
The theory of the mediated subject derived from the
knowledge of psychoanalysis also presents an implicit
return to Hegel, a return that is nevertheless held off
owing to the difficulties which informed Kristeva's
thought from the outset, owing to the fixation of the
'Reflexionsbestimming' of heterogeneous contradiction.
Part II, below, presents the 'subject' known to
psychoanalysis from the dynamic of the transference,
and demonstrates that the limitation intrinsic to
Kristeva's concept of heterogeneous contradiction
necessarily reappears at the point where she endeavours
to specify the utility of psychoanalytic concepts
beyond the bounds of 'analysis'.
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PART TWO
RENEWAL THROUGH LOVE 2 ON DIVINE LAW
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CHAPTER 4
LACAN AND FREUD:
FROM A 'KANTIAN SUBJECT' TO A HEGELIAN 'SELF-
CONSCIOUSNESS'
In troduc ti on
Kristeva's later writings restrict themselves to the
'transformation in the subject' or 'subjective spirit',
retaining only the objective totality from the earlier
negotiation of socio-historical transformation, and
leaving the question of the social 'in itself' open-
ended. Once the reformed Maoist dialectic is abandoned,
so is the political dimension of this dialectic (Smith
and Elliott note this lack).l
Nevertheless, the deployment of psychoanalysis in
Kristeva's thought remains an attempt to disclose the
site and comprehend the nature of 'practice'. The
presentation of the 'unity' of the semiotic and the
symbolic does not only develop psychoanalysis as a
theory of culture (as Lacan had done) but returns to
the Freudian theory of the drives and of 'narcissism'
for the 'practical' reason contained in the knowledge
of psychoanalysis. The turn to a deeper engagement with
psychoanalysis claims broad social and political
implications for the ethics derived from the 'ethic' of
psychoanalysis. Kristeva's later writings therefore
remain within the problematic of social transformation,
a problematic that was first expounded as a dialectic
of subjective and objective spirit.
The science of psychoanalysis provides a theory of the
subject. Kristeva's return to Freud for a 'theory of
the subject' reveals her estimation of 'theoretical'
reason after Freud: the grasp of the 'split' subject as
a unity of nature and language. At first sight, the
diachronic exposition of the formation and deformation
of the 'subject' and of societal structures presents
their 'constitution' out of the semiotic (hence its
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seeming 'precedence'). However, the diachronic
exposition is needed because the intrasymbolic status
of the semiotic can only be presented by articulating
the role of the symbolic in the semiotic generation of
the symbolic.2
The synchronic 'truth' of the unity of semiotic and
symbolic presents Kristeva's estimation of 'practical'
reason after Freud: the semiotic 'exists in practice
only within the symbolic and requires the symbolic
break to obtain the complex articulation we associate
with it in musical and poetic practices' (RPL, p. 68).
While Kristeva's diachronic presentation expounds the
mutual determination of semiotic and symbolic, the
truth of this reciprocity (Wechselbestimmung) is their
'heterogeneous contradiction' . Nevertheless, Kristeva's
'thetic break' does not have the status of the
Indifferenzpunkt since the 'drives' remain its
precondition and the 'thetic moment' stands apart - as
'boundary to the infinite' - from the semiotic on one
side and the symbolic 'order' on the other. The thetic
moment is isolated, however much it 'returns' in the
synchronic perspective within poetic practices. In
Hegel's terms this will lead to a system of absolute
op-positing, to the primacy of opposition in the
exposition. Kristeva sustains the foundational
distinction between the 'semiotic' and the 'symbolic'
for the sake of opening up a dialectical comprehension
of the 'subject', but the nonsublation of semiotic and
symbolic lead to a movement of endless 'op-positing'.
The foundational distinction is made in Kristeva's
early writings and continues to have effects throughout
her oeuvre. Revolution in Poetic Language comprehended
the separation of subjective and objective spirit, and
here the 'idea' of the heterogeneous contradiction of
signifying process and social process had a critical
status: no conclusion is posed to the 'modern'
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separation of spirit; the idea is not made into an
'ideal'; but the division of subjective and objective
spirit is made absolute.
In the later writings there appears a revised relation
between experience and knowledge on the terrain of the
psychoanalytic scene. Psychoanalytic practice presents
a dialectic of experience and 'provisional
interpretation' . The relationship between theory and
practice changes in accordance with that revision. The
'theoretical' stance may involve a reflection set apart
from the site of its 'object' . However, because that
stance emerges out of a new relationship between
knowledge and experience on the terrain of analytic
practice, theory is to reassess the problematic of
'ethics' and 'politics' in modernity. The theory of the
subject recovered in the return to Freud is combined
with the proposal of an 'ethics of psychoanalysis'
which 'implies a politics' (SO, p. 192). The ethics and
the implication are consequent upon the knowledge of
the practical which emerges in the psychoanalytic scene
of 'transference' and 'provisional interpretation' (TL,
p. 276); it is a knowledge of the 'process of formation
and deformation of meaning and the subject' (TL, p.
23).
Within the aporetic space of modernity in which the
idea of the 'entire recasting of subjective and social
structuration' is not to be turned into an 'ideal',
Kristeva turns to a deeper engagement with
psychoanalysis in order to consider the 'efficacy' of
the 'infinite' disclosed in psychoanalytic experience
(transference as metaphorical production). This
'ethics', developed without a rethinking of objective
spirit (which thus remains standing, as an opposition
between a socio-historical 'in itself' and the
structures of society) is meant to contain the
possibility of a rethinking of the political. The
character of the ethics/politics dLstinction in
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Kristeva's thought is determined by the retention of
the foundational distinction between 'semiotic' and
'symbolic'.
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A. Semanalys.is
1. Post-philosophical Method
My prejudice has been that God is analysable.
Infinitely. ('Mémoire', L'infini, pp. 46-7)
Kristeva's genealogical treatment of the formation and
deformation of the 'modern subject' has never been
seriously	 addressed	 because	 the	 philosophical
foundations	 of her argument	 have never been
acknowledged and questioned.
In Tales of Love Kristeva proposes an open-ended
typology	 of	 discourses	 (theology,	 mysticism,
philosophy,	 courtly and modern literature) 	 and
approaches their elaborations of 'love' as 'stories'
(histoires) of love, repudiating a dialectical
treatment of her 'object' as inappropriate to the
subject matter (TL, p. 276). The elaborations of 'love'
in western thought and literature are discourses whose
meaning a dialectical approach would subsume or
suppress since they present a meaning 'for the speaking
subject' whose drive-relation is suppressed in the
subjective and systematic reclosure of the idealist
dialectic. The philosophical (Greek) and monotheist
(Jewish, Christian) discourses on love are approached
as 'diverse images of love' out of which emerge the
'amorous protagonists' to be found in religion and
literature: 'Narcissus, Don Juan, Romeo and Juliet, or
the Mother with her child of which the Virgin Mary is
our prototype' (TL, p. 16). Kristeva's text analyses
the images of love in western thought and the 'various
dynamics affecting the amorous protagonists who emerge
out of them' (ibid.). As a whole, Tales of Love is 'a
contribution to the elaboration of a history of
subjectivity' (ibid.).
'Semanalysis', Kristeva's method, is based on the
materialist inversion of the idealist dialectic, and
leads to a genealogical	 treatment of	 'western
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subjectivity' : 'a history of subjectivity' . The method
with which she approaches the discourses on love in
western thought and literature contains a
presupposition: that the discoveries of psychoanalysis
combined with the concept of 'metaphor' elaborated on
the terrain of literature have made it possible to
position the history of modern philosophy within the
epistemological reduction of the 'subject' to a knowing
subject (cogito ergo sum). The 'Cartesian' moment in
the history of western thought is, for Kristeva,
ineliminable within the philosophical thought of the
'subject'. Kristeva puts western thought on a terrain
for which the psychoanalytic discovery is 'outrageous'
The psychoanalytic stance allows one to
record a true transformation of Western
discourse, in which the metaphor is at stake,
accomplished at the expense of the loving
subject; it thus determines a position that
can only be termed outrageous within the
history and typology of interpretative
discourse. (TL, p. 276)
Kristeva's 'presupposition' lies in the historical
significance of and theoretical connection between
Cartesian and Freudian reason: between the Cartesian
loss of the 'loving subject' in the epistemological
treatment of the subject, and the Freudian discovery of
'death's work' within amorous space (and its
consequences for civilization). This prioritization of
Descartes and Freud within a genealogical grasp of
western 'thought' is inseparable from Kristeva's
determination of speculative reason: 'I-legel' represents
the high point of system in philosophy and turning
point to an 'open typology' of discourses. Hegel is
thereby positioned on the border of the epistemological
reduction; with the idealist dialectic 'Reason' has
advanced to:
the Hegelian Negativity - which at the same
time restored and systematized, unleashed and
bound the power of the Other, against and
within the consciousness of the Same. (SO, p.
169)
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2. The Presupposition in Kristeva's Thought
There are three dimensions to the 'beginning' of an
open-ended typology of discourses out of which Kristeva
proposes a contribution to the elaboration of a
'history of subjectivity' . These three dimensions
inform Kristeva's thought as a whole. The first lies in
the overemphasis on Freud's historical significance:
psychoanalysis is the first science to put the
'subject' onto analyable terrain, because of its
expansion of the meaning of sexuality (IBWL, pp. 46-7),
but also 'because it does not abstract from or
neutralize the subject of knowledge' (ibid., p. 19).
The second is Kristeva's interpretation of monotheism
as a 'strategy' of identity-formation aiming to secure
'western internality' (religious disposition); and her
interpretation of the meaning of the 'death of God' as
the 'loss of the One God'. The third is a reliance on
the significance (for the critique of modernity) of the
concept of 'metaphor' as rescied from its determination
by metaphysics, notably in the texts of Ricoeur and
Derrida (TL, pp. 269-70). The 'literary' treatment of
metaphor, in combination with the psychoanalytic
knowledge of the dynamic of the transference, allows
the power of psychoanalysis to be determined:
psychoanalysis is the 'positive' complement to the de-
formation of the subjective internality that western
monotheism aimed and failed to secure.
These three aspects of Kristeva's thought determine her
cultural interpretation of the modern separation of
subjective and objective spirit. They are discussed in
turn in the following three sections, and leads into a
demonstration that the theory of culture presupposes
'philosophy' and leads to the Hegelian difficulties
implicit in the return to Freud.
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(i) Psychoanalysis: Freud's historical significance
The first presupposition, on which Kristeva is most
insistent, is her claim for the historical significance
of Freud's science and its object. She claims for
psychoanalysis a profound and novel contribution to the
problematic of the subject in social and political
relations: from 'the tremendous 1-legelian continent that
gave the impetus to and completed the thought of the
Other' to 'the political and ethical impact of the
Freudian breakthrough':
With Freud indeed, foreignness, an uncanny
one, creeps into the tranquility of reason
itself, and, without being restricted to
madness, beauty, or faith anymore than
ethnicity or race, irrigates our very
speaking-being, estranged by other logics,
including the heterogeneity of biology...
Henceforth, we know that we are foreigners to
ourselves, and it is with the help of that
sole support that we can attempt to live with
others.	 (SO,	 pp.	 169-70;	 ellipsis	 in
original)
This claim for Freud's place in the history of reason
rests on Kristeva's genealogical grasp of the discovery
of the unconscious:
Psychoanalysis is the most internalized
moment of Western historicality. (TL, p. 276)
Kristeva's proposition expresses the dialectical
relation between the fate of 'western internality'
(embracing religious disposition) and the historical
appearance of its science. At the point of the crisis -
manifest de-formation - of western subjectivity its
'reason' (theory and knowledge) comes on the scene.
One is compelled to note that the aims of
psychoanalysis have changed. After
psychiatric semeiology, Freud had discovered
the symptom as metaphor, that is,
condensation, of fantasy. Now, and thanks to
Lacan, one analyzes the symptom as a screen
through which one detects the workings of
signifiance (the process of formation and de-
formation of meaning and the subject). (TL,
p. 23)
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Psychoanalysis emerges and develops in response to the
'modern' crisis for the speaking subject faced with the
failure of moral and political discourses to
accommodate subjective internality and with the
manifest failure of western monotheism to secure it a
sphere apart. It emerges and develops in step with the
intensification of the symptom and re-cognizes the
basis of the symptom.
The dialectical meaning of Kristeva's proposition that
'Psychoanalysis is the most internalized moment of
Western historicality' is the following. The theory and
knowledge of psychoanalysis is appraised as the most
'internalized' moment of western historicality because
it comprehends western internality at the moment of its
crisis: the critical moment when western internality
not only loses a structuring foundation but when the
consequent de-formation of meaning and subjectivity
finds no discourse of restructuration. Conversely,
psychoanalysis is the most internalized moment of
western 'historicality' because its emergence as a
science is inseparable from the history or fate - (de-)
formation - of 'western subjectivity'
(ii) Psychoanalysis and monotheism
The dialectical meaning of Kristeva's proposition is
inseparable from the understanding of 'religious
disposition'. She analyses the 'images of love' in
monotheism as presenting strategies of identity-
formation, and her interpretation of the 'death of God'
poses 'the loss of the One God'. This loss is taken to
be coeval with the crisis of western subjectivity: a
collapse of intrapsychic space on the order of that of
Ovid's 'Narcissus'. The latter, appearing in Tales of
Love as a 'beginning' of the elaboration of amorous
space in western thought, presents the morbidity of a
psychic space later opened up, witness Plotinus, in
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departure from the polls. 'Leaving politics to its
laws' (TL, p. 119),
the problem to which [Christian, gnostic and
neo-Platonic] thinkers had to respond was
identical: it involved the emotional disarray
of a society whose center was no longer the
city (polls), but which was becoming a
civilized universe (olkoumene) that, while
cosmopolitan, gave human beings over to what
J-I.--Ch. Puech calls 'ineffable solitude'. (TL,
p. 118)
'After'	 the	 Judaeo-Christian	 trajectory	 -
(de)formations - of western subjectivity, the
contemporary speaking subject is returned to the
morbidity, presented by Ovid, at the basis of the
(de)formation of western internality. The departure
from the laws of the polls thus remains a general, but
unelaborated, context of Kristeva's contribution to a
'history of western subjectivity' . It is Narcissus'
ineluctable 'morbidity', reemerging in full force with
the loss of the One God, that is intelligible 	 at last
- to psychoanalysis: 'to think that it has taken such a
long time!' (SO, p. 182)
The crisis of the 'subject' is, in turn, coeval with
the now evident failure of western thought to secure
Narcissus against internal and external dangers by
means of an ontology (western theology) or epistemology
(Hegel) of the good: 'because the guideposts that
insured our ascent toward the good have been proven
questionable, we have crises of love' (TL, p. 7).
The 'crisis' of western internality in modernity is an
outcome of the manifest failure of the theological and
mystical elaborations of love which attempted to secure
it. Kristeva views monotheism as a strategy of
identity-formation involving an accommodation of the
hatred inseparable from the loving subject which
reaches its heights in the 'passion of the cross' (St
Paul):
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Christ's passion brings into play even more
primitive layers of the human psyche; it thus
reveals a fundamental depression (a
narcissistic wound or reversed hatred) that
conditions access to human language (IBWL, p.
40)
Notwithstanding the complexity of the Christian
sublimation, monotheism is addressed as a whole in
terms of its misrecognition and suppression of the
'nature' of the subject beloved of God (the drive-
related speaking subject). What it 'reveals' is not
negotiated; instead, as an elaboration of the 'symbolic
and physical importance of the paternal function in
human life', Christianity formulates the shaping of
male desire: 'Unfortunately the proscription of female
sexuality helped to infantilize half the human race by
hampering its sexual and intellectual expression'
(IBWL, p. 43).
The necessity of the failure of monotheism is
intelligible to psychoanalysis whose object,
'civilization and its discontents', embraces the
illusion of 'religion', and whose practice comes on the
scene with the 'death of God'. The failure of
monotheism's attempt to secure religious disposition is
intelligible as the failure to negotiate 'death's work'
in love. Monotheism lacks a negotation of, and
suppresses, the drive-basis of love: the 'heterogeneous
nature of conscious and unconscious representations'
(IBWL, p. 5).
While pychoanalysis, in its role as renewal of 'psychic
space', is not on the order of the discourses it
replaces, it can take over from the elaborations of
love in western monotheism:
to say that such elaborations soothe and take
over from secondary narcissism (perhaps
thrusting their affects as far as primary
narcissism) is a blunt statement that could
check the believer and bother the analyst as
he finds himself involved in a discourse to
which he is opposed. It remains nevertheless
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true that what has been defined as the
nonathropological, nonpsychological aspect of
that love could be understood only thanks to
recent developments in psychoanalysis: by
incorporating psychotic experience and
fitting it in at the basis of psychicism they
have allowed us to reach its human
intelligibility, so human nevertheless, and
also, taking things the other way around,
permitted us to consider post-theological,
secular means of sublimating our sickness of
being, which is a sickness of love. (TL, p.
171)
Kristeva's argument for the strategic opposition of
psychoanalysis to religion is a concern for the
'boundary' of psychoanalytic experience. In the context
of psychoanalysis as an experience of love which must
not enslave, Kristeva poses a 'strategic' opposition to
religion. This opposition arises from the need to
safeguard psychoanalytic practice from the political
and religious context on which it must not encroach
(IBWL, p. 57).
Kristeva never qualifies the importance of this
opposition, and often contemporary 'religious
disposition' appears to be commensurate with the
fixation and repetition of the de-formation of western
subjectivity: 'the experience of psychoanalysis can
lead to renunciation of faith with clear understanding'
(IBWL, 26). Psychoanalysis is promoted in contrast with
and over against the religious disposition that western
monotheism elaborates: the analysand 'recognizes that
he is caught in the toils of an unconscious logic, even
though he can grasp the nature of that logic on a
conscious level' (IBWL, p. 61). Psychoanalysis, in
contrast to religion, contains an 'ethic' for the
drive-related speaking being: 'the speaking being opens
up to and reposes in the other' (ibid.). This ethic
forms the basis out of which a nonfoundational ethics
can be theorized. (See section B below.)
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(iii) Psychoanalysis and literature
The third presupposition of Kristeva's thought, which
is inseparable from Kristeva's repudiation or
'sublation' of the teleological reason she perceives as
ruling the progress of the Phenomenology of Spirit (see
section 3 below), as it is from her method, is her
indebtedness to the concept of 'metaphor' developed on
the terrain of literature. The 'tradition' informing
her concept of 'metaphoricalness' is praised for having
extracted the concept from its determination within the
field of metaphysics from Plato to Heidegger (TL, pp.
268-9).
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the two discourses
of aesthetics and psychoanalysis, Kristeva's 'choice'
of aesthetics as the metadiscourse on modernity is
interlinked with her estimation of psychoanalysis
through their shared status as sites of the production
of metaphoricalness (transference). Kristeva will
extend the significance for psychoanalysis of the
concept of 'metaphor' taken from literary theory, by
adding to its meaning as 'condensation', the meaning of
a	 nonobjectal	 transference	 disclosed	 by
psychoanalysis's enquiry into pre-Oedipal relations.
Here the term metaphor should not bring to
mind	 the	 classical	 rhetorical	 trope
(figurative vs plain), but instead, on the
one hand, the modern theories of metaphor
that decipher within it an indefinite jamming
of semantic features one into the other, a
meaning being acted out; and, on the other,
the drifting of heterogeneity within a
heterogeneous psychic apparatus, going from
drives and sensations to signifier and
conversely. (TL, p. 37)
The former meaning corresponds to the status of the
subject as a speaking being. The latter meaning
corresponds to the dynamic of the 'transference', and
to the definition of the 'being who acts' contra
Hegel's 'historico-social act' (PH, pp. 29-3): 'The
"being who acts" could exist only for a subject in
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symbolic contact, that is to say in motion, in
transference with another' (TL, p. 274). Since the
symbolic contact is not an identification with an
object, but a preobjectal dynamic that opens up psychic
space, psychoanalysis is a site of the production of
metaphoricalness.
Transference reenacts the pre-Oedipal structuration of
the speaking being on the basis of 'metaphoricalness'
specifically, of the 'uni-fication' of the subject (TL,
p. 29). With the acknowledgement, since Freud, of
death's work in the birth of the 'subject', a discourse
based on a metaphorical motion secures psychic space
without suppressing death's work in the unity of nature
and culture. As a site of the production of
metaphoricalness, psychoanalysis (in terms of its
ethic) has a knowledge of 'the existence of infinite
space', and provides an ethics on this basis. Kristeva
takes ethics out of the 'historico-social', to which it
can return only via the scene where the heterogeneous
relation of conscious and non-conscious representations
are recognized. The Hegelian comprehension of the
socio-historical 'subject' is only reapproached once
the 'subject' is known to be a subject of the
'imaginary' 'a provisional accident, differently
renewed within the only infinite space where we might
unfurl our loves, that is the infinity of the
signifier' (TL, p, 277).
In	 the	 diachronic	 persepective,	 presymbolic
transference 'to (from)' an imaginary other is a
precondition, 'lining', of intersubjectivity. The
formation of the 'subject', from nature (autoeroticism)
to culture (language), is dependent on the production
of metaphoricalness - the existence of infinite space.
In the synchronic perspective (once the Other or
signifier is posited), the heterogeneous relation of
drives and 1anguag marks the 'subject' as renewable
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within	 the	 'infinity	 of	 the	 signifier',	 the
metaphorical object.
The semiotic lining of the love-relation determines the
latter as the 'foreignness' of the 'subject', a
heterogeneity (unity and difference) of life and death;
a love/hatred (for the other) whose uni-fication is
determined by 'the existence' of infinite space
('metaphoricalness'). The following proposition
expresses that uni-fication:
The object of love is a metaphor for the
subject. (TL, p. 30)
The movement of the proposition renders the motion and
meaning of the transference: no subject without an
object, but here 'the object of love' denotes no object
prior to love but connotes the motion, 'to (from)', of
transference out of which the subject, and object,
emerge.
Thus when Kristeva comes to determine the 'dynamic' of
the transference intelligible upon a reformulation of
the Lacanian imaginary, it carries the dual meaning of
'metaphoricalness': both 'condensation' and the space
of metaphorical shifting opened up by the advent of the
imaginary 'other'; no 'metaphor' without the opening up
of its 'space'. The drives' status as articulation
(condensation and displacement) does not precede but
requires the opening of the space of transference. The
pre-thetic dynamic of the transference also fully
explains the 'production' of space formerly discussed
in the context of the mirror stage of the thetic phase
(chapter 2 above).
Kristeva's explanation of the 'advent' of the imaginary
other has the consequence, as will be seen, of making
the 'symbolic' the principle of the heterogeneous
relations of the imaginary. Nevertheless, the retention
of the distinction between the 'semiotic' and the
'symbolic' leaves the status of the drives as a
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'postulate' without which Kristeva's 'infinite' (the
existence of the 'space' of metaphorical shifting)
would fall to the ground, since it represents an
'impossible' harmonization of two terms which, as
harmonized, would only represent the domination of one
over the other (drives/language = psychosis/concept-or-
master signifier).
The shared status of psychoanalysis and modern
literature as sites of metaphorical production is
intended neither to equate their knowledge and practice
nor to repudiate 'metadiscourses' on modernity other
than the aesthetic. Although Kristeva's concept of
psychoanalysis does claim for analysis the knowledge of
the being-forgotten of metaphor production, her claim
is not that a philosophical thought (signification or
'interpretive discourse') can be analysed for 'its'
forgotten metaphor. The distinction between the
experience and knowledge of psychoanalysis which closes
the following passage from Tales of Love is embraced by
the theory of the semiotic and the symbolic: the
negativity which articulates two orders and posits the
subject in process cannot be 'unearthed' from the sign
since it is inseparable from the sign.
Functioning under the same amatory conditions
that rule the production of metaphoricalness
in poetic discourse, psychoanalysis
nevertheless keeps a certain distance from it
since it produces, with respect to that
discourse, a knowledge effect. Does this mean
that it produces its concept? If that were
true, it would not be distinguishable from
speculative philosophy. Not in disseminating
each concept by way of metaphor or asserting
that every sign is necessarily a forgotten
metaphor that must be brought to the fore in
order to dissolve its idealizing conceptual
seizing. Rather, it does so by preserving a
typology of discourses (for instance, the
'poetical' is not the 'philosophical'
discourse, which is not the 'analytical'),
and setting for itself the regular task of
being, on the one hand, a scene of metaphor
production (as in the amatory state or in
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poetry) and, on the other, a scene of
provisional interpretation. (TL , p. 276)
In Revolution in Poetic Language, psychoanalysis was
characterized as a 'subset' of practice and the
'transference' operating in poetic language was
distinguished by the 'absence of a represented focal
point of transference' (RPL, p. 209). In Tales of Love
the elaboration of the 'regulation' of the semiotic
chora expounds a psychi.c transference on the same order
of nonobjectality. Furthermore, the discussion of the
'cure' expounds the meaning and status of the
'knowledge effect' in psychoanalytic experience. Here,
the 'certain distance' of psychoanalysis from the
'infinite' puts knowledge and a direct and immediate
experience (the dynamic of the transference) into
relation.
Despite Kristeva's emphasis here that this relation
holds only within the psychoanalytic 'scene', the
concept of negativity which emerges from Kristeva's
theory of metaphoricalness (the infinite space of
metaphorical shifting) takes up three positions. As
'experience' it is enacted in analysis; the 'knowledge'
of it determines the limit and boundary of
psychoanalysis ; 3 the theory of metaphoricalness poses a
general concept of a 'boundary' between heterogeneous
discourses - hence the insistence on a 'typology of
discourses'. Kristeva is an uncritical advocate of the
conception of 'reason since Freud'.
Kristeva's concept of negativity determines both her
characterization of philosophical and theological
'discourse' and her treatment of the subject in modern
social and political relations. When Kristeva comes to
situate psychoanalysis, religion and literature in a
mutual relation determined by her conception of
'infinity', she will do so in contrast to the relation
that is supposed to hold between Hegelian 'immediacy'
and 'mediation' . Dispatching the Hegelian 'system' on
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account of the non-relation she perceives as holding
between 'immediacy' and 'mediation', her sublation of
the idealist dialectic claims to open up a mediated
subjectivity; one which simultaneously changes the role
of the function of 'lack' in the Lacanian symbolic, and
the status of the 'Phallus'
being the magnet for loving idealization
causes the Other to be understood not as
'pure signifier' but as the very space of
metaphorical shifting. (TL, p. 37)
The Kristevan concept of negativity (heterogeneous
contradiction, 'going from drives and sensations to
signifier and conversely' (TL, p. 37)) informs the
typology of discourses: 'the "poetical" is not the
"philosophical" discourse, which is not the
"analytical"'. While the mention of this typology
occurs in reference to what is preserved on the scene
of analysis, the discussion of heterogeneity
determines, above all, the limit of speculative
philosophy. Despite Kristeva's awareness of her choice
of metadiscourse, her mode of distinguishing
'philosophy', 'theology' and 'literature' posits a
typology of discourses in relation to which the concept
of negativity stands as their ground. The typology of
discourses therefore rests within the agnostic moment
in her thought. The 'existence of infinite space' is an
absolute which infers the infinite repetition of the
creative function of the imaginary. This is enactable
in the psychoanalytic scene, but there is no
'knowledge' of a kind which can bring it into the
political realm.
3. Psychoanalysis, Theology and Philosophy
All the philosophies of thought, from Plato
to Descartes, Kant and Hegel, that have aimed
to give the experience of love a strong hold
on reality have pruned out of it what is
disorderly in order to reduce it to an
initiatory voyage drawn toward the supreme
Good or the absolute spirit. Theology alone,
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and only within its mystical deviations,
allows itself to be lured in the trap of a
blessed loving madness, from the Song of
Songs to Bernard of Clairvaux or Abelard.
(TL, p. 8)
The concept of the 'loss of the One God' is inseparable
from Kristeva's oscillation between positing a history
of western 'thought' and elaborating an open and
flexible typology of histoires. The analysis of western
psychic space on the terrain of psychoanalysis
presupposes a 'history' of philosophy in which Plato
figures as the outset of western thought, Descartes the
pivotal figure, and Kant and Hegel as the site of the
manifestation of the limits of modern philosophy.
The passage quoted above illuminates further Kristeva's
statement on the historical meaning of psychoanalysis:
'Psychoanalysis is the most internalized moment of
western historicality' (TL, p. 276). Its claim for the
importance of psychoanalysis is a carefully qualified
claim since It is intended to avoid positing
psychoanalytic theory and knowledge as the latest stage
of 'Reason' . Hegel is thought to have claimed the
latest stage of Reason for philosophy: in Kristeva's
view, Hegel's philosophy of spirit holds out to
consciousness	 (natural	 and	 philosophical)	 a
philosophical grasp of the totality. 'Absolute
knowledge' is held to mean the philosophical grasp of
'absolute spirit' (comparable with the meaning of
psychoanalysis as the theory and knowledge of 'western
internality'). Kristeva divests this meaning from the
irony of its utterance, and Hegel is criticized for
having posited a telos for consciousness: absolute
knowledge is an ideal held out to the thinking or
philosophical consciousness of western 'historicality'.
Absolute knowledge 'would' grasp absolute spirit.
In Kristeva's appraisal 'Absolute Knowledge' becomes
the telos of 1-legel's philosophy of spirit rather than
the ironic expression of its presupposition. This telos
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is presentable, in her view, only if the 'the presence
of the Absolute in Knowing is immediately revealed to
the subject' (TL, p. 39). Kristeva's interpretation of
Hegel's proposition that 'the absolute is from the
outset in and for itself beside us and wants to be
beside us' identifies the 'absolute' and the
'immediate' in Hegel (ibid.). This turns absolute
knowledge into the 'in itself' or essence of the
movement of consciousness taken as a continuous whole,
rather than an expression for the speculative re-
cognition of the movement of consciousness, of the 'in
itself' and 'for itself' of knowing (erkennen).
Contra this reduction of the Hegeliari utterance,
'absolute knowledge' acknowledges teleology in 'western
thought', and ironically expresses the impossibility
for consciousness (natural and philosophical) of
grasping the totality. The Phenomenology re-cognizes
consciousness as a movement in which consciousness'
determination of truth opposes, and aims to identify,
truth and certainty: 'truth' is the 'in itself' or
essence for consciousness; certainty, truth 'for
itself', is its aim. Consciousness, for Hegel is - in
abstract terms - the movement which tries to unite
truth and certainty. Since, in one sense, it is no more
than their separation, it is the experience of the
failure to posit their unity owing to the failure to
acknowledge that as the movement of separation it is
their 'unity' (the unity of identity and difference).
There is no Hegelian experience of self-consciousness
without the 'separation' of consciousness; their is no
experience of consciousness without the 'unity' of
self-consciousness.
In each configuration consciousness posits an 'in
itself' or essence, fails to acknowledge that positing,
and moves, through the effects of that failure, to
another positing. If 'absolute knowledge' is the final
'position' of the Phenomenology of Spirit it is not the
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'in itself' by and toward which a continuous movement
of consciousness is programmed, but the disclosure of
the separation or movement of the 'in itself' and 'for
itself' 'for itself'; in other words, for the modern
philosophical consciousness in which 'the
subject=object does not get away anymore from
difference and reflection' (Diff, p. 133). This means
that the Phenomenology is the experience of natural
consciousness and the re-education of the philosophical
consciousness whose transcendental turn gets 'out of'
experience only to fall into it 'unconsciously'.
Philosophical reflection re-cognizes its methodological
abstraction from and opposition to natural
consciousness only by joining the drama it thought to
have left behind, and whose (mis)recognitions it
repeats. As a pivotal moment between the Phenomenology
of Spirit and the Science of Logic, the irony of
'absolute	 knowledge'	 re-educates	 philosophical
consciousness	 into	 the	 'presupposition'	 of	 its
conceptual unfolding.
The unfolding of philosophical categories (the Logic)
may, as a phenomenology, differ from the unfolding of
the movement of natural consciousness. However, the
logical unfolding of the concept presupposes the labour
of the concept, the recognition and misrecognition
within the identity and difference of self-
consciousness that determines it as a movement:
(mis)recognition. 'Absolute knowledge' is neither the
telos of consciousness nor the absolute presupposition
of Hegelian logic. The Science of Logic as a whole
presupposes the Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole (the
'result' and the 'way').
The way and the result are not separable without
reimposIng a methodological position. This is what
'system' means in Hegel: no speculative proposition
without a speculative exposition; 'as soon as
speculation steps out of the concept that it
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establishes of itself [subject=object) and evolves into
a system, it abandons itself and its principle and does
not come back to it again' (Diff, p. 81). Hegel's
thought is not a 'tremendous continent that gave the
impetus to and completed the thought of the Other' as
Kristeva maintains (SO, p. 169), for the 'Other' if
only thought 'as such' is a lost continent: a continent
which, in Kristeva's view, Freud was the first to
discover.
In Kristeva's thought, the Other is an immanent
infinite which as a 'heterogeneity' is not the immanent
presence of the absolute in knowledge - as Hegelian
'immediacy' is understood to be. The Hegelian immediate
- here Kristeva follows Heidegger - 'presents itself
as the logic of Absolvenz, as severance outside of
relationship, and constitutes the absoluteness of the
absolute' (TL, p. 39). Thus understood, immediacy is
cut off from the mediation it produces: 'any other
"means" of knowledge is no more than a recognition'
(ibid.). The 'leap' in Kristeva's dialectic is
formulated in opposition to the thought of the Other in
order to overcome the perceived severance of immediacy
and mediation at the heart of the Hegelian circle of
circles.
However, without the distinction between erkennen or
(re)cognition and absolute Wissen (between the way and
the result) there would be no Hegelian 'experience',
both because it is not an experience of a 'constituted
consciousness', and because if Hegelian self-
consciousness were a constituted, unitary consciousness
in Kristeva's sense, there would be no experience for
it to have. It is Kristeva who inscribes an ineluctable
agnosticism within the 'production' of the dialectic
(of recognition and misrecognition). Kristeva's Maoist
dialectic introduced an absolute severance of knowledge
and experience into signifiance, which was thus doomed
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to the separation of immediacy and mediation attributed
to Hegel.
The repudiation of modern philosophy contained in
Kristeva's 'typology of discourses' thus ultimately
arrests it within a Cartesian framework. As
distinguished from the theory and knowledge of
psychoanalysis, the history of philosophy is determined
as the 'philosophy of thought'. Hegel emerges as the
'end' of the philosophical mastery of reason and the
transition to a a typology of discourses. The 'end' of
the philosophical mastery of reason is simultaneously
the possibility of comprehending the 'psychic' as 'open
systems' preserved from that mastery (TL, pp. 13-16).
If psychoanalysis comprehends 'what is disorderly in
love',	 it also determines a position that is
'outrageous' to philosophical system.
Kristeva proposes that 'what is disorderly in love' is
failed at the outset of the elaborations of love in
western thought. The Platonic dialogues on love are
analysed as an 'initiatory voyage' whose movement
presents the mania of 'male' eros and whose end, under
the guidance of the wise philosopher, is a peaceful
synthesis of possession-love and uniting-love
represented by Diotima: 'As if in Phaedrus Eros were
displayed in its libidinal economy while Diotima, in
the Symposium, presented it more along the lines of an
idealized object relationship that it takes for
granted' (TL, p. 72).
Platonic eros, in its economy and in its telos,
presents a male sexuality because it abstracts from
what is 'feminine' in love. Kristeva reads the
'initiatory vogage' which the Platonic dialogues
present as a reflective synthesis of terms - 'manic
eros' and 'feminine ideal' - which themselves result
from an abstraction from what is disorderly in love.
The 'disorderly' is determined by a heterogeneous
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contradiction of 'feminine' and 'masculine' facets of
love. The grasping of Plato's abstraction from what is
disorderly in love implies its re-cognition. In
Kristeva's semanalysis of histoires, the 'image of
love' that accommodates the heterigeneous relation is
attributed to medieval thought, starting with Plotinus'
rehabilitation of Narcissus within a cosmogony of the
'good'
Do not the feminine and the Narcissan, with
Plotinus, merge in that image of his early
biography, as recalled by Porphyry, which
shows the child, already eight years old,
still sucking his nurse's breast? The
internality illuminated by One good that
comes out of it is at any rate gaze and eye,
just as the good itself, a soothing haven for
narcissistic	 dichotomies,	 ecstatic
reaborption of inside/outside,	 same/other
splittings. (TL, p. 112)
The pivotal significance of Descartes, for Kristeva, is
the turn from an ontological to an epistemological
treatment of the 'subject' . In modern philosophy the
loving subject of medieval thought is forgotten (TL, p.
42). The fate of the experience of love in the modern
philosophical treatment of the 'subject' ('pruned of
what is disorderly') is most evident in Kant and Hegel.
For Kristeva, if there is no accommodation of the lover
(of the disorder of love and hatred which defines the
'human event' (TL, p. 168)), there is no 'relation to
the other' in Kant and Hegel. This claim restricts
modern philosophy within a Cartesian limitation,
whether this is conceived as an epistemological
reduction of the existent to an object of thought - to
a 'mastering subjectivity' (IBWL, p. 59; TL, p. 187);
or a systematic reclosure of the thought of the Other
in the consciousness of the Same (Hegel's system) (SO,
p. 169).
In contrast, psychoanalysis is the knowledge of what is
disorderly in the experience of love, and the
theoretical exposition of its historical occlusion.
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That history is coextensive with the formation(s) and
de-formation(s) of western internality leading to the
experience of its crisis: the modern 'crisis' is the
crisis of the subject whose maladies are the object of
psychoanalysis. This claim for psychoanalysis is
inseparable from Kristeva's determination of the
history of western thought: 'Might not Universality
Be... Our Own Foreignness?' (SO, p.169). This chapter
title to Kristeva's discussion of Freud's relation to
German romanticism and of her own reformulation of
Kantian cosmopolitanism after Freud, anticipates her
placing of the universal - in the unconscious.
4. Modern Law
In Kristeva's cultural analysis, the 'death of God'
conceived as a 'loss of the One Godt leads to the
critical moment in the formation and de-formation of
western subjectivity: a 'critical' moment because both
de-formation as crisis and de-formation 'for itself'
(known to psychoanalysis). The manifest failure of
monotheism to secure subjective internality in a sphere
apart from that of legal relations is understood to
intensify the 'exile' of the subject from modern
legality and morality. Narcissus is an exile and an
alien.
Today Narcissus is an exile, deprived of his
psychic space, an extraterrestrial with a
prehistory bearing, wanting for love. An
uneasy child, all scratched up, somewhat
disgusting, without a precise body or image,
having lost his specificity, an alien in a
world of desire and power, he longs only to
reinvent love. The ETs are more and more
numerous. We are all ETs. (TL, pp. 382-3)
Kristeva's notion of the law 'external to the subject',
compliance with which depends on the superego (TL, p.
209), is indebted to the philosophical recognition of
the modern subject (the divided, Kantian, subject). She
does not, however, specify the moments and aporiae of
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that 'subject', tending instead to locate the
problematic of 'externality' within philosophical
judgement (passim).
Briefly, and to fill in where Kristeva leaves off: the
Kantian subject is divided from itself, both a 'legal
person' and a 'moral subject', subject to a law imposed
from without and to the moral law it gives itself
through reason; as moral subject it is both autonomous
(a lawgiver) and heteronomous (subject to natural
determination).4 The Kantian subject iis the self-
contradiction of legal person, moral subject, and
natural being. The philosophical recognition of the
modern subject reveals its aporetic nature, as both the
starting-point of rational moral judgement and victim
of its own testing and giving of laws. The subject is
not 'harmonizable' within the modern separation of
morality and legality since as 'individual t it re-
presents that separation. All attempts at unification
of its conflicting dimensions only reimpose another
'master'. Alternatively, the attempt to harmonize the
conflicting dimensions dissembles the awareness of
separation by way of an unadmitted oscillation: between
locating that 'harmony' in human reason and tranferring
it to a 'holy moral lawgiver' (Phen., #374-83).
Kristeva's response to the modern, Kantian subject
focusses on the Cartesian turn from an ontological to
an epistemological treatment of the 'subject':
when theology is emptied of its essence and,
with Descartes, holds the other in a position
of a causa sive rationem and seeks the true
basis of reason only in the articulation of
judgement and no longer in analogy, which,
even when preserved, loses its function - we
then witness a double banishment. Nascent
rationalism brushes aside in the same stroke
analogy, the scar of metaphoricalness in the
specific domain of ontotheology, and its
correlative, the Ego a.ffectus est: the loving
subject. To make possible the advent of
judgment and the Ego cogito. (TL, p. 275)
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With Descartes as such a pivotal figure in the move
from an ontology of the 'good' (Aquinas) to an
epistemological treatment of the 'good', Kantian and
Hegelian reason and judgement are inscribed within this
Cartesian 'loss'. The Kantian difficulty over the
harmonization of the moral law and natural being is,
for Kristeva, a specifically philosophical failure of
the 'relation to the other' . The Kantian, and
ultimately Hegelian, '.subject' lack 'relation to the
other'.	 -
Bernard posited the immanence of God's love
in our nature, carnal and greedy as it may
be; this is lacking with Kant and causes the
loss of what one readily calls the
'unconscious' part of love, at the same time
as the loss of amorous happiness as the
essential definition of the human event. (TL,
p. 168)
Kristeva's objection to the Lacanian fate of
psychoanalysis is that the subject of lack ('desire
divides the subject from itself') re-presents the
Kantian subject, the unnegotiable division of the
rational subject, with all its illusions and their
consequences - divided within, by a moral law
(superego) and divided from a law imposed from without
(societal structures).
Kristeva's elaboration, contra the subject of 'lack',
of Lacan's statement that 'drives divide the subject
from desire' contains her return to the meaning of
Hegelian self-consciousness since it contains a re-
cognition of the mediations of the desiring subject. On
Freudian terrain, Kristeva articulates a loving and
desiring (drive related and symbolic) subject: the
Kristevan subject is not divided from itself
'absolutely', but 'separated'.
The diachronic exposition of the formation of the
'subject' discloses formation within de-formation and
de-formation	 within	 formation.	 De-formation	 is
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intrinsic to the effects of the pre-Oedipal ternary
structuration which opens up the 'space of metaphorical
shifting'. This 'unity' of formation and de-formation
is grasped on the terrain of psychoanalysis (see
section B below). The historical and cultural meaning
of the formation and de-formation of subjective
internality is succinctly expressed in Kristeva's
situating of the 'modern' Narcissus, 'after Religion,
Morality, Legality' (PH, p. 16). Since Narcissus is in
exile, Kristeva's 'after' does not posit the 'end'
(finis) of religion, morality and legality. It
expresses the manifest failure of their telos, and the
speaking subject's experience of this failure.
The recovery of the 'semiotic' from Freud, and the
mediations of the semiotic and the symbolic dimensions
of the subject-law relation, mark a transition from the
primacy of 'lack' or exile to the intelligibility of
the divided subject, and consequent negotiation of the
de-formation of psychic space. Kristeva's disclosure of
the 'separated' subject takes place in a margin between
the acknowledgement of the failure of 'self-certainty'
to esablish itself in the dialectic of desire and the
utter restrictions on the subject implicit in Lacanian
'desire'. It marks a transition from Hegelian Begierde
(the dialectic of the failure of self-certainty to
establish itself) to the philosophical concept of self-
consciousness, even as Kristeva posits a materialist
thinking of the 'suppressed' in Hegel's system.
Kristeva's return to Freud's theory of narcissism for
the intrapsychic essence of intersubjective relations,
re-cognizes the subject as a unity of love 'and'
desire. The Kristevan subject is already an other-
relation within the ill-ease, perversity and hostility
which the 'exiled' Narcissus lends back to
intersubjective relations within the social and
political relations which have determined that exile.
It is a theory of the recognition of the 'otherness' of
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the other within the degeneration of modern social and
political relations.
It is through unraveling transference - the
major dynamics of otherness, of love/hatred
for the other, of the foreign component of
our psyche - that, on the basis of the other,
I become reconciled with my own otherness-
foreignness, that I play on it and live by
it. Psychoanalysis is then experienced as a
journey into the strangeness of the other and
of oneself, toward an ethics of respect for
the irreconcilab1. (SO, p. 182)
The notion that On the basis of the other, I become
reconciled with my own otherness-foreigness' refers to
a mediation of the subject of lack. The division of
intersubjectivity and the division within the Kantian
individual (in and through modern legality - the state,
and morality - a law of reason opposed to natural
being) is re-cognized as the separation of the 'self'
through the other; a separation through which I become
reconciled with myself as a being of love/hatred
irreducible to an identity: 'the loved object is a
metaphor for the subject'.
Kristeva's ethics of psychoanalysis derives from the
knowledge of 'the imaginary', of the ternary
structuration that sets up the 'infinite space' of
metaphorical shifting. It responds without utopia to
the contemporary symptom of the 'modern Narcissus'. In
response to the collapse of the western subject the
analyst knows that
the language that tames and makes us love
this being uprooted from psychic space
remains always imaginary. Nusic, film, novel.
Polyvalent, undecidable, infinite. A
permanent crisis. (TL, p. 383)
The appreciation in Kristeva commentary of her
pluralist estimation of heterogeneous 'practices' (for
example, of its 'usefulness' to feminism) has
contributed to a reception of her thought which accepts
its explicit relation to philosophy.5 Kristeva's
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situating of the semiotic process within the symbolic
code (as pre-Oedipal 'symbolic contact') proposes an
'ethic' of psychoanalysis: the production of the space
of the creative imaginary. A nonfoundational ethics is
to be formulated out of this ethic. Nevertheless, the
reformulation of Lacan in the later writings opens up
an ethics without a politics and leads to Kristeva's
'demand' for a political sociology to respond to and
complement the social .theory implied in her estimation
of the knowledge and theory of psychoanalysis (NN, p.
53). When Kristeva's pluralist notion of 'practice' is
uncritically adopted, the implicit philosophy in her
writings is ignored; and neither the full ambition of
its social and political critique, nor the worried
dimension of that critique, is grasped.
'Permanent crisis', then? The acceptance of a pluralist
notion of practice lends itself to the reduction of
objective spirit in Kristeva's thought: to the
affirmation of a crisis turned 'permanent' once re-
cognized in the element of 'metaphoricalness'. As a
consequence, the full implications of Kristeva's return
to Freud, displayed in her analysis of Céline's
writings (see below, section 02) are not negotiated.
The problem can only be approached by returning to
Kristeva's elaboration of the 'ambiguity' of narcissism
as 'both prime mover and barrier for love' (TL, p.
124); and to the danger which the 'modern Narcissus'
presents on the terrain of social and political
thought.
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B. The Theory, Knowledge and Power of Psychoanalysis
1. The Formation and Deformation of 'Subjective
Internality'
(i) Narcissism, a 'ternary structuration'
Kristeva's writings of the 1980s further expound the
diachronic presentation of the 'unity' of the semiotic
and the symbolic. The return to Freud's theory of the
drives in 1974 presented the 'drives' status as
articulation' (TL, p. 131) rather than as 'origin'. The
diachronic treatment of the semiotic chora expounded a
'logic' of drive re-jection which could account for
Lacan's 'mirror image' and the entrance into language.
It explicated the formation of the symbolic 'subject'
as a process of its 'constitution'. However, the
postulate of heterogeneous relations in the semiotic
was only provisionally explicated as a 'regulation' of
the semiotic.
In the 1980s Kristeva returns to Freud's theory of
narcissism and expounds the regulation of the semiotic
as a psychic drama prior to and formative of the thetic
phase: formative of the mirror image and the subject of
desire posited by - as absent from - the symbolic. The
heterogeneous relations of the semiotic comprise a
'ternary structuration' of narcissism which discloses
the latter as the dynamic 'form' of the love-relation.
primary identification, dawn of identity and
idealization, where the future speaking being
grasps his own image on the basis of the
ideal apprception of a form that is external
to his needs and desires, and that is not
libidinally cathected but has the qualities
of both parents. (TL, p. 202)
The focus on heterogeneous relations in the semiotic
rather than on the logic of the drives reveals how
Kristeva's reformulation of the Lacanian 'symbolic'
consists largely in a reformulation of the 'imaginary'.
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The reaccommodation of the drives makes Kristeva's
exposition of imaginary processes logically prior to
Lacan's 'mirror stage'. Kristeva's psychoanalysis 'of'
the semiotic and the symbolic remains, nevertheless, a
knowledge of the 'imaginary' , the 'symbolic' and the
'real' (Lacan's 'fundamental categories').6 Elaborating
on Freud's observation that the transition from
autoeroticism to narcissism indicates a 'new psychical
action', she remarks:
That observation endows narcissism with an
intrasymbolic status, dependent upon a third
party but within a disposition that
chronologicaly and logically precedes that of
the Oedipal Ego. It prompts one to conceive
of an archaic disposition of the paternal
function, preceding the Name, the Symbolic,
but also preceding the 'mirror stage' whose
logical potentiality it would harbour - a
disposition that one might call that of the
Imaginary Father. (TL, p. 22)7
Kristeva expounds the 'intrasymbolic' but pre-Oedipal
psychic drama by addressing the dynamic ambiguity of
narcissism disclosed by Freud. The two complementary
texts of the 1980s, Powers of Horror and Tales of Love,
expound the heterogeneous elements of the psychic drama
of primary narcissism: 'abjection' and 'idealization',
which are figured, respectively in the pre-Oedipal
separation from the mother and advent of the imaginary
father (TL, p. 41). Narcissism is only intelligible as
a 'drama' once it is elaborated as a ternary
structuration (this term stresses the formative
significance of narcissism in constrast to the thetic
meaning of the triadic Oedipal 'structure'.)
The immediate transference toward the
imaginary father, who is such a godsend that
you have the impression that it is he who is
transferred into you, withstands a process of
rejection involving what may have been chaos
and is about to become an abject. The
maternal space can come into being as such,
before becoming an object correlative to the
Ego's desire, only as an abject.
In short, primary identification appears
to be a transference to (from) [my emphasis
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the imaginary father, correlative to the
establishment of the mother as 'ab-jetted'
Narcissism would be that correlation (with
the imaginary father and the 'ab-jetted'
mother) enacted around the central emptiness
of that transference. This emptiness.., is
apparently the primer of the symbolic
function. (TL, pp. 41-2)
In Tales of Love the exposition of 'narcissism'
demonstrates the correlation of abjection and
idealization through the primal emptiness of separation
first opened up by the 'advent of a third'. The
exposition of 'abjection' in Powers of Horror portrays
it as a struggle out of autoeroticism, one
characterized by the violence of the drives and battled
out on the field of the mother's body. The advantage of
psychoanalytic knowledge of 'the speaking subject' is
the intelligibility for it of the violence of
separation which marks the 'birth' of the 'subject':
'In the beginning was hatred', Freud said
basically (contrary to the well-known
biblical and evangelical statement), as he
discovered that the human child
differentiates from its mother through a
rejection affect, through the scream of anger
and hatred that accompanies it, and through
the "no" sign as prototype of language and of
all symbolism. (NN, p. 29)
Nevertheless, abjection is intelligible only within the
ternary structuration or 'heterogeneous relation' of
narcissism, as the contrary of idealization. The
ambiguity in narcissism - 'both prime mover and barrier
for love' (TL, p. 124) - discovered by Kristeva within
Freud's 'inconsistencies' on the subject (TL, p. 24),
is explained by the prodigious effects of the
heterogeneous contradiction of idealization and
abjection.
Kristeva synthesizes the ambiguity through an
interrogation of the meaning and 'advent' of the father
of individual prehistory (TL. p. 33). The synthesis not
only explains the formation of the 'ego ideal' on the
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basis of a 'preobjectal' relation to a third; it
accounts for the 'advent' of the third or,
diachronically speaking, its condition of possibility.
The presentation of this 'condition of possibility'
further expounds the most well-known aspect of
Kristeva's thought: the status of the mother's body in
the drama of psychosexual individuation; the mother's
body as field and site of the pre-Oedipal relations
within 'the first separation between what is not yet an
Ego and what is not yet an object' (TL, p. 24).
The psychic drama denoted by 'narcissism' therefore
remedies the lacunae in the early account of the drive-
based semiotic network. The drama of connection with
and separation from the mother's body is now presented
in terms of the pre-Oedipal functioning of a 'paternal
agency': sine qua non of the semiotic 'ordering'.
Kristeva's exposition of the imaginary father shows
that the semiotic chora or receptacle, 'nourishing and
maternal', is only a chora (mobile and provisional
articulation) (RPL, p. 26), by virtue of the archaic
instance of the paternal function. The chora is
'receptacle of narcissism' (PH, p. 13). The mother's
body is the 'principle' of mediation only in unity with
her position in the order of the symbolic. Her status
as 'coagulation of the mother and her desire' (TL, p.
41) intrigues a semiotic disposition of the 'paternal
agency' preceding the thetic moment instituting the
symbolic, and yet opening up the 'site of the Other'.
Without the archaic disposition of the paternal
function Kristeva's semiotic chora is not only
unintelligible but without symbolic (and hence
practical) implication.
Kristeva proposes that the ambiguity of narcissism
(prime mover and barrier for love) lies in the conflict
intrinsic to the primal emptiness that the mother's
desire gives rise to: on the one hand, the void is the
potentiation of subjective individuation; on the other,
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the negotiation of the void is threatened by the
dominance of the death drive, the 'chaos' that hangs
over the gap consequent upon the break from
autoeroticism. Primal separation can lead to the
eroticization of the void. Furthermore, narcissism's
void will take on the fetishism of the mirror image it
potentiates. Narcissism's 'protection' against
emptiness bears the dangers of its central 'abyss'. As
an intrapsychic unity-of what will be the 'self' and
the 'other', the negotiation of the abyss does not only
bear a threat for the ego, but carries over to the
'other', to intersubjective relations. Kristeva's
reformulation of the Lacanian imaginary elaborates the
function of the drives in the determination of
(Kleinian) aggression It explains the drives' function
in fetishization: the 'structure' of the mirror stage
is formed through an investment of the previous
semiotic body in the image (TL, p. 33).
While the passage last cited claims no primacy for
either abjection or idealization, Kristeva makes it
clear that the former represents the primacy of the
death drive and is the 'form' of world-relation. The
abjection of the mother ('a process of rejection
involving what may have been chaos') places the psychic
'rebound' against the death drive, the reversed hatred,
at the core of psychic space.8 Kristeva places
'mysogeny t as the border onto and minimal psychic
security against the chaos of hatred and death.
Nore than insane, empty, that lining of our
projection and representation devices is yet
another defense of the living being. When he
succeeds in eroticizing it, when he allows
the nonobj ect-oriented, prenarcissistic
violence of the drive directed toward an
abject to run wild, then death triumphs in
that strange path. (PH, p. 49)
In default of idealization (which 'withstands a process
of rejection involving what may have been chaos and is
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about to become an abject') ab-jection remains 'the
only violent link to the world' (PH, p. 47).
An ego, wounded to the point of annulment,
barricaded and untouchable, cowers somewhere,
nowhere, at no other place than the one that
cannot be found. Where objects are concerned
he delegates phantoms, ghosts, 'false cards';
a stream of spurious egos that confront
undesirable objects. Separation exists, and
so does language, even brilliantly at times,
with apparently remarkable intellectual
realizations. But no current flows - it is a
pure and simple splitting, an abyss without
any possible means of conveyance between its
two edges. No subject, no object:
petrifaction on one side, falsehood on the
other. (PH, p. 47)
In contrast, idealization as the 'ideal apperception of
a form' is condition of the subject as relation to the
other. The inseparability of idealization and abjection
lend to the love-relation, as prototype (heterogeneous
semiotic lining) of the relation to the other, the
intricate unity of love and hatred.
Narcissism, their 'correlation', is thus the psychic
drama of relation and separation played out around the
central emptiness intrigued by the relation to a third.
The drama of narcissism demonstrates the unity of love
and hatred (which Kristeva will formulate as 'lovehate'
- '(hainamoration) on condition of a third: 'without
that disposition of the psyche, the child and the
mother do not constitute "two"' (TL, p. 40). The
emptiness which the advent of the relation to a third
opens up, and which is central to narcissism as
correlation of abjection and idealization, determines
the 'fragility' of narcissism. 'Primer of the symbolic
function', it nevertheless contains within it the
tendency to dissolution of the psychic space it forms:
de-formation out of formation.
A conflictual negotiation of primal emptiness,
narcissism bears the tendency to repulsion or
assimilation of the other. As a resource for the
227
speaking subject it protects against the dissolution of
internal boundaries under the threat of the death
drive. In the Lacanian terms deployed in the 1980s,
naricissism surrounds and wards of 'engulfment in the
real'. Founded in a primal loss, it determines the
speaking subject's imaginary as creative and abyssal.
If narcissism is a defense against the
emptiness of separation, then the whole
contrivance of imagery,	 representations,
identifications, and projections that
accompany it on the way toward strengthening
the Ego and the Subject is a means of
exorcising that emptiness. Separation is our
opportunity	 to	 become	 narcists	 or
narcissistic, at any rate subjects of
representation. The emptiness it opens up is
nevertheless also the barely covered abyss
where our identities, images, and words run
the risk of being engulfed. (TL, p. 42)
Kristeva's analysis of narcissism, with its borders on
the drives, the mirror image, and desire, informs her
insistence on the actuality of 'borderline cases'. The
problematic of primary narcissism is that of a
protection against the collapse of psychic space, but a
protection which determines the subject in a
melancholic direction. If, as has been stressed (Smith
and Rose), Kristeva's ethics of the 'imaginary'
reintroduces 'the individual as value' into social and
political theory, it does not simply demand a
rehabilitation of the 'individual' in social and
political thinking.9 Melancholy has to be recognized
for the danger it presents. It is a border onto hatred
and death. The drive-related and desiring speaking
subject 'is not innocent'.
the habitual and increasingly explicit
attempt to fabricate a scapegoat victim as
foundress of a society or countersociety may
be replaced by the	 analysis of the
potentialities of victim/executioner which
characterize each identity, each subject,
each sex.lO
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(ii) The living and loving father: the symbolic in the
semiotic
In Kristeva's reformulation of Lacan, the processes of
idealization and abjection herald dangers for the
speaking subject if they are divested of that
correlation whose condition is an interconnection with
the 'symbolic'. Kristeva's appraisal of the dynamic
that narcissism represents proposes (diachronically
speaking) an 'originary' pre-Oedipal integration of
imaginary processes which (synchronically speaking) are
imaginary resources for the speaking subject: love and
hatred, psychic counterpart to the drives, represent
the creative as well as destructive potential of the
imaginary.
Kristeva's 'imaginary', therefore, elaborates the
difficult and contradictory path from autoeroticism to
thetic phase:
love in the feminine, against which mystical
experiences stumble, coils up around the
mother-child's tight embrace, the blurr of
images prior to the 'mirror stage'. A
swallowing up of the imagination by the real,
the emergence of the imaginary under the
aegis of the symbolic, the beginning and
absolute of the ideal - this feminine facet
of love is perhaps the most subtle
sublimation of the secret, psychotic ground
of hysteria. (TL, pp. 112-13)
The dangers implicit in narcissism are consequent upon
its transitional status as formation of psychic space:
its processes, as psychic counterpart to the drives,
take on their dominant destructive wave ('swallowing up
of the imagination by the real'); as 'potential' of the
mirror stage the processes adopt the structure of the
mirror image as determinant of fetishization. The
fragility of the heterogeneous relation (owed to the
third party) of idealization and abjection potentiates
also the opposition of love and hatred, with
proliferating	 consequences	 for	 intersubjective
relations. First tenuous sublimation of the drives, and
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potential of the mirror image, the qualities of
narcissism emerge in the aggressive and self-protective
conflicts of the subject as a relation to the other.
The prime significance of the relation to a third which
is indispensable to the correlation of idealization and
abjection is that it represents an archaic disposition
of the symbolic. The 'emergence of the imaginary under
the aegis of the symbolic' therefore expresses the
significance of narcissism as a whole, its meaning as
intrasymbolic.
Freud inscribed narcissism - which for him is
basically and absolutely libidinal - within
the dependency of a 'new psychic action'
which turns out to be an archaic instance of
symbolic fatherhood as magnet for primary
identifications and requirement for the Ego
Ideal. Having thus recognized the original,
libidinal foundation of narcissistic seeming,
Freud, in the same stroke, strengthened his
conception of the libido and the Ego by
defining them as dependent, beyond
autoeroticism, on what Lacari calls the Other.
(TL, p. 123)
(iii) 'Not-I': primal void as mediated 'essence'
Without a doubt, Kristeva's recovery of the semiotic
figures idealization as the 'essence' of Oedipal
identification. The diachronic presentation of the
'stages' of separation is a presentation of the
constitution of the subject of desire through a process
deemed 'mimetic' (since direct and immediate -
following Freud).11 The concept of 'desire', for
Kristeva, presupposes a structuration of the psyche in
which the infans takes the 'third' for itself:
that archaic vortex of idealization is
immediately an other who gives rise to a
powerful, already psychic transference of the
previous semiotic body in the process of
becoming a narcissistic Ego. Its very
existence and my being able to take myself
for it - that is what already moves us away
from the primal maternal satisfaction and
situates us within the hysterical universe of
loving idealization. (TL, pp. 33-4)
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Idealization, or the formation of the ego ideal, is the
essence of the thetic phase (process of individuation),
and in turn of the Oedipal structure of exclusion and
identification. Nevertheless, the semiotic processes
are not the absolute principle of intersubjective
relations, since they themselves are determined by the
symbolic (the mother's body and her desire are the
principle of idealization).
In 1974 Kristeva proposed that the 'mother's body' is
what mediates 'the symbolic law ordering social
relations' (RPL, p. 27). As the ordering principle of
the semiotic chora the mother's body is the principle
of the drives' status as articulation. This proposition
is supplemented in the 1980s. The semiotic is an order
of heterogeneous relations only if the 'principle' of
mediation is a unity of the mother's body and her
desire. There is a functioning of lack (fundamental
character of the symbolic) prior to the discovery of
lack which marks the entry into language.
The condition of possibility or 'advent' of the
imaginary father is the mother's relation to another
(than the child). The mother's symbolic significance as
a unity of nature (in terms of autoeroticism) and
culture (her position in the symbolic order) is thus
brought to the fore in the later writings. She is a
unity, in Kristeva's words, of nurse and assistant (TL,
p. 48). Her symbolic status, as 'incomplete', that is
to say her desire 'for the Father's Phallus', intrigues
the advent of the imaginary father. The central meaning
of the status of the mother in Kristeva's reformulation
of Lacan is the argument, not that 'she' is the chora,
but that psychosexual individuation is determined by
the symbolic instance.
Kristeva's account of the 'rescue' from the dyadic
mother-child relation (in which, without a third, they
do not constitute 'two') draws away from the classical
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configuration in which the condition or advent of the
third is the intervention of a 'stern' paternal law.
Kristeva's archaic disposition of the paternal function
redefines the paternal function as twofold, releasing
both 'father' and 'subject' from the burden of the
Oedipus complex, and turning the role of the paternal
agency - the 'not dead Father but living Father... non-
desiring but loving father' - into the intriguing of
psychic space, or internal boundaries (TL, p. 30).
The mother's desire for another impresses on the infans
a negation or 'primal repression': the 'not I'.
The imaginary father would thus be the
indication that the mother is not complete
but that she wants... Who? What? The question
has no answer other than the one that
uncovers narcissistic emptiness;
	
'At any
rate,	 not I.'	 (TL,	 p.	 41;	 ellipsis in
original)
The 'not I' is both a crisis for the infans (the
emptiness central to separation) and the potentiation
of the 'subject': not the opposite of 'I' but its
condition of possibility. If the mother's desire is
turned not to another but to the child, the latter is
positioned as fantasmatic object of her quest for the
Other. The infans is locked in a struggle with the
mother over the refusal of the 'gift' (TL, p. 40).
Within the psychoanalytic knowledge of the abjection of
the mother, abjection is recognized as a necessary
dimension in the process of psychosexual individuation
- conditional, that is, upon its heterogeneous relation
with idealization of the 'father'. Furthermore, the
importance of idealization of the father is not
intended as the revaluation it seems to harbour of
'paternal agency' over maternal nurturing. The mother's
'assistance', and not paternal law, is the principle of
individuation: her 'desire' intrigues the advent of the
father of individual prehistory. The third 'term' of
the semiotic ternary structuration is the imaginary
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father ('object' of idealization), but the 'advent' of
the third is the imaginary mother. Kristeva's
'feminism' could be formulated by extending Lacan's
doctrine: 'There is no Other of the Other... thanks to
the (m)Other.'
The intricacy of Kristeva's presentation of the advent
of the imaginary father will eventually lead her to
propose an abstract logical formulation for the advent
and significance of the imaginary. The abstraction is
intended to overcome the residual difficulties which
accrue to Kristeva's account of the 'heterogeneous
relation' of narcissism owing to the gendered terms of
that relation. These difficulties have led commentators
to judge either that the mother's status as the unity
of nature and culture endows her with the full
significance of the semiotic or that the emphasis on
the mother's 'lack' harbours a revaluation of the 'Name
of the Father' .12
In response to the doubts over the success of her
recovery of the semiotic voiced at the ICA in 1984,
Kristeva claimed:
I think I understand your preoccupation. It's
true that feminism has been very much against
these sharp distinctions. I have two things
to say. Firstly, for me it's not necessary to
call them mother or father - what is
necessary is to have three terms, if you
prefer call them X and Y, why not? But I'm
not sure that changes very much. What is
necessary for what I call the psychic space
to acceed to language is the existence of
this distance and I cannot imagine another
organization than th? one of three terms.
('Desire', pp. 22-3)
(iv) The desire of the mother is the desire of the
Other
It is the mother's symbolic status as unity of semiotic
and symbolic which endows her with the semiotic status
of being the principle of the formation of the
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'narcissan' subject. She is a principle of mediation.
While Kristeva does make a provisional theoretical
distinction between 'narcissan' and 'narcissistic' in
order to clarify the positive significance of
narcissism, she will not sustain the terminological
distinction owing to the unity of formation and
deformation.
The mother's status as principle of the advent of the
imaginary father is also her status as the 'imaginary'
mother. The archaic or semiotic parents (whose status
as a conglomerate is expressed in terms of ' the advent
of the father of individual prehistory') are a
combination which sets in process the formation of
psychic space out of the crisis of primal separation.
This is not an Oedipal crisis. Kristeva expands on
Freud's notion of 'a direct and immediate'
identification.
If there is an immediacy of the child's
identification with that desire (of the
Father's Phallus), it probably comes from the
child not having to elaborate it; rather, he
receives it, mimics it, or even sustains it
through the mother who offers it to him (or
refuses it) as a gift. In a way, such an
identification with the father-mother
conglomerate, as Freud would have it, or with
what we have just called the maternal desire
for the Phallus, comes as a godsend [my
emphasis]. (TL, p. 40)
When the child stands in for the mother's ideal, the
non-correspondence of metonymic recession of the object
(petit a) and the prototype (the Other) represents the
foreclosure of the symbolic. Their 'non-correspondence'
is equivalent to the possession of an idea of the
existence of the 'ideal', in abstraction from the
existence of 'infinite space' which is the meaning of
the 'site of the Other'. Once the infans is
precociously situated as an 'I', as ideal object,
through misrecognition of the site of the mother's
desire, the advent of the 'not I' is endangered. This
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danger and its implications for intersubjectivity are
withstood only by the mother's turn to a third party.
The semiotic meaning of her 'desire for the Father's
Phallus' is desire for a third as such. It presents
'the desire of the Other' and hence intrigues the 'site
of the Other'. The mother is principle of the semiotic
unity of the semiotic and the symbolic only as
'subject' of the symbolic in addition to field of
autoeroticism.	 -
Freud's famous 'what does a womaiji want?' is
perhaps only an echo of the more fundamental
'What does a mother want?' It runs up against
the same impossibility, bordered on one side
by the imaginary father, on the other by a
'not I' And it is out of this 'not I' (see
Beckett's play with that title) that an ego
painfully attempts to come into being... (TL,
p. 41; ellipsis in original)
The mother's desire for a third in the symbolic order
is 'the desire of the Other' (Lacan's subjective
genetive) in the semiotic 'order'. Before the subject
is posited it is loved. The intrapsychic lining of the
'subject' is the beloved. The mother's gift holds off
the consequences for the infans of being made the
object of the metonymic quest which does not correspond
to its metaphoric prototype (TL, p. 36). The mother's
'incompleteness' may reintroduce the primacy of
Lacanian lack into the semiotic (itself recovered to
forestall that primacy), but the unity of semiotic and
symbolic restores mediation to symbolic lack. The
mother's incompleteness is, for the infans, 'the very
place from which he is seen and heard' (TL, p. 22): the
mediation of lack, or the semiotic unity of semiotic
and symbolic is a godsend.
The unity of the semiotic (prelinguistic) and the
symbolic (positing or 'thesis' of the Other) is not
opposed to Lacan's notion of the site of the Other, but
to the fate of the concept of lack. The symbolic in the
semiotic recovers for Lacan's 'Other' the dynamic it
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loses when the significance of lack for intersubjective
relations is reduced to the meaning and consequences of
its 'discovery'. Kristeva's foundational distinction
recovers the mediation of this moment: the significance
of lack for the 'subject' is separation in rather than
externality to the Other: 'the loved object is a
metaphor for the subject'
(v) The 'cure'
Kristeva's elaboration of narcissism qualifies the
judgement on the cure made in Revolution in Poetic
Language. In 1974 the transference was considered in
its significance as a reorientation of the subject to
'identification' and hence to the norms of social
relations. Qualified by the meaning of the semiotic
dynamic this - formerly negative because 'normalizing'
- significance of the cure is now crucial to the
efficacy of psychoanalysis on its own terrain. If the
'transference' has, recognized in its semiotic
dimension, a dynamic value missing from the fixities of
symbolic identification, its instability delimits the
curative power of that dynamic. 'Narcissus is both
prime mover and barrier for love' (p. 124). The
knowledge of psychoanalysis presents the necessity of
the Oedipal structure.
If 'love in the feminine' is to lend imaginary
resources to the speaking subject, the presentation of
the 'originary' correlation of abjection and
idealization is not to be abstractly understood as
setting the task of reintegrating the psychic sphere in
its pre-Oedipal form. Narcissism, even as the dynamic
of internal boundaries, carries within itself their
dissolution. The 'object' and dynamic of psychoanalysis
is given as the imaginary:
Freudian love - transference - holds to a
wager lucidly laid beyond hatred and death:
it is the amorous transference that produces
the dynamic effects of the cure. Freudian
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dualism finds its strongest expression in
this impossible harmonization of amorous
space, in this fractured space of lovehate.
(TL, p. 125)
Nevertheless, in the synchronic perspective, not only
the correlation of love and hate but the
interdependency of the imaginary and symbolic is the
condition of the creative potential of the imaginary.
The speaking subject is the subject of drives and
desire, the imaginary and representation. The wager
laid 'beyond' hatred and death requires the dialectical
experience of love, but inseparable from hatred as the
latter is, the dynamic of love is insufficient to the
aims of analysis. Its aim remains the traditional one
of recovering the 'desire' of the analysand.
The deformation of the semiotic processes does not
simply pose the question of reintegrating the
'imaginary' but demands an acknowledgment of the
significance, diachronically, of their fate in the
Oedipus complex. Idealization does not have the
stability of the libidinal cathexis of an object.
Alone, it is a fragile transference, turning the other
into a 'fake':
The fake would arise because one only rarely
succeeds in identifying fully with that
ideal; either it does not hold, or it is
demolished, or else Narcissus, with his
mother's help, believes he does not need it
because he already is it (an ideal for his
mother). Then instead of having to create
what will enable him to equal his ideal - a
work, or an idealized object to love -
Narcissus will fabricate an ersatz. (TL, p.
126)
The immediate identification with an imaginary other
runs the risk of erotic passivation. Both enslavement
to the other and fetishization of one's own image (p.
126) indicate the ambiguity of narcissism, since its
pre-objectal identification inclines Narcissus away
from recognition of the otherness of the other.
237
Since it is not object-oriented,
identification reveals how the subject that
ventures there can finally find himself a
hypnotized slave of his master; how he turns
out to be a nonsubject, the shadow of a
nonobject. (TL, p. 37)
The necessity of the 'fake' for the sake of separation
is met by the necessity of the negotiation of the
Oedipal complex for the sake of the object of desire
through which the ideal becomes an 'other'.
Formerly, when poetic language and psychoanalysis were
considered as signifying practices in the doctoral
thesis of 1974, poetic language was distinguished by
reason of the absence of addressee in its
'transference' on to the signifying process alone. In
the 1980s, Kristeva's claim that the transference
involves the dynamic of the imaginary turns
psychoanalytic experience into a site of the production
of 'metaphoricalness', analogous to that of poetic
language. In a manner comparable with the release from
finitude enacted in poetic language, psychoanalytic
experience enacts infinity (the dynamic of the creative
imaginary) by intriguing the 'existence of' infinite
space.
Kristeva is not therefore suggesting that the
reparative potential of narcissism lies solely in the
correlation of abjection and idealization. As
contraries they are mutually dependent and the
overweaning power of one requires the corrective
strength of the other. Thus, recovery from enslavement
to an , idealized other may go the way of the violence of
abjection as a capacity for separation: 'Abjection of
self: the first approach to a self that would otherwise
be walled in' (PH, p. 8). Nevertheless, bordering on
the drives or engulfment in the real as abjection is,
this way out may then stumble self-protectively on
fetishization;	 bordering on	 the	 mirror stage,
narcissism tends to the fetishization of one's own
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image. For Kristeva, however dialectical the complex of
abjection is, it is not a complex which psychoanalysis
can be said to have the power to approach: 'Emphasizing
it would lead the patient into paranoia or, at best,
into morality' (PH, p. 48).
The loving dynamic of the transference substantiates
the minimal, violent, connection with the world formed
by abjection. Kristeva's return to Freud's theory of
narcissism seems to suggest that the terms of the cure
reside in the intriguing and enactmen1 of the relation
to the imaginary father. However, while for Kristeva
the psychoanalyst must stand in for the 'Great Other'
( p. 31) in order to recover the dynamic of narcissism
in its totality, this is not the cure: 'The analyst
occupies the place of the Other.... Indeed,
identification with this manifestation of the Other
together with his introjection do not take place
without his symbolic or imaginary putting to death'
(TL, p. 13). The analyst 'follows or diverts the path
[of abjection], leading the patient toward the "good"
object - the object of desire' (PH, p. 48).
The cure, in its power and in the limits of that power,
requires both the correlation of semiotic processes and
their interconnection with intersubjective relations.
The analyst aims at, not the narcissist, but the lover:
the lover is a narcissist with an object....
As far as he is concerned, there is an
idealizable other who returns his own ideal
image (that is the narcissistic moment) but
he is nevertheless an other. (TL, p. 33)
The meaning of the cure which emerges from Kristeva's
return to Freud is the recovery of the drive-related
and desiring subject. Thus, although Kristeva will mark
a hesitation over Freud's use of the term primary
identification for the process of construction of the
ego ideal (TL, pp. 40-1), she will not make a
terminological distinction which would obscure the
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unity of semiotic idealization and symbolic
identification. In their 'unity' each mediates the
other.
It is as subjects of representation and subjects of the
Other that both the dangers of narcissism
(idealization/abjection) and the fixation of identities
(subject/object; culture/nature) are relieved of their
internal and reciprocal opposition. The dual nature of
the 'transference' lends the knowledge of
psychoanalysis its status as basis for an ethics: the
negotiation of the 'otherness' of the other requires
acknowledgement of the primal void, and thus of the
idealization reparative of abjection's violence. But it
also requires the 'distance' set up by identification
in the Oedipal complex. Or rather, it requires the
distance between the 'ideal' and the 'object of desire'
as condition of their mediation. Kristeva calls this
mediation, or in her terms heterogeneous relation, an
'impossible harmony': neither disharmony nor
harmonization since the latter would reintroduce the
former; it would overcome the distance necessary to the
withstanding of either the metonymy of the impossible
quest or the narcissistic deformations of hysterical
idealization. The loved object - hence the self as
'other' to itself - is an 'impossible' perfect lover.
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C. 'After Religion, Morality, Legality'
1. The Modern Narcissus
Kristeva's conception of the modern Narcissus diagnoses
a culture suffering from a surplus of abjection
connected with the lack, or loss, of love. Her theory
of the modern subject diagnoses its maladies as a fate
of western subjectivity in the context of the death of
God ('God is love'). This diagnosis draws on the
Freudian return to Narcissus for the psychoanalytic
knowledge of narcissism's dynamic, a knowledge which
takes into account the death drive.
It is perhaps more interesting today to
stress the originality of the narcissistic
figure and the very particular place it
occupies, in the history of western
subjectivity on the one hand, and on the
other, taking its morbidity into account, in
the scrutiny of the critical symptoms of that
subjectivity. (TL, p. 105)
Kristeva's modern subject is the one who 'lacks being
particular' (its laws, whether imposed from without or
self-given, do not mediate its dimensions but divide
them off from one another). The modern Narcissus is the
subject 'outside': isolated by the modern forms of law,
and without the resources of a God-relation.
Because today we lack being particular,
covered as we are with so much abjection,
because the guideposts that insured our
ascent toward the good have been proven
questionable, we have crises of love. Let's
admit it: lacks of love. (TL, p. 7)
Kristeva coined the term 'lovehate' (hainamoration) to
express the place of the 'impossible' harmony, to which
idealization and abjection contribute, within
intersubjective relations. The conception of lovehate
responds to the modern Narcissus, who represents the
de-formation of the western subject.
When Freud took the word narcissism back from
the realm of psychiatry, Narcissus again and
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more than every caused discomfort. Narcissus
had become a perverse symptom. The tremendous
introspective elaboration of which Plotinus
or Thomas Aquinas only represent eminent
summits, had become dismantled, and a sickly,
illusory longing on the part of a Self
deprived of an Other is all that remains of
the speculative journey aiming at the
creation of a subjective internality. (TL, p.
123)
On the scale of her cultural interpretation of modern
social and political relations, the rehabilitation of
Narcissus represents a recommendation to the theory and
knowledge of psychoanalysis in the context of the 'end'
of monotheism and the fate of the loving subject it
attempted to elaborate and to secure a space for. The
return to Freud's 'knowledge' of narcissism elaborates
a relation to a third which does not promise salvation
in ignorance or repression of 'death's work' in the
formation and de-formation of the speaking being (p.
124); nor re-present the burdensome exclusions and
identifications of the Oedipal triad. The reintegration
of imaginary resources (the phantasmatic love and
hatred informed by the pre-Oedipal drama) signifies the
recovery of psychic space or 'innerness'
The degeneration of idealization and abjection is
founded in an abstraction from the mediation of
semiotic and symbolic. The breakdown of amorous space
thus bears a historical significance and a cultural
meaning. It signifies the fate of 'western' subjective
internality, and it means that the breakdown in modern
social and political relations corresponds with crises
of love. Kristeva diagnoses the disintegration of
intersubjective relations in the symbolic order as the
social de-formation of love and hatred, and theorizes
that deformation on the basis of the processes of
idealization and abjection intelligible to
psychoanalysis.
Kristeva will later develop a social theory of
nationalism and religious disposition in which the
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intensity of patriotism and the hatred of the foreigner
re-present the disharmony of idealization and
abjection. Both that 'love' and that 'hatred' represent
a social breakdown - toward hatred and death. In
Strangers to Ourselves (1988) Kristeva's call to
rethink the foreigner as the 'stranger within'
corresponds to her theory of the correlation or
heterogeneous relation of idealization and abjection:
To discover our disturbing otherness, for
that indeed is what bursts in to confront
that 'demon', that threat, that apprehension
generated by the projective apparition of the
other at the heart of what we persist in
maintaining as a proper, solid 'us'. By
recognizing our uncanny strangeness we shall
neither suffer from it nor enjoy it from the
outside. The foreigner is within me, hence we
are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner,
there are no foreigners. (SO, p. 192)
Kristeva does not, however, propose a simple
reintegration of intersubjective relations through the
ethics of psychoanalysis. The possibility of the dis-
integration of love and hatred in social relations is
itself founded in the fragility of the 'pre-Oedipal'
drama of narcissism. The tendency to de-formation of
the heterogeneous processes of idealization and
abjection, as has been argued, lies within: there is no
question of a straightforward theory of social reform
on the basis of psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalytic
'knowledge' is a knowledge of the difficult 'birth' of
the subject out of love and hatred. The notion of the
drives' dominant destructive wave of 1974 is not
subject to any revision: the birth of the subject takes
place in a 'vortex' of violence, as its condition.
Psychoanalysis has no speciously benign illusions about
the nature of the speaking being: the speaking subject
'is not innocent'
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2. The Aesthetic: Site of Critique or Fascination with
Abj ection?
And yet, in these times of dreary crisis,
what is the point of emphasizing the horror
of being? ... In short, who, I ask you, would
agree to call himself abject, subject of or
subject to abjection? (PH, pp. 208-9)
In the realm of intersubjective relations the
deformation of the imaginary triad operates as
enslavement (idealization) and the 'power of horror'
(abjection). The enslavement to an ideal or the
fascination with horror are interconnecting polarities
with a dire social and political implication of
profound contemporary relevance. Modern literature, the
re-composition of monotheism's elaboration of love and
hatred, discloses the 'truth' of the sacred (PH, p.
26), and bears the consequences of the disclosure. The
enslavement of self and other which Kristeva claims to
be a fate of the 'Father-religions' of monotheism, in
their contemporary impact on the speaking subject, is
articulated within the literary disclosure of the
'abjection' suppressed by monotheism's boundary to the
sacred. The critical moment of the re-composition of
love, hatred, and the feminine which Kristeva discovers
at the centre of modern literature (Miller, Artaud,
Céline...) bears, in her view, the complementary
narcissistic de-formation: fascination with... powers
of 'horror'.
The exposition of abjection in one of the two
complementary texts on narcissism (Powers of Horror)
concentrates on Céline's 'specific articulation of the
abject' (PH, p. 26). Céline's writing does not take up
its place in Kristeva's thesis of the disclosure of the
repressed of monothesism in any simple sense (PH, p.
26). It portrays the danger of the fascination with
abjection. Céline's writing recomposes (re-jects and
reconstructs) monotheism t s configuration of love and
hate, only to reconfigure an object of hatred: the Jew,
Céline's t one object' (PH, p. 178). His writing borders
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on the eroticization of the abjection it discloses, on
the 'defence' of the living being in the face of
abjection: 'when he succeeds in eroticizing it, when he
allows the nonobject-oriented, prenarcissistic violence
of the death drive directed toward an abject to run
wild, then death triumphs in that strange path' (PH, p.
49).
The theoretical stance Kristeva takes on modern
literature is less a seeming paradox in the context of
her affirmation of poetic language than an ethical
stance. The violence inseparable from 'revolution in
poetic language' must be known and theorized. The
theoretical stance is the possibility of articulating
an ethics out of psychoanalysis' knowledge of the
imaginary. Psychoanalysis responds to the modern
'surplus' of abjection, and to the cathartic imaginary
of modern literature. Modern literature's status as
recomposition of the sacred contributes to Kristeva's
estimation of the 'aesthetic' as site of the critique
of modernity (presentation of its contradictions).
Nevertheless, the theory and knowledge of
psychoanalysis remains indispensable.
Céline's writings present the adventure of poetic
language, but also the danger it harbours:
contemporary literature, in its multiple
variants, and when it is written as the
language,	 possible	 at	 last,	 of	 that
impossible	 constituted	 by	 either	 a-
subjectivity or by non-objectivity,
propounds, as a matter of fact, a sublimation
of abjection. Thus it becomes a substitute
for the role formerly played by the sacred,
at the limits of social and subjective
identity. But we are dealing here with a
sublimation without consecration. Forfeited.
(PH, p. 26)
A word of warning on Borges, for example:
Just	 imagine	 that	 imaginary	 machine
transformed into a social institution - and
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what you get is the infamy of... fascism.
(PH, p. 25, ellipsis in French original)
It is the ethic of psychoanalysis that responds to the
'powers of horror'
My prejudice is that of believing that God is
analysable. Infinitely. ('Mémoire', L'infini,
pp. 46-7; my emphasis)
The conclusion to Kristeva's brief section on Borges
presents an equivocal statement. It does not simply
signal a danger immanent to the poetic text as
'signifying practice', an efficacy poised in the
direction of fascism. The claim needs to be read in the
light of the insistence on knowing the necessity of
maintaining the existence of 'infinite' space that
forms the imaginary. Hence the above warning can be
read as follows:	 'just imagine'	 (imaginer) that
imaginary machine transformed into a social
institution, and what you get is anti-semitisim, the
'infamy' of fascism; imagine again - infinitely, as
psychoanalysis has the capacity to do and the necessity
of which it knows - and out of the psychoanalytic ethic
you have the basis for a nonfoundational ethics.
Psychoanalysis does not negotiate abjection, since 'at
best' this would lead into morality (PH, p. 48).
Instead it intrigues the full dimensions of the
imaginary and hence the 'infinitely' of Kristeva's
infinite.
The enslaving tendency of idealization and the 'horror'
of abjection have cultural implications of which
psychoanalysis is the theory and knowledge. The return
to Freud retrieves its social and political
implications because the theory of psychoanalysis
discloses the implications for social and political
thought of the knowledge of psychoanalysis: the
speaking subject is not innocent, and so the task of
theory is 'to provide a law (universal) for its
jouissance (singular)' .13
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Nevertheless, the full social and political
significance of the 'theory, knowledge and power' of
psychoanalysis emerges in Kristeva's appreciation of
Céline. Kristeva both analyses the fascination with
abjection in its subjective mechanism and appreciates
it as 'limit' and outcome of symbolic Power - a limit
and an outcome to which the analyst bears witness. In
Powers of Horror, abjection, intelligible to
psychoanalysis but beyond the dialectic of the cure,
takes on the full weight of the departure from the
polis and manifests the absolute 'inner' of death drive
and the persistence of the 'thetic moment' as a
boundary which structures and encloses the 'symbolic
order'. 'Monotheism' belongs within this boundary as
part of Kristeva's 'objective totality', even though
its determinations (pure/impure, inside/outside) point
to the 'structuration' of the symbolic order.
Céline's writings configure the impact on the speaking
being of the moral, political, signifying, and above
all religious structures of western history. As has
been shown, Kristeva outlines the communication between
literature and psychoanalysis on the ground that
psychoanalysis functions 'under the same amatory
conditions that rule the production of metaphoricalness
in poetic discourse' (TL, p. 276) The amatory condition
of Céline's re-jection of monotheism's elaboration of
love and hatred is anti-semitism. Kristeva's
delineation of the 'position' of the contemporary
psychoanalyst ('he', 'she') is tinged with an
acknowledgement of the profound meaning of Céline's
amatory condition: his hatred of 'the Jew'.
Because of knowing it, however, with a
knowledge undermined by forgetfulness and
laughter, an abject knowledge, he is, she is
preparing to go through the first great
demystificatiori of Power (religious, moral,
political, and verbal) that mankind has ever
witnessed; and it is necessarily taking place
within that fulfillment of religion as sacred
horror, which is Judaeo-Christian monotheism.
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In the meantime let others continue their
long march toward idols and truths of all
kinds, buttressed with the necessarily
righteous faith for wars to come, wars that
will necessarily be holy. (PH, p.210; my
emphasis)
The rendering of the production of metaphoricalness as
a loss in modernity is echoed in Kristeva's statement
of it in 'Desire' where she was forced to change her
terms 'mother' and 'father' into an abstract
formulation on the importance of maintaining the
existence of the distance between 'X and Y' . Kristeva
referred there to the crisis of the paternal function
and claimed it to be a 'contemporary fact' (p. 23). The
status given to the facticity of the crisis of
'metaphoricalness' leads further, in Nations and
Nationalism, to a comprehension of the contemporary
western world in terms - with the usual reservations -
of Hegel's configuration of culture: 'self-alienated
spirit' . In the same publication the problematic of the
ego ideal is directly raised in relation to 'the
national problem today'. The question, on social and
political terrain, 'where is the optimal located?'
takes us away from the categories of psychoanalysis:
'We have no choice here but to abandon psychoanalytic
references and turn to political sociology' (NN, p.
53) . 14
Does this represent a change of heart on Kristeva's
part over what 'others' have been doing 'in the
meantime'? If there are such others (political
sociologists?), the reasons behind Kristeva's readiness
to readdress them are an outcome of the difficulty of
pluralist practices in the face of the reality of the
'crisis'; but they are also an outcome of the 'loss' of
the comprehension of objective spirit from the
beginning of her writings, and the consequent fixation
of 'death drive' and 'symbolic order' which led to the
psychoanalyst's isolated knowledge of and witness to
horror:
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literature: the sublime point at which the
abject collapses in a burst of beauty that
overwhelms us - and 'that cancels our
existence' (Céline). (PH, p. 210)
The analysis of Céline's 'scription' suggests that
modern literature presents both implications of the
'critical' de-formation of the subject: it is the site
of 'critique' of monotheism and of the subject-law
relations in legality and morality; but it also
embodies and enacts the 'crisis' of that de-formation.
Once again, the key feature of Kristeva's concept of
'infinity' and her exposition of 'practice' is the
importance of the renewal of rejection, or in other
words the 'maintenance' of heterogeneous contradiction,
which implies a sustained engagement with the
'symbolic'. Any 'practice' of poetic language will
simply reenact the 'crisis' if it does not lead to a
renewed engagement with the symbolic (under the
guidance of the wise analyst?). It will remain locked
in opposition to, hence in identity with, the object of
its 'decomposition'
Despite the distinction made in the early writings
between the avant-garde and modern literature, Céline's
'scription' reveals that modern literature remains
within the problematic of the 'negative affirmation'
infinity 'in' language may always result in the
negativist fetish which made avant-garde literature a
symptom as well as a practice.
Given Kristeva's concept of 'infinity', the only
theoretical stance she can take up at this point is to
urge the importance of sustaining an engagement with
the symbolic. It is the nature of Kristeva's
'infinite', therefore, which lies at the root of the
striking position she has adopted recently on the
resources for rethinking 'nationality' in contemporary
Europe. Her estimation of what is to be expected from
the respective resources of the French Enlightenment
and of German post-Enlightenment thought rests on the
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opposition of 'semiotic' and 'symbolic' which her
theory of the 'subject' means to undermine, but which
her concept of infinity makes absolute. Chapter 5 will
show how the 'theory of the subject' based on the
discovery of the unconscious presents difficulties for
the attempt to transcend the 'boundary' of
psychoanalysis and engage with the symbolic order on
its own terrain.
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CHAPTER 5 'STRANGERS' AND 'CITIZENS'
Introduction
In two recent publications Kristeva has developed the
theoretical arguments of the 1980s into an assessment
of the implications and limitations of the theory and
knowledge of psychoanalysis for addressing contemporary
social and political, relations. First: the concluding
chapters to Strangers to Ourselves argue for the
pertinence of the return to the Kantian 'idea' of
cosmopolitanism, and propose a revised notion of
cosmopolitanism which accommodates the ethics of
psychoanalysis.	 Second:	 Nations	 and	 Nationalism
considers the question of how 'the ethical course
suggested by psychoanalysis' stands in relation to the
contemporary problematic from which it is not
exonerated: that of 'putting the "national" back into
question' CNN, p. 51).
In both texts Kristeva seeks to determine the position
and utility of psychoanalytic references, given the
'absence of a new community bond - a saving religion'
able to integrate the multiple social bonds of the
contemporary multinational society (SO, p. 195). In
order to do so, Kristeva poses and responds to two
basic questions. The first: given the lack of a
contemporary integrational and salvatory discourse, how
do the resources of psychoanalysis contribute to our
understanding of the paradoxical communities of
contemporary Europe? urther: at what point must
specifically psychoanalytic references give way before
the theoretical task set by the rise of the
multinational society (notably France), and by the
(re)emergent ideologies of nationalism in Europe?
Kristeva's seeks to determine the value of the
respective contributions of psychoanalysis and
political sociology for thinking through the encounter
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between the 'stranger' and the 'citizen'. The explicit
and implicit relation to 1-legel informing Kristeva's
fundamental concepts are central to her assessment of
the implications of psychoanalysis for an ethics and a
politics responsive to the contemporary world. This
chapter takes issue with the manner in which 1-Tegel's
'worlds of spirit' are deployed in order to determine
the (de)formation of the contemporary western world;
and with the subsequent repudiation of the resources of
speculative philosophy for the theoretical task of
expounding the encounter between 'stranger' and
'citizen'.
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A. The Power of Duty
1. The Law of the Unconscious
In Strangers to Ourselves, Kristeva proceeds from the
exposition of the fascination with horror that lurks in
modern literature, in order to reconfigure the 'powers
of horror' within the Freudian account of the
unheimlich'. This reconfiguration suggests that the
truth of the sacred disclosed in Céline's 'scriptiont
re-presents an intrapsychic 'law' that inclines towards
the working out of the powers of horror. Uncanny
strangeness is, on Freudian terrain, 'a psychic law
allowing us to confront the unknown and work it out in
the process of Kulturarbeit, the task of civilization'
(SO, p. 189).
In reference to and distinction from the Kantian 'idea'
of the league of nations, Kristeva proposes a
cosmopolitanism based on the 'law' which the discovery
of the Freudian unconscious has disclosed. The logic of
the unconscious presents the irreducible 'universal' of
the speaking being: the speaking being as a 'bundle' -
'desiring, desirable, mortal and death-bearing'; yet,
as such, 'always already shaped by the other' (SO, p.
182). The formation of psychic space, working out of
the death drive, founds the bond of intersubjectivity.
The ethics of psychoanalysis implies a
politics: it would involve cosmopolitanism of
a new sort that, cutting across governments,
economies and markets, might work for a
mankind whose solidarity is founded on the
consciousness of its unconscious - desiring,
destructive, fearful, empty, impossible.
On the basis of an erotic, death-bearing
unconscious, the uncanny strangeness - a
projection as well as a first working out of
the death drive - which adumbrates the work
of the 'second' Freud, the one of Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, sets the difference
within us in its most bewildering shape and
presents it as the ultimate condition of our
being with others. (SO, p. 192; my emphasis)
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A law for the speaking being must recognize and
rehabilitate the fundamental law 'of' the speaking
being which shapes intersubjectivity. If the foundation
of our solidarity is the first working out of the death
drive, Kristeva's 'universal' is placed in the
unconscious as a fundamental 'otherness' to itself of
the speaking being. The ultimate conditions of our
being with others are death's work and the metaphorical
'object', out of which our psychic, lovehating space
takes form. This notion of the 'subject' poses the
renewability of intersubjective relations because the
separated subject is an 'accident' of infinite space.
The renewal of the intersubjective is a tcathartic
eternal return' based on the law of the 'bundle':
'Night not Universality Be...	 Our Own
Foreignness?' (SO, penultimate chapter title)
In the ethics of psychoanalysis duty does not, as Hegel
said of Fichte's political philosophy, 'only have power
insofar as the individual's reason acknowledges it as
law' (Diff., p. 149). The acknowledgement of 'mankind's
solidarity' is the consciousness of its unconscious,
which suggests that the truth of the unconscious will
have power insofar as it is acknowledged as universal.
The question remains of how to elaborate the politics
'implied' in the ethics of psychoanalysis; how to turn
this law, intelligible to and theorized by
psychoanalysis but not within its power beyond ,its own
confines, into a law 'for us'. This implication itself
implies a renegotiation of the 'being particular' that
we lack today. Yet the ethics of psychoanalysis already
presents a difficulty for the elaboration of the
politics it 'implies', given that the foundation of
man's solidarity suggests a cosmopolitanism which is to
'cut across governments...'. If the truth of the
unconscious will have power insofar as it is
acknowledged as universal, what 'in the State... is to
govern'? (Diff., p. 149)
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2. Esprit générale: Horror of the Volk?
Kristeva's 'Open Letter to Harlem Désir' (1990) is one
of the essays, translated in Nations and Nationalism
(1993), which engages in a debate on how to rethink
'nationality' in contemporary Europe. The context of
this rethinking is the problem set for the notion of
citizenship by the multinational society arising from
the growth of immigration. Kristeva's ethics of
psychoanalysis, approached in Strangers to Ourselves,
is to find its place at this difficult encounter
between 'stranger' and 'citizen'. Kristeva attempts to
determine the position of 'the ethical course suggested
by psychoanalysis' vis-à-vis the problematic of
'nationality' from which it is not exonerated.
It is notable that Kristeva announces the necessity of
abandoning psychoanalytic references at this point (NN,
p.53). The foundation of mankind's solidarity is
intelligible to psychoanalysis as the unconscious -
death-bearing but 'always already shaped by the other'
The destructive potential of the intrapsychic condition
of intersubjectivity is met, within the psychoanalytic
scene, by the dynamic of 'identification' with the
metaphorical 'object'. Nevertheless, the idea of 'the
optimal narcissistic image' cannot function as a
regulating idea on socio-political terrain. The
regulating ego ideal does not translate into a concept
of the 'national', since it is difficult to locate the
'optimal' apart from the degeneration that the
narcissistic image harbours (NN, p. 52).
The necessity of turning from psychoanalytic references
to a political sociology is then drawn out within an
uneasy negotiation of the respective contributions to
be expected from French Enlightenment and German post-
Enlightenment thought. For Kristeva, the German thought
of 'culture' and 'nation' is redundant, for the reason
that the romanticist and idealist elaborations of
Volksgeist present a danger within the untranscendable
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reality of 'national identities' today (NN, p. 33). At
the point of the turn to political sociology, Kristeva
is adamant on the distinction between the resources of
the French tradition and those of the German for the
'problem of the nation':
I am among those who dread and reject the
notion of Volksgeist, 'spirit of the people',
which stems from a line of thinkers that
includes Herder and Hegel. (NN, p. 52; my
emphasis)
Unquestionably located within the tiarcissistic de-
formation, German Volksgeist is opposed to French
esprit generale (expounded in the thought of
Montesquieu).
Kristeva first presents the destiny of Volksgeist: 'a
repressive force aimed at other peoples and extolling
one's own' (p. 54); 'the Volksgeist's appropriating and
authoritarian calls' (p. 62). Volksgeist cannot
contribute - quite the reverse - to rethinking
'nationality' since the notion bends the 'other' to
'the norms of our own repression'. In strong contrast,
esprit générale is promoted as an idea that can
valorize and guarantee private and particular domains,
safeguarding them against the claims made by the
legislative, the political or the 'national' to be the
'last recourse' (pp. 61, 55). The destiny of esprit
générale: France, 'this contractual, transitional, and
cultural nation' (p. 47); this 'highly symbolic body'
( p. 43).
Leaving behind the psychoanalytic reference of the
optimal narcissistic image and its possible (German?)
destiny beyond the confines of psychoanalysis, Kristeva
turns to the tradition of the French Enlightenment for
its elaboration of particular and universal, citizen
and nation. The resources for thinking nationality in
German (German romanticism, German idealism) are
intelligible, after Freud, as presenting an opposition
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of semiotic and symbolic: a ('secret') foundation from
which a symbolic Power is deduced (die deutsche
Nation). Conversely, the French nation is a highly
symbolic body. The idea of esprit générale does not
abdicate the engagement with the symbolic, but neither
does it present an abstract ideal, since it posits the
general in the particular, puts it in concrete form
CNN, p. 56). When it comes to elaborating the politics
implied in the knowledge of psychoanalysis, we must
leave the 'German' at its boundary.
the secret notion of Volksgeist, one that is
intimate and indeed mystical (in the sense of
Gemüt and Einfuhlung), appears to me as
favoring hegemonic claims (be they German,
Hungarian or Romanian) and is a product of
the same disease, with differences that are
simply quantitative and, one would hope,
consequences less catastrophic than those of
the Third Reich, wherever that ideology turns
up. I would thus assert that nationalism is
neither 'good' nor 'bad', but that within the
reality of national identities, which cannot
be transcended today or in a long time, I
would choose Montesquieu's esprit générale
over Herder's Volksgeist. CNN, p. 33)
In the theory of psychoanalysis Einfuhlung, 'the
assimilation of other people's feelings', is an
identification with a metaphorical 'object' (TL, p.
24). It points to the dynamic of the transference. On
the terrain of social and political relations it would
be a mystical, secret notion, which is better rejected
within the 'reality' of national identities today, even
if nationalism is neither 'good' nor 'bad'.
Kristeva does not specify that in German idealism it is
Fichte who translates the ' yolk' into the 'Nation';
who, in the context of Napeolonic military occupation
in 1808, 'addresses' the people; who, by identifying
the 'culture' or 'formation' of the German people,
adopts the 'nation' into German (Reden an die deutsche
Nation - not 'Volk'). It is Fichte who, without
abandoning the rational state deduced from first
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principles, now bases his ethical and political
philosophy on a theory of 'culture'.l
Hegel, grasping in 1801 the social and political
implications of Fichte's system, presents in contrast
to the foundational treatment of ethics and politics
which prepares the way for Fichte's 'nation', the idea
of the 'yolk'
As a result of the absolute antithesis
between pure drive and natural drive
[Fichte's] Natural Right offers us a picture
of the complete lordship of the understanding
and the complete bondage of the living being.
It is an edifice in which reason has no part
and which it therefore repudiates. For reason
is bound to find itself most explicitly in
its self-shaping as a people (Volk), which is
the most complete organization that it can
give itself. But that State as conceived by
the understanding is not an organization at
all, but a machine, and the people is not the
organic body of a communal and rich life, but
an atomistic, life-impoverished multitude.
(Diff, pp. 148-9; my emphasis)
Kristeva's supposed sublation of the idealist concept
of the 'subject' fails to address the Hegelian notion
of the Volk. It led in the early writings to the
impossibility of recognizing mediation in the posited
totality of objective existence (the symbolic order).
When the question arises of the politics implied in the
ethics of psychoanalysis, the problematic of mediation
in objective existence must be returned to; but the
return to social and political relations is unavoidably
hampered by the retention of Kristeva's fundamental
concepts. At the 'boundary' of psychoanalysis the
materialist concept of negativity is hampered by its
sublation of the 'system'. Kristeva's 'ethics' and
'politics' are formed out of the restriction of the re-
cognition of mediation in objective existence.
The nonfoundational ethics based on the knowledge of
psychoanalysis suggests a renegotiation of particular
(citizen) and universal, whose outcome is the idea of
258
an optimal national model. First, the 'ethics'
comprehends a recognition of otherness on the basis of
our own otherness. Second, and in contrast to the
destiny of Volksgeist, the 'politics' promotes an idea
of the integration of particular spheres - multiple
social bonds - within a symbolic body. The process of
integration, its moments, is grasped in the concept of
esprit générale received from the French Enlightenment.
In this concept, the particular is not subsumed under
the universal; what is grasped is the movement of duty
- the recognition of particular and universal within
and, in transition across to, each more encompassing
sphere of societal organization. Kristeva's rethinking
of the 'national' according to a transitional logic of
particular and universal (of the 'confederate' rather
than	 the	 'citizen')	 quotes	 approvingly	 from
Montesquieu's Les pensées:
If I knew something useful to myself and
detrimental to my family, I would reject it
from my mind. If I knew something useful to
my family but not to my homeland, I would try
to forget it. If I knew something useful to
my homeland and detrimental to Europe, or
else useful to Europe and detrimental to
Nankind, I would consider it a crime. (NN, p.
28)2
The ethics of psychoanalysis 'implies' this recognition
of what is claimed to be a serial logic of concord,
despite the 'rejecting' and 'forgetting' it contains.
Its knowledge can be accommodated in the notion of
esprit générale.
let us have universality for the rights of
man, provided we integrate in that
universality not only the smug principle
according to which 'all men are brothers' but
also that portion of conflict, hatred,
violence, and destructiveness that for two
centuries since the Declaration has
ceaselessly been unloaded upon the realities
of wars and fratricidal closeness and that
the Freudian discovery of the unconscious
tells us is a surely modifiable but yet
constituent portion of the human psyche. (NN,
p. 27)
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The notion of esprit générale in Kristeva's view can
accommodate the intrapsychic foundation of
intersubjectivity. It takes up where the 'optimal
narcissistic image' must leave off. The speaking
subject is rehabilitated as in-dividuum and
participates in different social groups which are
nevertheless connected at points where the social
organization has a broader and more encompassing scope.
The speaking subject. belongs in the flexible 'symbolic
body'. Esprit générale is held to exist as a French
national idea that 'can make up the optimal rendition
of the nation in the contemporary world (NN, p. 39).
The serial logic of concord is a model presenting a
workable transitional movement of 'duty' in the
contemporary multinational society. To adopt
Montesquieu's esprit générale as the 'nation' is to
locate an 'optimal model' which accommodates 'the
heterogeneous, dynamic, and "confederate" meaning that
Montesquieu gives to a political group' . This location
of the optimal is held to avoid the degenerations of
the dynamic of idealization and of identification known
to psychoanalysis. It is only 'within' the boundary of
the psychoanalysis that its knowledge has a positive
content, where the 'dynamic' unfolds as experience.
Beyond that boundary the knowledge of psychoanalysis is
'negative' and regulative, establishing the limitations
of the legislative, the political and the national as
claims to be a last recourse.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear what 'in the State...
is to govern' . Kristeva's retention of the foundational
distinction between semiotic and symbolic is requisite
for the concept of heterogeneity which informs the
'law' of the unconscious and hence both the ethics of
p sychoanal ys is and the politics it implies. It has been
seen that the diachronic exposition of the unity of the
semiotic and symbolic presents the 'positing' of the
subject and the symbolic through a 'leap'. The 'leap'
illuminated thus, diachronically, invests the totality
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of objective existence with an irreducibly unknowable
founding moment. The foundation and laws of the 'state'
present a totality of 'structures' without mediation,
whose objective 'biological' and 'historical' law
remains an unknown 'inner'.
Kristeva's rendering of the atomistic individual
subject to symbolic Law fails to recognize mediation in
the objective totality. It implicitly accepts the
Fichtean concept of the 'state', even as the Volksgeist
qua foundation of 'German' nation elicits dread and
rejection. If the thetic moment out of which the
structures of society are posited is a 'leap', it is in
effect an unknowable principle of what 'is not an
organization at all' - the symbolic order. It remains
the case that 'in the State, Right alone is to govern'
(Diff., p. 149). The subject-law relation in the sphere
of legality is merely that of an atomistic self-
consciousness bound to a structure, a symbolic Law. The
subject may be pulverized, put in process, subject of
and to abjection, wrenched in love out of identity,
uncannily strange to itself. But symbolic Law remains
as a simple, if unstable, identity. Kristeva's
reformulation of Lacan does not change the significance
of the symbolic order for human law but leaves it as an
irrevocable human destiny. The unity of the 'separated'
subject, as desiring and drive-related, cannot be
brought into a relation with societal structures. The
'idea' of the optimal national model cannot return to
the opposition of the 'separated subject' and symbolic
law, since the heterogeneous logic it accommodates has
made that opposition absolute.
Kristeva's 'law' of the unconscious is, implicitly, a
return to Hegelian self-consciousness because it
presents a 'subject' that is not an individual set
apart from the universal, but is inseparable from
intersubjectivity. However, the relation in which it is
placed to Power on the one hand, 'destiny' on the
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other, disguises the Hegelian truth. Kristeva's thought
of the opposition between 'powers of horror' and
'symbolic Power', in which the first cannot escape from
the second, can only be overcome by re-cognizing her
law of the unconscious as a one-sided unity or
identification of human and divine law. When she
expresses the law of the unconscious in the proposition
'the object of love is a metaphor for the subject',
self-consciousness (in Hegel's sense) is isolated over
against 'symbolic Power'. She isolates the mechanism of
'desire-and-drives' from a realm of social and
political relations which on the one hand is subject to
'the first great demystification of Power' (TL, p.
210), and on the other stands fast in opposition to the
- human and divine - universal of the speaking subject.
The idea of esprit générale is introduced in the
context of the persistence of abstract right and
symbolic Power, but can only persist in setting them
aside.
The following two sections will question the necessity
of this outcome for the speaking subject, by addressing
the return to Hegel where Kristeva's elaboration of an
ethics and a politics returns explicitly to the
exposition of the	 'worlds of	 spirit'	 in	 the
Phenomenology of Spirit. What can be achieved here is
not the 'synthesis' of psychoanalytic references and
Hegel's philosophy of law, but a demonstration that
Kristeva has mistaken and lost the meaning of
'mediation', and hence the resources of speculative
philosophy for the problematic in which she is engaged.
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B. Antigone: the Destiny of the Actual Self
Kristeva's adoption, repudiation and adaptation of the
shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit
lies within her general presupposition of the meaning
of Hegelian 'self-consciousness'. As has been seen,
Kristeva maintains that there is an absolute
distinction between Hegelian 'immediacy' and the 'in
itself' and 'for itself' of consciousness. On one side,
the immanent presende of the absolute in knowledge is
the truth of Hegelian mediation, on the other 'any
other "means" of knowledge is no more than a
recognition' (TL, p. 39). The possibility of the
progress of the phenomenology of 'spirit' - Hegelian
necessity - is located in the standpoint of
philosophical consciousness, which takes upon itself
what happens for consciousness 'behind its back'.
Consequently	 the movement	 of	 consciousness	 is
determined as a structural repetition.
The rendering of Hegelian self-consciousness as a
constituted consciousness determines the presupposition
of 'spirit' in Kristeva's analyses of the shapes of
consciousness which present the first two of Hegel's
three 'spiritual spheres': 'the true spirit' (the
ethical order), 'self-alienated spirit' (culture), and
'spirit that is certain of itself' (morality). In the
Phenomenology of Spirit the movement of consciousness
as the relation to a 'world' is explicitly ('for
itself') the movement of 'spirit'. The necessity of the
progress of the shapes of consciousness is determined
by the immediacy or abstraction of that relation when
it develops within the standpoint of consciousness:
Spirit is the ethical life of a Ifolk in so
far as it is the immediate truth - the
individual that is a world. It must advance
to the consciousness of what it is
immediately, must leave behind it the beauty
of ethical life, and by passing through a
series of shapes attain knowledge of itself.
These shapes, however, are distinguished from
the previous ones by the fact that they are
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real spirits, actualities in the strict
meaning of the word, and instead of being
shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of
a world. (Phen., #441)
Kristeva repudiates the movement of the idealist
dialectic on the grounds of the supposed
reconciliations which are held to determine the
transitions from one spiritual sphere to the next
(ultimately and from the beginning - if impossibly - to
'absolute knowledge'). She adapts the dialectic of the
ethical order and of culture on the basis of the
accommodation of the 'unconscious' in the dialectic.
This adaptation contributes to the elaboration of an
'ethics'
1. The Eternal Irony of the Community
I will comment here on a passage from one of the early
essays discussed in chapter 1 (Matire, sens,
dialectique), in order to draw out the problematic
outlined above: the appearance of an opposition between
the 'law' of the unconscious and the 'power' of socio-
symbolic Law. This opposition has led to the idea of a
cosmopolitanism based on the recognition of
intersubjectivity as mediation of the 'self' in and
through the 'other'. The idea is proposed in deliberate
abstraction from the socio-symbolic conceived either as
a Power in the process of demystification or as
'governments' to be 'cut across'.
In 'Matière, sens, dialectique' the discussion of
'maintained heterogeneity' turns briefly to Hegel's
presentation of the 'eternal irony of the community'
(MSD, pp. 269-70). The context is the difficulty for
philosophy - to be worked out through the materialist
dialectical logic informed by psychoanalysis - of
thinking 'woman' as knowing and ethical subject; it is
a question of 'her' discourse. The section in
Kristeva's essay avails itself of certain moments of
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Hegel's	 presentation	 of	 Antigone.	 It	 is	 a
counterreading of these moments, rather than either an
independent interpretation of Antigone or a
comprehensive approach to Hegel's dialectic of the
interconnection and opposition of human and divine law
in the distinct spiritual sphere of the ethical order.
The renegotiation of Hegel's presentation of Antigone
coopts the determinations of 'universal', 'singular'
and 'immediate' in the first world of spirit. It
deploys the relations of 'man' and 'woman' to desire
and death in the disequilibrium of the ethical world
and in ethical action, on the presupposition that the
Hegelian 'concept' is equivalent to IKristeva's
rendering of Lacan's 'master signifier'. This use of
the dialectic does not remark on the difference between
'ethical order' and 'ethical action'; but it accounts
for the later use of the determinations of 'universal',
'singular' and 'immediacy' in the context of an enquiry
into the possibility of an ethics for 'women today' ; a
possibility which arises by way of an overturning of
the gendered relations to desire and death in the first
world of spirit ('Stabat Mater'; see section 2 below).
Kristeva compresses two determinations of 'woman' in
the dialectic of the ethical world by identifying the
moment of 'the peaceful organization and movement of
the ethical world' with the opposition of the
community-essence relation (manifest/unconscious
power). Such an identification reveals the failure to
approach Hegelian 'necessity' since it ignores the
movement of the dialectic. Kristeva does not specify
the movement of the dialectic, from ethical order to
ethical action,	 because her deployment of its
categories ('immediately universal', 'immediately
particular', 'singular') would not address the subject-
substance relation which spirit is in the first shape
of the spiritual spheres, and in which the dialectic
unfolds: the first world of spirit unfolds the
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relations of 'universal' and 'singular' within the
immediate unity of self-consciousness and substance
('the true spirit').
In an effort to pose the question of 'how' there exists
a discourse maintaining heterogeneity (without falling
into the problem of the subjective enclosure - be it
the aesthetic enclosure or the 'detour' of perversion
intelligible to psychoanalysis) Kristeva claims a
materialist sublation of how 'woman' is situated in
relation to the Hegelian 'concept'. Since the 'concept'
is translated as the 1 master signifier' , Kristeva
discovers in the Hegelian dialectic an opposition
between the subject of desire (man) and a being who
does not attain to that singularity (woman). It will be
by focussing on the position of 'woman', and
requestioning the restriction on her possibilities
which her 'negativity' vis-à-vis the community
institutes, that Kristeva will proceed to rethink woman
as subject of desire and ethical subject (section 2
below). The position of 'woman' is assessed as follows
in 'Matière, sens, dialectique'
It is perhaps not insignificant that it falls
to a 'woman subject' to maintain here (and
elsewhere) this frustrating discourse,
neither father nor son, the discourse of
heterogeneity. For woman, of whom each knows
that one cannot know what she wants because
she wants a master, represents the negative
in the homogeneity of the community: 'eternal
irony of the community'. That by which she
ironises the communitary homonomy is that 'in
her being destined for singularity and in her
pleasure, she remains immediately universal
and alien to the singularity of desire'.
(MSD, p. 269)
My intention here is to question the deployment of
Hegel's dialectic as a source for Kristeva's attempt to
pose the possibility of an ethics for, or rather from,
'her' (herethique). I will turn in the following
section to show that this is a direction in which
266
Kristeva attempts to take the Hegelian structural form
of the ethical order.
In Hegel's dialectic the homogeneity of the 'community'
is, as such, not substantial. It does not endure (just
as there is no constituted self-consciousness as basis
of the dialectic). For here, where substance is
immediately grasped as self-consciousness, the
community subsists only in interconnection with its
'essence', with the unconscious divine law. The
dialectic of human and divine law presents the specific
shape of spirit as the immediate truth of the unity of
self-consciousness and substance. Spirit is the simple
division into manifest and unconscious power, each
determined as the (immediately) universal beings, Mann
and Weib.
The difference between the ethical life of
the woman and that of the man consists just
in this, that in her vocations as an
individual and in her pleasure, her interest
is centred on the universal and remains
alient to the particularity of desire;
whereas in the husband these two sides are
separated; and since he possesses as a
citizen the self-conscious power of
universality, he thereby acquires the right
of desire and, at the same time, preserves
his freedom in regard to it. (#457)
When Kristeva compresses these determinations of Mann
and Weib together with the moment of the 'eternal irony
of the community', she fails to comment on the
differences presented between the union of man and
woman in the ethical order and the relation of brother
and sister (Antigone) through which the content of the
relation to divine law is specified. The moments of the
peaceful world order and its destruction are taken to
present the instability of a structural difference;
rather than the necessity of the transition from the
peaceful movement of the ethical order to its
destruction, a necessity presented when this spiritual
sphere is distinguished as a structured form (#672).
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'Woman' only represents the negative in the homogeneity
of the community given the movement of 'singular' and
'universal' within this distinct spiritual sphere.
Kristeva isolates a circle in Hegel's 'circle of
circles' and posits it as the totality. It is only by
doing so that she can translate the 'concept' of the
first world of spirit as the 'master signifier'
The dialectic is to be grasped as the movement of
necessity which takes place when the immediate division
of substance (self-consciousness) is aetermined as two
individuals; each in relation to one of the ethical
powers as which the division of substance presents
itself; one in relation to the known law (self-
conscious power) and one in relation to its essence
(the unconscious power); as a relation to the ethical
powers the individuals are universal beings. The
dialectic presents the necessity of the downfall of
'the beauty of ethical life' because the beauty of
ethical life presents the unity of self-consciousness
and substance in its immediate truth (Phen., #441).
The dialectic of the first world of spirit expounds the
movement from 'justice' to 'crime' given the specific
determination of the subject-substance relation. That
relation brings forth 'ethical action' in the peaceful
world order, as a necessity. The movement which
reintroduces equilibrium in the peaceful order is
'justice', since it does not 'happen' through the
opposition of the two laws. Ethical action is
distinguished as the movement which determines 'guilt'
and 'crime' since the deed which takes place is the
opposition	 and	 mutual	 violation	 of	 the	 two
determinations	 of	 law.	 It	 breaks	 up	 their
interconnection and brings down this spiritual sphere.
As a consequence of Kristeva's concept of self-
consciousness - of her conception of the unstable
'thetic unity' - she must presuppose what spirit is in
268
this spiritual sphere. The structural concept of the
homogeneity of the community fails to negotiate the
differences within and between ethical order and
ethical action. The Hegelian dialectic is taken up one-
sidely. 'Man' and 'woman' are approached as
differentiated positions in the ethical world's
'concept' (master signifier). There is no approach to
the determination of 'man' and 'woman' in the 'beauty
of ethical life'; to. the division of spiritual essence
into distinct spiritual substances - 'a human and a
divine law' (#445); or to how the immediate individual
existence that the ethical powers give themselves
characterizes the difference of 'man' and 'woman'
the two sexes overcome their natural being
and appear in their ethical significance, as
diverse beings who share between them the two
distinctions belonging to the ethical
substance. These two universal beings of the
ethical world have, therefore, their specific
individuality in naturally distinct self-
consciousnesses, because the ethical spirit
is the immediate unity of the substance with
self-consciousness - an immediacy which
appears, therefore, both from the side of
reality and of difference, as the existence
of a natural difference. (# 459)
To read Hegel's categories of 'universal', 'immediacy'
and 'singularity' as presenting his interpretation of
sexual difference through the relation of 'man' and
'woman' to the community or the law is to ignore the
relation in which the dialectic unfolds. It is to
ignore that 'the union of man and woman' in the
peaceful world order is the interconnection of 'human'
and 'divine' law because the unity of self-
consciousness and substance is immediate; it is also to
ignore that that middle term breaks down as a middle
term because the 'middle' is at the same time the fall
into an opposition between the known law (the manifest
power) and the unconscious power.
In the first spiritual sphere, spirit is
	
'the
individual that is a world' because the ethical order
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presents the unity of the substance (spiritual essence)
with self-consciousness in its immediacy: 'Spirit is,
in its simple truth, consciousness, and forces its
moments apart t
 (#444). The necessity of the movement
from the peaceful organization and movement of the
ethical order (justice) to its downfall is the
necessity of the unity of 'justice' and 'crime t when
the subject-substance relation is an immediate unity.
The immediacy determines the division of the unity of
self-consciousness and substance into two ethical
powers which give themselves individual existence in
consciousness: the two universal beings. The division
of spiritual substance is determined as consciousness,
'and forces its moments apart'. This is the moment of
ethical action. Spirit in its simple truth turns the
'unity of substance and self-consciousness' into an
opposition of consciousness and substance: the division
of 'substance and consciousness of the substance'
(#444).
It is in action that the division of spirit comes to
light (ibid.). Ethical action in the ethical order is
the ruin of the ethical substance in this shape: 'what
is ethical, being at once absolute essence and absolute
power cannot suffer any perversion of its content'
(#467); for what is ethical in this spiritual sphere,
distinguished as such, is the interconnection of the
conscious law and the unconscious power. The conflict
of 'Creon' and 'Antigone' is the movement in which this
comes out 'into the light of day'.
the ethical action contains the moment of
crime, because it does not do away with the
natural allocation of the two laws to the two
sexes, but rather, being an undivided
attitude towards the law, remains within the
sphere of natural immediacy, and, qua action,
turns this one-sidedness into guilt by
seizing on only one side of the essence, and
adopting a negative attitude towards the
other, i.e. violating it. (#468)
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Woman is not 'the eternal irony of the communityt
because as individualization of the divine law or
'general possibility' of the other, self-conscious,
power 'woman' is the eternal disturbance of the
homogeneity of the community. Woman is the eternal
'irony' of the community because the disturbance of the
peaceful organization is an outcome of its repose. The
law of the nether world is an unconscious power which,
brought into the light of day wreaks destruction on the
community that misrecognizes the action of the other as
an arbitrary violation. This the movement proceeds from
conscious and unconscious power to 'human and divine
knowledge'
the significance of the deed is that what was
unmoved has been set in motion, and that what
was locked up in mere possibility has been
brought out into the open, hence to link
together the unconscious and the conscious,
non-being with being. In this truth,
therefore, the deed is brought out into the
light of day, as something in which the
conscious is bound up with the unconscious,
what is one's own with what is alien to it,
as an entity divided within itself, whose
other aspect consciousness experiences and
also finds to be its own, but as the power it
has violated and raised to hostility. (#469)
The disturbance of the ethical world is the action of
the two sides as which the two ethical powers 'give
themselves an individual existence' (#465). In the
repose of the ethical order (the beauty of ethical
life) 'woman' comes forth as the eternal irony of the
community from by way of how she figures from the
perspective of 'knowledge' of human law. But from the
perspective of knowledge of human and divine law it can
be seen that the manifest power has (mis)recognized
what it encounters, the law with which it is
interconnected, as the arbitrary action of 'nature';
has failed to recognize in it the appearance of the
power of the nether world, essence or general
possibility of the its own power.
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In the ethical order, justice restores equilibrium in
response to the power of nature ('as yet no deed has
been committed' (#464)). The restoration of justice on
the part of human law does not lie within an opposition
of individual and community:
The justice, however, which brings back to
equilibrium the universal in its ascendency
over the individual is equally the simple
spirit of the individual who has suffered
wrong; it is not split up into two, the one
who has suffered the wrong and an entity in a
remote beyond. The individual himself is the
power of the nether world, and it is his
Erinys, his 'fury', which wreaks vengeance.
(# 462)
Because the divided attitude of consciousness to law is
determined as two consciousnesses, the action of one
universal being - 'woman' - is treated by the other as
a 'wanton outrage'; but the crime is the action of both
sides. It is only in the action of the two universal
beings as which divided substance is determined that
the disturbance appears and woman presents the eternal
irony of the community (not of the ethical order). On
the one hand, the unity of substance and self-
consciousness 'appears as order and harmony of two
essences'. On the other, 'the deed is the actual self'
It becomes the negative movement, or the
eternal necessity, of a dreadful fate which
engulfs in the abyss of its single nature
divine and human law alike, as well as the
two self-consciousnesses in which these
powers have their existence - and for us
passes over into the absolute being-for-self
of the purely individual self-consciousness.
(#464)
When Kristeva determines the 'subject' as conceived by
'philosophy' as the void whose truth is forgotten in
the turn to the espistemological treatment of the
'subject', she discerns but does not approach the
transition to 'legal personality': 'the absolute being-
for-self of the purely individual self-consciousness'
Instead of approaching the transition, Kristeva departs
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from 'legality'. Hegel's dialectic presents 'the
soulless community which has ceased to be the substance
- itself unconscious - of individuals and in which they
now have the value of selves and substances possessing
a separate being for self' (#477). Kristeva's writings
presuppose 'legality' and her thought starts out from
'our dreary crisis' (PH, p. 208).
Furthermore, her construction of the 'act' in
speculative philosophy abstracts one moment of the
dialectic. The 'act' is held to be the socio-historical
act through which (sexual) impurity 'gets rid of
itself': 'Probably echoing the Greek polls, [Hegel]
conceives of no other ethics than that of the act', the
'historical act' (PH, p. 29). Kristeva provides no
specific reference for this interpretation, but in
Hegel's presentation of the conflict of 'Creon' and
'Antigone' the deed is not the totality of the ethical.
The ethical action is the actual self, which brings
down the ethical order. It is not the 'historical act'
but the movement which breaks up the ethical order, the
dialectic of the immediate unity of self-consciousness
and substance in its specific shape.
If the 'stages' of the Phenomenology of Spirit are
taken in their dramatic sense, the drama here moves
from the Greek stage to the Roman stage, and the
transition from the ethical world to legal personality
can be viewed as a 'historical act' . In this case,
Hegel's philosophy of law cannot be said to suppress
'death's work' in the concrete history of the
'subject'. The moment of 'pure self-consciousness' in
the Phenomenology of Spirit is the outcome of the
engulfment in the abyss of true spirit; of the 'deed'
in which 'what is one's own' is bound up with 'what is
alien to it' (#469). This outcome is 'for us' -
acknowledging that engulfment in the abyss of
'negativity in the form of individuality' (#674) would
leave neither self nor other surviving.
273
Kristeva's account of psychoanalysis argues that the
truth of the speaking being is brought into the light
of day, within the boundary of analysis, as the unity
of what is one's own and what is alien. It is not,
within those bounds, an actual self or 'deed'. This
brings into question how Kristeva's speaking subject,
unity of Oedipus and Narcissus, of human and divine
law, is placed in modern social and political
relations. Alone as a lover, a lover alone - since the
actual self is dead?; cut off from governments,
economies and markets; depositing a permanent catharsis
of permanent crisis:
literature: the sublime point at which the
abject collapses in a burst of beauty that
overwhelm us - and 'that cancels our
existence' (Céline). (PH, p. 210)
2. An Ethics From Her
In 'Stabat Mater' Kristeva attempts to elaborate the
structural relations of 'death', 'desire', the
'feminine', and 'discourse', and the implications of
these structures for an 'ethics' . This attempt works
out of Hegel's determinations in the dialectic of true
spirit, but fails to address what spirit is in the
movement of manifest and unconscious power, to their
opposition and to 'human and divine knowledge'. As
outlined above, the division of essence, individualized
as 'man' and 'woman', implies the self-opposition of
spiritual essence: 'consciousness is a divided attitude
to law'
Kristeva's claim for the importance of examining the
meaning of the Virgin Mary - 'alone of her sex' (TL, p.
253f.), without singularity or individuality
[Einzelheit] - is justified as the necessity of
analysing the 'fantasy' of motherhood in our
civilization: 'the consecrated (rkeli,.ious or secular)
representation of femininity is absorbed by motherhood'
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(TL, p. 234). Kristeva acknowledges the restrictions
for women today of this 'consecrated' representation of
femininity, and acknowledges that its rejection in
feminist thought is a response to the implications of
its acceptance (a model for women without singularity
or individuality). Yet she stands firmly against the
position of rejection, since, she argues, it is
impossible to say whether the empty result of the
repudiation of the .representation of motherhood can
find a content. 'Nothing, however, suggests that a
feminine ethics is possible' (TL, p. 262). 'Stabat
Mater' stands by the task of rethinking what exists -
'the only function of the "other sex" to which we can
definitely attribute existence' (TL, p. 234). The
impact and contradictions of a morality that opposes
law and flesh sets the task - in default of there being
anything to say whether or not a 'feminine ethics' is
possible - of giving the law 'flesh', of rehabilitating
love and death.
The task of elaborating what Kristeva calls an
héréthique is posed as a route through and departure
from Hegel:
A woman will only have the choice to live her
life either hyperabstractly ('immediately
universal', Hegel said) in order thus to earn
divine grace and homologation with symbolic
order; or merely different, other, fallen
('immediately particular', Hegel said). But
she will not be able to attain to the
complexity of being divided, of
heterogeneity, of the catastrophic folding-
'being' ('never singular', Hegel said). (TL,
pp. 248-9)
Kristeva reads the configuration of the ethical world
order as containing Hegel's determination of the
relation of 'woman' to the 'symbolic'; and as
presenting the dissociation of 'woman' from the
separated 'subject', owing to the opposition of
negativity	 and	 'desire'	 determined	 as	 sexual
difference. The theory of the 'semiotic' and the
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'symbolic' has evidently opened up a different analysis
of 'woman' than that attributed to Hegel's thought, by
readdressing rather than rejecting what the 'mother'
is. She is disclosed as both the 'field' of the
negative heterogene (matter, drives) and 'site' of the
emergence of the symbolic - not the negativity of the
'symbolic' therefore, but a separated subject. The
theory of the semiotic and the symbolic presents,
'contra' Hegel, her .singularity, her 'being divided'.
The possibility of her discourse, her speech is posed:
'if she were to situate herself in the Logos, she would
construct a discourse that would be the negation of
this master signifier as an engendering of the
concept... exposing it as an engendering starting from
an elsewhere' (MSD, p. 270). Without losing the subject
of 'lack' - corresponding to the necessity of
representation - the negation of the 'master signifier'
overcomes the opposition of 'desire' and 'negativity'
determined as sexual difference.
The re-cognition of 'woman' illuminates the necessity
of acknowledging the nature of the speaking being
(separated, desiring and mortal) in an ethics which no
longer rests on and repeats the opposition of 'law'
and 'negativity', or 'community' and 'essence', known
'from Hegel'; an ethics beyond the opposition of man
and woman, as subject of desire on one side and
immediately universal or fallen being on the other.
'Herethics'	 is	 an	 ethics	 which	 recognizes
heterogeneity.	 'It swallows up the goddesses and
removes their necessity' (TL, p. 263)
Both Kristeva and Hegel re-cognize the truth of the
sacred as the unconscious power. However, Hegel does
not determine the gender relation as opposition of
'desire' and 'negativity' . The dialectic presents the
individualization of the determinations of substance
when the subject-substance relation is in immediate
unity. For Hegel, the truth of the sacred is
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unconscious power in this spiritual sphere as a
distinct spiritual sphere. Here, self-consciousness
'is' substance, and substance 'is' self-consciousness
only in the immediate truth of their unity. The
mediations that this implies does not leave the
subject-substance relation in the immediate truth in
which it appears in the configuration of true spirit.
With Kristeva, who comprehends the whole movement of
the dialectic as sustained by and for a 'constituted'
consciousness, we come, given psychoanalysis, to know
the subject-substance relation in one way alone: self-
consciousness is a lover. The wrenching of the subject
out of identity (subject-object relation) through the
metaphor is the only subject-substance relation.
Consequently, the foundation of the separated subject
remains in opposition to the totality of objective
existence, the socio-symbolic order; and we know the
(de)formation of self-consciousness only as a 'torn
consciousness'
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C. Self-alienated Spirit. Culture
1. Spiritual Judgement and the Disrupted Consciousness
The Nephew's 'torn consciousness' (Hegel) is
the culture that knows itself as such:
knowing that we are at least double, like the
Nephew, we accomplish an essential step in
culture. By mending that laceration, we shall
attain absolute religion or spirit. I have,
however, just mentioned some of the
totalizing pitfalls involved. Let us then
remain within the culture and the endeavour,
as did the nephew, to recognize ourselves as
strange in order better to appreciate the
foreigners outside of us instead of striving
to bend them to the norms of our own
repression. (NN, p. 30; my emphasis)
In Hegel the transition 'for US' from the ethical world
to 'legal personality' is necessary for the
comprehension of 'self-alienated spirit' (culture). If
the transition were not 'for us', there would be a
continuous process of natural consciousness toward and
out of 'absolute knowledge' . Kristeva turns the
recognition of 'self-alienated spirit' into a step in
culture; and it is her own turn to a concept of duty,
beyond the boundary of psychoanalysis, that attempts to
mend the laceration of the 'actual self'
Hegel's dialectic of 'culture' is the movement of the
self-consciousness which is self-related since it 'does
away with this abstraction of the person' (#596). The
two determinations of spiritual essence, or the two
spiritual powers, are 'dominion and wealth' (#495). The
subject-substance relation is not in immediate unity,
hence, not divided into a conscious and an unconscious
law. The opposition of subject and substance in 'self-
alienated spirit' is an opposition in which both
determinations of substance are known. With 'pure
consciousness', 'the moments of substance are for him
not state power and wealth, but the thoughts of good
and bad' (ibid.).
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The movement of the opposition of subject and substance
is the experience of a pure consciousness whose nature
changes because the necessity of the movement is not
from 'justice' to 'crime', the appearance of the unity
of unconscious power and manifest law - but 'spiritual
judgement' (ibid.). The pure consciousness finds that
object to be good which is like itself, 'and that to be
bad in which it finds the opposite of itself' (#496).
The movement of the dialectic presents the reversal of
the judgement of good and bad because in the subject-
substance relation of this spiritual sphere spiritual
judgement self-consciousness is 'in and for itself'
(self-related). The different attitude to the
determinations of substance - the thoughts of good and
bad - is not a divided attitude, and the movement is
the movement of the pure consciousness itself.
the consciousness that is in and for itself
does find in the state power its simple
essence and subsistence in general, but not
its individuality as such; it does find there
its intrinsic being, but not what it
explicitly is for itself. Rather, it finds
that the state power disowns action qua
individual action and subdues it into
obedience. (#497)
The nature of the determinations of spiritual
substance, dominion and wealth, as self-alienated
determinations, will be brought to light throught the
movement and reversal of spiritual judgement.
The individual, therefore, faced with this
power reflects himself into himself; it is
for him the oppressor and the bad; for,
instead of being of like nature to himself,
its nature is essentially different from that
of individuality. (ibid.)
The judgement is inverted:
Wealth, on the other hand, is the good; it
leads to the general enjoyment, is there to
be made use of, and procures for everyone the
consciousness of his particular self. It is
implicitly universal beneficence; if it
refuses a particular benefit and does not
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choose to satisfy every need, this is
accidental and does not detract from its
universal and necessary nature of imparting
itself to all and being a provider. (ibid.)
Consciousness is a 'disrupted consciousness' which has
experienced the self-alienation of the determinations
of tdominion and 'wealth'. Spiritual judgement now
falls into two consciousnesses, that which is aware of
the experience of the 'twofold finding of likeness and
twofold finding of disparity' (#499), the disrupted
consciousness; and that which sustains the immediate
validity of the thoughts of good and bad, the honest
consciousness that rejects the position taken by the
disrupted consciousness. It is the former which
presents the shape of spirit:
The content of what spirit says about itself
is thus the perversion of every concept and
reality, the universal deception of itself
and others; and the shamelessness which gives
utterance to this deception is just for this
reason the greatest truth (#522; my emphasis)
The greatest truth of the world of self-alienated
spirit is the position which gives utterance to
consciousness of the absolute perversion; the absolute
perversion of itself and of the 'universal power' (law,
good and right) (#517-19). Here consciousness is 'the
double reflection of the real world into itself : ' the
fading, but still audible sound of all this con fusiont
(#525).
The reversal of spiritual judgement has brought to
light the self-alienation of the determinations of
'substance'; and the concepts of good and bad which are
the moments of substance for pure consciousness, have
lost their immediate validity. The mediations of this
dialectic, the judgements of pure consciousness and
their reversal, has as its outcome the 'spirit' of the
world of culture: 'spirit that is conscious of itself
in its truth and in its concept' (#520). The world of
culture is known as self-alienated spirit - the
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disrupted consciousness is the consciousness that knows
the absolute perversion.
Kristeva's version of the 'disrupted consciousness'
abandons a 'language' of spirit and turns this world of
spirit into the 'culture that knows itself as such'.
She argues the necessity of not stepping out of the
disrupted consciousness, but instead of a materialist
rethinking of it 'after' Hegel. However, in the
dialectic of the distinct sphere of culture, the
determinations of substance for pure consciousness -
law, good, and right - cannot be abstracted from the
self-alienated determinations of substance: 'dominion',
or 'universal power', and 'wealth' . The determinations
of substance re-present the unity of self-consciousness
and substance that 'culture' configures: they re-
present the antithesis of essence and individuality
when self-consciousness, as 'in and for itself', is the
self-conscious unity of self and essence but remains
'consciousness of an objective real world freely
existing on its own account' (#485).
In this distinct spiritual sphere substance is self-
alienated as 'state power' and 'wealth'. Kristeva,
however, inserts into the meaning of 'universal power'
both the concept of 'good' she has determined as that
of monotheism and the concept of 'morality' that
opposes law and flesh. As a result of this deployment
of Hegel, the narcissistic experience intelligible to
psychoanalysis must present itself as the experience
deposited by the self-alienation of 'universal power'
The 'universal power' is known to be self-alienated but
counts as actual. That this is Kristeva's position is
succinctly expressed in the discussion of her work in
1984, where she claims that the 'crisis of the paternal
function', together with the perversity of our times
inseparable from it, 'is a contemporary fact' (Desire,
p. 23).
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Given Kristeva'S rendering of symbolic Law or
(universal) Power, narcissistic experience is the
'unique access road to truth' (TL, p. 133). In the
relation sustained between the concept of the death
drive and the concept of the 'symbolic', our task is to
remain within the culture and the endeavour 'to
recognize ourselves as strange' . Both the estimation of
literature and the function of psychoanalysis take up
their positions in .- what Kristeva will not call -
self-alienated spirit.
2. Literature: Spirit of the Real World of Culture
There is no trace left of the slightest shame
or condemnation: scription, which knows and
wants itself to be sign and symbol, claims
Narcissus' divided image and draws its
inspiration from that exquisite separation
within the speaking being. (TL, p. 133)
Kristevan 'scription' is, in Hegel's words 'the
shamelessness which gives utterance' to the perversion
of every concept and reality, and which is 'just for
this reason the greatest truth' (#522). Literature as
scription is the spirit of the real world of culture -
spirit that is conscious of itself in its truth and in
its concept. The self-alienated universal power, or
'prohibiting judging agency' whose structure
psychoanalysis has disclosed, is actual. It is both the
re-jected thetic unity and the necessary margin of
poetic 'practice'. In this way Hegel's third world of
spirit, 'morality', and the dialectic of religious
representation, is restricted to the moment of
'universal power' in the dialectic of culture.
Furthermore, the concept of the 'good' attributed to
the theological and mystical elaborations of love finds
its place within the moment of 'universal power': 'By
mending that laceration {the disrupted consciousness]
we shall attain absolute religion or spirit' (NN, p.
30).
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Literature is the consciousness of culture - beyond
'good' and 'bad' ('nationalism is neither "good" nor
"bad"'). It may then present the symptom, intelligible
to psychoanalysis, of the impact of self-alienated
universal power. Céline's writings exemplify the
inextricability of the decomposition of Power and the
'powers of horror' . The truth of religion, its
'fulfilment as sacred horror' or as abjection, is
presented in Céline's writings: 'he believes that death
and horror are what being is'; nevertheless 'he can
show it to us only because he stands elsewhere - within
writing' (PH, p. 34). His 'scription' is a sublimation
of abjection without consecration. It remains a
'symptom' because there is no renewal of the
decomposition-composition of the determinations of
substance (law, good and right). The absence of renewal
is, here, the fixity of Céline's 'amatory space', a
position taken from the known impact on the unconscious
of the monotheism (universal power) of western
civilization. This fixity is a security in the face of
the death-bearing risk of 'scription'. Célinian anti-
semitism is the 'scription' that remains fixated on the
'universal power' it re-jects: 'a delirium that
literally prevents one from going mad, for it postpones
the senseless abyss that threatens this passing through
the identical, that scription amounts to' (PH, p. 137).
Literature as the consciousness of culture only goes
beyond the 'symptom' thanks to the concept of the
infinite given through the knowledge of psychoanalysis:
'we are all subjects of the metaphor' (TL, p. 279). The
'signifier', rescued through the theory of the drives
from its Lacanian position as 'master' , is the site of
infinite space and renewability of the 'subject' (TL,
p. 277). At this point in Kristeva's thought - where
the boundary between psychoanalysis as a 'practice' and
literature as a practice has been shown
(catharsis/working through), and shifted (knowledge of
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psychoanalysis/infinity of the signifier or 'permanentt
catharsis) - there emerges a concept of 'faith'.
In the Hegelian dialectic, spirit that is conscious of
itself and of its concept is the transition to 'faith
and pure insight': 'an actuality has been raised into
another element', an essence for consciousness beyond
the actual world, which 'nevertheless counts as an
actual essence' (#527). In Kristeva's writings
knowledge of the disrupted consciousness provokes the
question of faith. Having departed Trom the 'faith'
whose moments are comprehended in the dialectic of
faith and pure insight, Kristeva seeks out our
alternative. 'Psychoanalysis or Faith', the subtitle to
Kristeva's second work on 'love', announces this moment
in the consciousness of self-alienated spirit.
The faith whose movement is presented at this point in
the Hegelian dialectic is in Kristeva's writings the
i 'illusion' disclosed by psychoanalysis. Furthermore,
the loss of the guarantee of that illusion is suffered
as the absence of a salvatory discourse. Remaining with
narcissistic experience, symptom of this absence and
unique access to truth, an aesthetic faith is affirmed
after we have attained clear understanding of - in
Hegel's words - the consciousness for which essence is
beyond the actual world but nevertheless counts as an
actual essence.
today literature is both the source of
'mystical' renewal (to the extent that it
provides new amatory spaces) and intrinsic
negation of theology to the extent that the
only faith literature conveys is the
assurance, painful just the same, of its own
performance as supreme authority. (TL, p.
279; my emphasis)
Faith is brought down to earth as the
performance of the lover (literature).
passing through the potentially abyssal
experience, a risk which does not re:
self-witting
The risk of
narcissistic
r authority
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elsewhere, is the production of metaphoricalness that
takes on the painful assurance of its own supreme
authority.
In love with our own productions, under empty
skies, we have not departed from aesthetic
religion. Religion of the imagination, the
Ego, Narcissus, esthetic religion dies harder
than Hegel thought.... Since then, forsaken
by faith but ever loving, hence imaginative,
egoized, narcissistic, we are the faithful of
the last religion, the esthetic one. We are
all subjects of the metaphor. (TL, p. 279; my
emphasis)
In the Hegelian dialectic the shape of consciousness
that stands under such emptied skies is the
'Enlightenment'. It is perhaps no accident that
Kristeva's thought turns to the French Enlightenment
when the 'stranger' known to psychoanalysis is brought
into an encounter with the 'citizen'. The importance of
the turn to political sociology for thinking this
encounter can be viewed in the context both of the
boundary of psychoanalysis, and of the uncertain
destiny of the powers of Narcissus' productions vis-à -
vis symbolic law, good and right.
Nevetheless, in the 'absence' of homogeneity, the
significance of modern literature holds as the
assumption of the discourse of heterogeneity.
Literature is left as the only outcome of the crisis of
the experience of loss of a salvatory discourse which
neither remains within its illusions nor fails to
accommodate its truth. It is left to 'literature' to
work on the self-alienated universal power (law, good
and right), while in the totality of objective
existence the idea of the confederate nation cuts
across governments. Esprit générale leaves to one side
the self-alienated 'Power' . It leaves in position the
'power' of governments, and what is to govern in the
'state' remains Fichtean 'right'. It is at the point of
this encounter between 'stranger' and 'citizen' on the
terrain of the thinking of objective existence
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(political sociology) that the relation sustained in
Kristeva's writings between psychoanalysis and
philosophy shows its inadequacy.
The presupposition of philosophy which holds in
Kristeva's cultural theory restricts the turn from
within psychoanalysis to the rethinking of social and
political relations. This presupposition represents the
failure within Kristeva's deployment of Hegel to
approach the 'third world of spirit' or to countenance
a 'faith' which is not aesthetic; in the broader terms
of the place of her oeuvre in post-Kantian thought, it
is the failure to take on Kantian and post-Kantian
philosophy of law.
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Summary of and Conclusion to Part II
The disclosure of 'death's work' in reason, the theory
of 'poetic languaget, and the formulation of an
intrapsychic law of intersubjectivity - together, these
fundaments of Kristeva's thought have presented a
typology, but also 'stages' of literature as a soclo-
historical practice that works on the self-alienated
'universal': the power of the modern state and power of
monotheism. The treatment of the semiotic in the later
writings has changed the meaning of ifs 'heterogeneous
relations' . In 1974 the semiotic chora, or ordering,
was adamantly distinguished from the concept of 'law'
('a term we reserve for the symbolic'). The triadic
structuration of semiotic relations is now put forward
as an intrapsychic law that founds the bond of
intersubjectivity. It was the absence of determinatess
and limitation in the semiotic 'unity' of semiotic and
symbolic which led in Part I above to the Hegelian
criticism of Kristeva's concept of 'practice'. The
question that now arises is whether Kristeva's
intrapsychic law posits determinateness and limitation
in both unities of finite and infinite. In fact this is
not the case, since the universality Kristeva claims
for her law of the 'unconscious' remains cut off from
the symbolic order. Even when she claims that the idea
of esprit générale both accommodates the Freudian truth
and presents a serial logic of concord that posits the
general in the particular, the idea is regulative and
opposed to what governs in the 'state'.
Kristeva's writings present two stages in the meaning
of 'psychoanalysis' for 'poetic language'. In the first
stage the deformations of the 'subject' (subjective
enclosure of the infinite 'in' language) produced the
necessity of psychoanalysis as the working through of
its determinations. The 'dynamic' of this working
through leads to a concept of infinity which overcomes
its previous appearance as the imperative to maintain
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'heterogeneous contradiction' . Once the semiotic
'ordering' is redefined as an intrapsychic law the
infinity of the signifier is secured as the 'existence'
of infinite space. The 'signifier' becomes the infinite
'in' language infinitely, and grounds the practical
potential of 'poetic language'. Nevertheless, this only
expresses the truth of Kristeva's concept of the
infinite, a truth which holds from the outset of her
materialist inversion of Hegel. Because determinateness
and limitation are not posited in one of the two
unities of 'semiotic' and 'symbolic', they return
absolutely in the eternal recurrence of the subjective
enclosure of 'signifying practice'. There is one
configuration of the 'formation' of the subject, and
consequently a proliferating typology of deformations
which is left without recourse to a knowledge of social
and political relations.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis has established that Kristeva's 'return to
Freud' contains an explicit and an implicit return to
Hegel. The attention given here to the philosophical
foundations of her thought has brought to light the
aporiae and inconsistences in the reformulation of
Lacan's 'symbolic' and the materialist theory of
culture it proposes.
Kristeva has claimed that the Freudian science
discloses 'death's work' in 'reason', and that the
implications of this for social and political thought
are established through a materialist rereading of the
Hegelian dialectic.	 The distinction between the
'semiotic' and the 'symbolic' overcomes the
nature/culture dichotomy in modern philosophy, and
turns the psychoanalytic knowledge of the 'separated'
subject into a comprehension of the formation and
deformations of 'self-consciousness' . The 'unity' and
deformations of self-consciousness are expounded on the
basis of the notion of the 'subject' as a heterogeneous
relation of divine and human law.
However, an opposition between the 'semiotic' and the
'symbolic' is sustained on the terrain of social and
political relations, and this leads to inconsistencies
in Kristeva's thought. A contradiction appears between
her departure from the philosophical comprehension of
the modern state and religion, and the explicit avowal
that the moments and structures of the 'state'
comprehended in idealist philosophy (the transcendental
'subject', abstract right and abstract morality) are
the essential moments of modern social and political
relations.
Kristeva's thought sustains a divided attitude to law.
On one side, a 'self-alienated' symbolic Law counts as
the actuality of the contemporary western world and is
to be 'worked on' by poetic language. On the other, the
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intrapsychic 'law' known to psychoanalysis sets a task
for political philosophy: to elaborate a 'regulative
idea' as the last recourse for responding to
differences in the modern multinational society. This
elaboration can only be followed through on the basis
of Kristeva's setting aside of socio-symbolic Law in
the 'ethics of psychoanalysis'.
The 'work' on the self-alienated Law, confined to
literature, and the 'work' on the intrapsychic law,
posed as the task of political philosophy, cannot be
brought together. The divided attitude to law, and the
nonunifiable separation of 'work' is an outcome of the
materialist abstraction and opposition of subjective
and objective 'spirit'; and of the consequent failure
to recognize mediation in social and political
relations.
Once 'death's work' 	 in 'reason' is held to be
suppressed in Hegelian self-consciousness, an
'immediate unity' of subject and object containing the
moment of 'death' is unearthed from the dialectic.
However, Kristeva's 'immediate unities' break down
within the task for which they are recalled: first,
Bataillean experience, the reversal of Hegelian
Erfahrung, is redundant because it is not a 'practice';
second, the 'Maoist' social agency is placed in 'the
most immediate violence', but the dialectic of social
transformation collapses without any exposition of the
breakdown being provided; third, the 'direct and
immediate experience' disclosed in the structure of
narcissism poses a concept of the 'infinite'
renewability of the 'subject', but the concept of
infinity contains the contradictions of the idealist
Sollen. Kristeva's héréthique, the sublation of the
first world of 'spirit', sustains a concept of the
symbolic order which isolates, totalizes and freezes
Hegel's circle of circles into one circle, whose solid
walls an 'other' ethics attempts to storm.
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When Kristeva presupposes tphilosophyt she misses the
meaning of Hegel's first world of spirit as an
'immediate unity' of subject and substance, and hence
the different configurations of the subject-substance
relation which determine the relations to 'work',
'desire' and 'otherness' in the experience of
consciusness. The seeming retrieval of death's work in
'reason' posits its abstract repetition, and does not
distinguish the forms of its appearance in Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit or their connection with the
standpoint and 'shapes' of consciousness.
Kristeva's typology of critical discourses abandons
'reason' to the endless renewal of a 'law' which is not
known. The thesis has located the source of this social
and political agnosticism in the fixation of the
reflective concept of 'negativity'. The value for
social and political thought of the 'ethic' of
psychoanalysis, and the place of the nonfoundational
'ethics' elaborated from it, is redefinable once
Kristevan 'self-consciousness' (the lover and stranger)
is brought into an encounter with the philosophy of law
intrinsic to Hegel's presentation of the formations and
deformations of 'self-consciousness'.
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APPENDIX
Terminology
The passage in this thesis across the range of
Kristeva's thought (from the 'materialist dialectical
logic', to the theory of symbolization, through the
analysis of 'narcissism', and finally to her position
on the contemporary European 'nation') leads to
problems of exegesis based on the developments and
changes in Kristeva's terminology. It is a particular
problem for this thesis because of Kristeva's own
strategy in the development and presentation of her
thought, which is an eclectic stragegy. Linguistics,
structuralism, dialectical materialism, phenomenology,
and psychoanalysis - a broad-ranging use is made of
categories from these different bodies of thought in
order to build up Kristeva's conceptual framework, and
to claim its scope.
It is necessary to follow Kristeva through this range
of intellectual resources, and to engage in varying
degrees with her semarialysis of philosophy, literature
and 'theology' . The unity of her thought, and its
philosophical foundations, can only be demonstrated
through her writings, and by placing it in an external
encounter with speculative philosophy.
Despite this, I will use Hegelian terminology within
the exegesis of Kristeva's thought. Her interpretation
of Hegelian 'spirit' and 'recognition' in the
Phenomenology of Spirit would seem to disallow the use
of these terms in the context of her own concept of
'negativity', or of the elaborations of 'practice'
derived from it. Furthermore, I am arguing that the
refusal of Hegelian 'mediation' in the comprehension of
social and political relations determines the
limitations and the difficulties which emerge in her
thought. Nevertheless, Kristeva's analysis of the
subjective (re)enclosures of the negative force of her
materialist dialectic does imply a grasp of the meaning
of '(mis)recognition' in Hegel's presentation of the
experience of 'consciousness' in the Phenomenology of
Spirit. I therefore employ the terms 'recognition',
'spirit', and 'concept of reflection'
(Reflexionsbestimmung) where the Kristevan concept
justifies such a use.
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Notes to chap ter 1
The specific logic that avant-garde texts
develop.., imposes a recall to Hegelian
logic: the sole analysis in full knowledge of
the syntaxical reason that modern texts,
precisely, subvert and ruin.
('Matire, sens, dialectique', p. 271.)
2 Lukács's account of the significance of these debates
for Marxist dialectics specifies the differences
between the practical philosophy of Kant, Fichte and
Hegel ('Reification and the Consciousness of the
Proletariat', section II, in History and Class
Consciousness (1967). Kristeva, however, will not
address the different 'forms' of transcendental
philosophy. The immediate relation to Hegel misses the
philosophy of law in German idealism, crucial to a
proper assessment of the thought from which Kristeva's
own thought embarks.
3 Collected in Polylogue, Editions du Seuil 1977. All
translations of passages cited from the three essays
under discussion in this chapter are my own.
4 The positions are those, respectively, of Fichtean
idealism, the dogmatic fate of Marxism, and the
Hegelian system.
5 The concept of 'rejection' will be discussed in
section B of this chapter, which outlines the emergence
of the Kristevan 'subject' out of Bataillean 'desire'
and the Freudian theory of the drives.
The link with Hegel is evident in the following remark
in 'Matière, sens, dialectique': 'A Hegelian logic
which would thus here be recovered and displaced,
confronted with what seems to us to be demanded in the
first place by a materialist position and,
consequently, with the Freudian "scission" of the
subject in the signifier' (p. 271).
6
But our reason, as it were,
surroundings a space for the
things in themselves, though
have determinate concepts of
limited to appearances only.
sees in its
cognition of
we can never
them and are
(Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, p. 101.)
7 Science of Knowledge ( 1797). Fichte attempted many
presentations of his W.issenschaftlehre ( ' Doctrine of
Scientific Knowledge'). The number of complete versions
included in the Nachiass is estimated at over twenty in
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and collection of his early
Fichte: Early Philosophical
the recent
writings (D.
Writings, p.
8 See Part I
Fundamental
Knowledge'.
translation
Breazeale,
33)
(pp. 93-119) of the Science of Knowledge:
Principles of the Entire Science of
9 Here is where the reference to Hölderlin and Fichte
comes in. The passage continues: 'Hölderlin seeks such
a heterogeneity when, in his letter to Hegel of 26
January 1795, he criticizes Fichte's conception of an
"absolute I".' (MSD, P . 279, n.2)
10 'le contraire de ce 'quelque chose' qu'il est et
qui, donc, le determine tout en se determinant dans la
contradiction qui les pose'. (MSD, p. 281)
11 In Hegel, the dialectic - 'discourse of the
concept', 'discourse in production' - exposes both
alternatives. The transcendental alternative is avoided
because the Logic presents the 'scission of the concept
through itself'. The channel of objectal investment is
avoided because the Phenomenology is 'a cold
universality, frustrating the I [Mol] by putting a
check on its desire (for recognition) and on its
phantasms), through the analysis, precisely, of their
engenderment' (MSD, p. 268).
e importance of
)f the practical
F psychoanalysis
on	 'love'	 and
significance of
appearance of a
the 'boundary' of
into the field of
chapters 4 and 5
12 Kristeva's clarification of ti
'narcissism' within the knowledge
available from the discoveries c
appears in the later writings
'abjection'. Her arguments on the
'narcissism' after Freud form the
difficulty over how both to determine
psychoanalysis and take its knowledge
social and political relations. See
below.
13 Kristeva's reference is to Ph. Sollers, 'Lénine et
le materialisme philosophique', Sur le matérialisme,
Editions du Seuil, 1974, p. 97.
14 I specify Kristeva's 'reversals' of the thinking of
the 'subject' from idealism to dialectical materialism
in chapter 3 below.
15 Kristeva's recovery of drive theory in Freud's
thought insists on a 'heteronomy', not dichotomy or
opposition, of the drives. This sustains her account of
symbolization and its import for social and subjective
transformation:
Drives are material, but they are not solely
biological since they both connect and
differentiate the biological and symbolic
within the dialectic of the signifying body
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invested in a practice.... Drives are the
repeated scission of matter that generates
signifiance, the place where an always absent
subject is produced.... In a moment that
constitutes a leap and a rupture - separation
and absence - the successive shocks of drive
ac!tivity produce the signifying function.
(RPL, p. 167)
Divesting the heterogeneity of drives of the
'fundamental dichotomy' which belongs to them in
Freud's insight (ibid.), Kristeva abandons the notion
of the drives as opposed forces in conflict (ego/sexual
drives; life/death drives), and posits them as not
only 'biological' but 'social'. Drive theory is the
basis of Kristeva's theory of signification, of her
claim that the materialist dialectic is social and
political thought, and of her concept of practice.
16 The texts she derives this response from are
L'érotisme, L'expérience intérieure, Méthode de
Meditation, and Etre Oreste.
17 Kristeva's doctoral thesis (Revolution du langage
poétique) is subtitled 'L'avant-garde a la fin du xixe.
siècle: Lautréamont et Mallarmé'. Part III in
particular expounds the negation at work in the
writings of Lautréamont and Mallarmé, and the social
and historical conditions for their limitations.
18 The idea of the operation Bataille exercises on
Hegel's Phenomenology is often presented in phrases
using the term 'a rebours'. In my opinion 'against the
grain' might best capture the thought of this
operation, since its meaning is less a 'reversal' of
the process than what such a reversal enables: the
disclosure of symbolization beneath the movement 'to'
self-consciousness. However, I will also translate it
as 'in reverse' or 'backwards' according to syntactical
necessity, acknowledging the French.
l9'Unary subject' translates Kristeva's sujet unaire,
in order to show the distinction from sujet unitaire:
the distinction marks the difference between the
subject as conceived by idealism (the unitary subject)
and the instance of the subject as a stasis traversed:
here, Bataille's 'ipse'.
20
Das einfache Ich ist diese Gattung oder das
einfache Aligemeine, für weiches die
Unterschiede keine sind, nur, indem es
negatives Wesen der gestalteten selbständigen
Momente ist; und das Selbstbewusstsein (ist]
hiermit seiner selbst nur gewiss durch das
Aufheben dieses Anderen, das sich ihm als
selbständiges	 Leben	 darstellt;	 es	 ist
Begierde. Der Nichtigkeit dieses Anderen
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gewiss setzt, es für sich dieselbe als seine
Wahrheit, vernichtet den selbständigeri
Gegenstand und gibt sich dadurch die
Gewissheit seiner selbst, als wahre
Gewisshelt, als soiche, weiche ihm selbst auf
gegenstandliche Weise geworden 1st.
(Phänomenologie des Ge.istes, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp,
1970, p. 143.)
21 Chapter 5 of Section II of Revolution in Poetic
Language, which repeats with minor amendments these
passages on Hegel from the essay on Bataille, runs:
'self-consciousness constitutes itself through the
supercession of the heterogeneous Other' (p. 134).
22 See 'The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic
of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious':
Truth is nothing other than that which
knowledge can aprehend as knowledge only by
setting its ignorance to work. A real crisis
in which the imaginary is resolved, thus
engendering a new symbolic form, to use my
own categories. This dialectic is convergent
and attains the conjuncture defined as
absolute knowledge. As such it is deduced, it
can only be the conjunction of the symbolic
with a real of which there is nothing more to
be expected. What is this real, if not a
subject fulfilled in his identity to himself?
From which, one can conclude that this
subject is already perfect in this regard,
and is the fundamental hypothesis of this
whole process. He is name, in effect, as
being the substratum of this process; he is
called the Selbstbewusstsein, the being
conscious of self, the fully conscious self.
(E, p. 296)
23 This idea that there is a transition from 'sense-
certainty' to 'self-consciousness' excludes the
dialectic of 'perception' and of 'force and the
understanding' within Section A of the Phenomenology.
Kristeva will come to read the second in a way
consistent with the interpretation of Beglerde - as the
dialectic's representation of negativity, as the
consitution of unity on the basis of 'scissions,
impulses, collisions, rejections driven back in the
name of and in view of the subjective unity not only of
the understanding, but also of reason' (RPL, p. 116).
With respect to 'perception', it is notable that Kojève
- whose translation is Kristeva's source - passes over
this configuration in his Introduction a la lecture de
Hegel, with the remark 'Ce chapitre n'a pas áté
commenté' (Gallimard edition, p. 46). This is not to
insinuate Kristeva's dependence on Kojève's work, but
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it is noteworthy in the context of an assertion of the
'transition from sense-certainty to self-
consciousness'
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Notes to chap ter 2
1 The French publication of Kristeva's doctorat d'etat
is divided into three parts of which the first is
'theoretical', the exposition of the concept of poetic
language. The second part reforms the science of
'linguistics' on the basis of the disclosure of 'poetic
language'. Part three details the role of the
nineteenth-century avant-garde (Lautréamont and
Mallarmé) in the passage to 'poetic language' . The
English version translates only the first, theoretical,
part.
2 See 'Postmodernism?', Bucknell Review 25, 2, 1980:
136-41.
3 This meaning is pointed out, for example, by Philip
Lewis in his review of La Revolution du langage
poétique on its publication in France in 1974
(Diacritics, Fall 1974, pp. 28-32); and is highlighted
in Roudiez's introduction to the English-language
translation of 1984 (p. 1).
4 The concluding section of Hegel's Philosophy of
History, on 'The Modern Time', expounds the emergence
of 'conscience and subjective principle' in the
Protestant Reformation, the latter's influence on
political development, and its failure to permeate the
whole Catholic world. Each term of Hegel's 'Reformation
and Revolution' is in a dialectical relation to the
other determined by the 'opposition of the will' they
present. The opposition holds between the principle of
Protestantism ('religious empancipation and inward
harmony', p. 438) and the Enlightenment's formal
principle of freedom, attaining its speculative
recognition in Kant ('rationality of will.., right
purely for the sake of right, duty purely for the sake
of duty', p. 443). The latter is put into practical
effect in the French Revolution. Hegel's inquiry into
the reasons for the separation of Reformation (in
Germany) and Revolution (in France) goes into the
historical conditions informing the determination both
of their respective principles and of the manner of
transformation of the secular in each case.
I am not suggesting that there is a direct analogy
between Hegel's dialectical recognition of the
separation of Reformation and Revolution in Germany and
France and Kristeva's generalization of the 'flight
from the finite'; merely that Kristeva's attempt to
account for the failure of 'right' - which addresses
only one side of the 'opposition of the will' -
contains a Hegelian ambition. Kristeva's analysis of
the ttransitionl from political to cultural revolution
in the socio-economic conditions of late nineteenth-
century France fixes the relations of determination,
with the result that 'capitalism' is taken to shatter
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the 'discourses' which Hegel's speculative treatment of
State and Church comprehends.
5 For example in sections of Tales of Love (1983), and
in Black Sun (1987).
6 The place of Maoism in Kristeva's published thesis
has hardly been noted in the critical receDtion of the
book, and as far as I am aware there has been no
discussion of its structural necessity in her thought
of this period.
Kristeva commentary and criticism focusses either on
the diagnostic meaning of 'revolution' in Rristeva's
doctoral thesis: the 'cultural' revolution represented
by the avant-garde (for example, Lewis 1974; Roudiez
1984) or on the - prognostic - notion of 'revolution'
in Kristeva's concept of modern (and postmodern)
signifying practices (Lewis 1974; Alice Jardine 1986;
Edeistein 1992).
Lewis refers to but does not elaborate on the socio-
political element in Kristeva's doctoral thesis:
The deconstruction of the unitary subject and
invention of a pluralized successor imply not
only the most radical of cultural
revolutions, but also the strategic placement
of revolutionary activity primarily in
relation to its	 localizable object,	 a
grounding of militant theoretical reflection
in	 the	 potential	 repercussions	 of
transforming that object.
	
(pp. 31-2; my
emphasis)
This comment does contain Kristeva's substitution of a
Maoist dialectical conception of experience (the
relation to a localizable object) for a Hegelian
dialectical conception of the experience of
consciousness. However, Lewis does not grasp the
theoretical exigency of the social subject within
Kristeva's formulation of the 'pluralized successor' to
the unitary subject.
7 Kristeva would have difficulty in maintaining this
position on the 'philosophical' tradition vis-à-vis
Hegel's treatment of sense-certainty had she not
already decided that philosophy cannot present 'reason'
except within the Cartesian framework of 'thought'
8 'From One Identity to an Other', Desire in Language,
Columbia University Press, 1980, p. 132. 'De l'une
identité l'autre' was published in France in Polylogue,
Editions du Seuil, 1977.
9 Elliot notes that Kristeva's return to Lacan recasts
'the Lacanian imaginary and symbolic orders into the
corresponding modalities of the semiotic and the
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thet.ic'.	 This	 'correspondence', 	 in	 his	 view,
nevertheless	 contains	 a	 departure	 from Lacan:
Kristeva's 'semiotic' continues to exert an influence
in the symbolic order of communication and
signification, whereas 'for Lacan entry to the symbolic
order implies a radical break-up of and separating out
of the imaginary order'. (1992, pp 221-2.)
Whether or not there is agreement with Elliot's
construal of Lacan, the point is clarified if it is
seen that it is Kristeva's articulation of the 'mirror
stage' and 'entry into' the symbolic as a 'thetic
phase' which establishes their connection in the
'order' of the symbolic.
10 Seminar II, XIX, p. 241. Kristeva's connection of
the imaginary and symbolic, in the thetic phase,
follows the Lacanian thesis that 'There is never a
subject without an ego, a fully realised subject, but
that in fact is what one must aim to obtain from the
subject in analysis' (ibid., p. 246). She, too,
emphasizes the dialectical nature of psychoanalysis
implicit in this statement. If, as Lacan states, 'the
ego gets confused with the subject', in Kristeva's
later works the 'narcissistic absorption' which sets up
imaginary objects of desire is not only a site of
difficulty for the subject, but the possibility of
renewal in analysis (IBWL, p. 55). Kristeva's works of
love will therefore always emphasize the role and forms
of narcissism. (See chapter 4.)
11 As Kristeva will put it in the 1980s: 'because
psychoanalysis is a different kind of science, we must
be clear about the fact that its object is something
that emerges from the imagination.' (IBWL, p. 20).
It is because Kristeva is concerned, in Revolution in
Poetic Language, with exposing the drive-related
subject subtending the desiring subject that her
position on transference in analysis appears to be so
critical (see the final section of chapter 3 below).
The whole impetus of the return to the theory of the
drives lies in the search for a way out of the subject
of lack (the subject absent from, subordinated to, the
signifier).
When Kristeva comes partially to revise her position on
transference in analysis, she proposes a thoroughly
Lacanian description of it: 'the object of
psychoanalysis is simply the linguistic exchange - and
the accidents that are a part of that exchange -
between two subjects in a situation of transference and
countertransference' (IBWL, p. 1).
12 'Du "Trieb" de Freud et du désir dv psychanalyste',
Ecrits, Editions du Seuil, p. 853.
300
13 The analysis of 'aggression' in Klein's middle
period contains the notion of a 'restitutive'
affection, but it is only in 1937 that she fully
develops the concept of 'reparation'. Compare the
discussions of the relation between sadism and anxiety
in the formation of the super-ego (The Psychoanalysis
of Children, 1932, Virago 1989) with 'Love, Guilt and
Reparation' (1937) in Love, Guilt and Reparation,
Virago 1988.
Kristeva develops Klein's notion of 'aggression' in
pre-Oedipal object-relations into a component of her
theory of narcissism (see chapter 4 below), and
ultimately into an irreducible component of the
intrapsychic law of intersubjectivity (chapter 5
below).
301
Notes to chap ter 3
1 Kristeva's economy of 'drive rejection' presents a
fundamental dimension of (re)symbolization: 'This is
the mechanism of innovatiou, which displaces the
frameworks of the real, and, as Marx has shown,
characterizes social practice in all domains, but
especially and with the most immediate violence, in
politics'. (RPL, p. 179; my emphasis)
2
The amount of drive pressure (Triebdrang)
depends on the extent of the contrast between
the genes that condition the whole. Modern
genetic theory has confirmed this doubling
and its repetition and has made it more
precise by positing the reversed selection of
doubles in the constitution of new
structures. (RPL, pp. 168-9)
For Kristeva, the limitation of genetic theory resides
in the 'substantialism' which sets its account of the
constitution of new structures apart from the social
dimension contained in Freud's theory of the drives.
When genetic theory comes to apply its findings to
psychopathological phenomena the result is a 'crude
typology' (p. 169). Kristeva's acknowledgement of this
theory for having provided a more precise understanding
of drive behaviour is therefore qualified: the theory
failed to comprehend the determinations of the drives'
differentiation-and-connection of the 'biological' and
the 'symboiic' (p. 167).
3 The expression 'localization' and the citation on the
possibility of ontologizing the unconscious are taken
from Samuel Weber's introduction to the thought of
Lacan. (Samuel Weber (1978), Return to Freud. Jacques
Lacan's Dislocation of Psychoanalysis,
	
Cambridge
University Press, 1991, p. 63.)
Weber emphasizes Lacan's treatment of the aporia opened
up by Saussure's structural linguistics. Saussure both
indicated the 'differential' nature of the signifier
vis-à-vis the signified (the signified is an 'effect'
of the signifier), and specified the 'unity' of the
sign, or correspondence of signifier and signified. The
aporia opens up when the signifier's differential
operations is once again reduced to the metaphysical
principle of the primacy of the ideational content (on
which the 'identity' of signifier and signified is
based). It is an aporia owing to the necessity, for
Saussure, of positing the unity of the sign if there is
to be an isolatable object of linguistics: langue or
the 'system' of language. (Weber, chapter 3).
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4 'Device' translates Kristeva's 'dispositif', a
previous thesis of the signifying process, a signifying
'arrangement' of semiotic functioning (dis-positif).
6 See chapter 4 below.
7 Kristeva's 'ethics of psychoanalysis' is quite
consistent with this thesis of the early writings, and
the latter remains unaffected by the abandonment of
Maoism.
8 See the Appendix below for a justification for using
this Hegelian term - (mis)recognition - in reference to
Kristeva's exposition of the renewal of re-jection.
9 See note 23 to chapter 1 above, on the fact that
Kojéve fails to comment on the configuration of
'perception'
10 When Kristeva does not specify 'objective material
relations' she avoids the attention to the forms of
'classical philosophy' which is present in Lukác's
studies on Marxist dialectics (History and Class
Consciousness). Kristeva neither articulates the
Marxist thought she depends on, nor returns to its
relation to German idealism as a whole.
11 Stewart Smith (ed.) Collected Works, trans. Clemens
Dutt, vol. 38.
12 Revolution du langage poétique, Editions du Seuil
1974, p. 178.
13 'From One Identity to an Other', in Desire in
Language, pp. 142-3.
14 Oxford Amnesty International Lecture Series, 1992.
15 'From One Identity to an Other', p. 146.
16 See chapter 4.
17 Kristeva, following Freud's text on 'Negation',
emphasizes the inextricability of the 'unconscious' and
'repression'. Kristeva's claim that the text 'has' no
unconscious rests on her claim that its 'act' recalls
'the dialectical moment of the generating of
signifiance' prior to the mode of negation which links
repression and the unconscious. (RPL, II, chapter 7).
18 Those who have drawn attention to this problem
include Jacqueline Rose, who is alert to the
consequences of abstracting the 'semiotic' from the
'symbolic', and grasps the significance of Céline in
Kristeva's thought (1986, pp. 143-4); Anthony Elliott,
who appreciates the value for social and political
thought of Kristeva's concept of the 'imaginary', but
suggests that 'a thoroughgoing revision of the Lacanian
303
concept of the symbolic' is necessary (1992, p. 230);
and Paul Smith, who abhors what he regards as the
primacy of the 'semiotic' in Kristeva's later writings,
believing that the concept of 'heterogeneous
contradiction' has been abandoned and that it sustained
the political dimension of Kristeva's thought (1989, p.
89).
19 SL, p. 142.
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Notes to Intertext
1 See chapter 3 above, note 1.
2 See chapter 4, section A3, below for Kristeva's
interpretation of the 'immediate' in Hegel.
3 In Hegelian logic, the infinite that posits the
finite appears in the logic of 'essence'. Kristeva's
concept of 'restructuration' would appear to avoid this
notion of causality.
4 See chapter 5 below, section A.
5 See chapter 3 above, note 2.
6 See NN, p. 53 and note the title to the final chapter
of Strangers to Ourselves, with its ellipsis: 'In
Practice...'. Kristeva's turn to 'political sociology
is discussed below in chapter 5.
Notes to chap ter 4
1 Smith (1989), p. 90; Elliott (1992), p. 227.
2 Kristeva's criticism of structural linguistics as
enclosed within the bounds of the positivist sciences
(see chapter 2 above) argued for the loss of the
'socio-historical' dimension of the 'subject'. In the
context of the categories of the 'diachronic' and the
'synchronic' therefore, Kristeva's reemphasis on the
'diachronic' dimension of language retrieves the
historical determination of its 'synchronic' dimension.
The latter, while it retains the preeminence it held in
Saussurean linguistics, is therefore released from the
structuralist characterization and limitations of the
'synchronic', in which it is posed as the articulation
of language as a differential system of 'values' in
abstraction from their generation.
3 In the Ego and the Id, Freud articulated what would
be necessary to negotiate the unconscious sense of
guilt,' the most profound and intractable obstacle to
the cure, if the 'boundary' of analysis is observed:
there is often no counteracting force of a
similar order of strength which the treatment
can oppose to it. Perhaps it may depend, too,
on whether the personality of the analyst
allows of the patient's putting him in the
place of his ego ideal, and this involves a
temptation for the analyst to play the part
of prophet, saviour and redeemer to the
patient. Since the rules of psychoanalysis
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are diametrically opposed to the physician's
making use of his personality in such a
manner, it must be honestly confessed that
here we have another limitation to the
effectiveness of analysis. (p. 391, n. 1)
Kristeva's reinvestigation into the 'primary process'
and her account of the intelligibility of psychosis,
proposes the 'temporary' use of the analyst's
personality in such a manner, within the dynamic of
transference and countertransference. The limitation of
psychoanalysis reemerges as its 'boundary':
Termination of the analysis signals the
dissolution of certain fantasies as well as
of the analyst, whose omnipotence is put to
death... Fantasy returns to our psychic life,
but no longer as cause for complaint or
source of dogma. Now it provides the energy
for a kind of artifice, for the art of
living. (IBWL, p. 9)
4 Grounding for the Metaphysic of Morals (1775),
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981.
5 The 'utility' of Kristeva's thought for feminism has
been presented most recently and comprehensively by
Oliver (1993).
6 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959-90), p. 20.
7 Freud, 'On Narcissism: An Introduction', On Meta-
psychology: the Theory of Psychoanalysis, PFL 11, p.
69:
we are bound to suppose that a unity
comparable to the ego cannot exist in the
individual from the start; the ego has to be
developed. The auto-erotic instincts are
there from the start; so there must be
something added to auto-eroticism - a new
psychical action - in order to bring about
narcissism.
8 The notion of abjection as 'reversed hatred' remains
indebted to Klein. See chapter 2 above, note 13.
9 See Smith (1989), p. 87; and Rose (1986), who is
aware of the point I am making.
10 'Women's Time', Kristeva Reader, p. 210. The
expression 'the speaking subject is not innocent' was
heard at Kristeva's lecture, presented as part of the
Oxford Amnesty International Lectures Series, 1992.
11 The Ego and the Id, cited in TL, pp. 26-7).
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12 The respective positions of Oliver (1993, p. 183)
and Elliott (1992, p. 230).
13 Oxford Amnesty International Lecture Series, 1992.
14 See chapter 5 below.
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Notes to chap ter 5
1 From the first Wissenschaftslehre (1794); within the
'Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation'(1974);
through the expositions of the foundations of 'natural
law' and the 'system of ethics' (1976-8); in the
articulation of a 'Closed Commercial State' (1800); and
most explicitly in the Addresses to the German Nation
(1808).
As Lukàcs remarks in 'Reification and the Consciousness
of the Proletariat', Fichte 'is always concerned with
the same problem' (History and Class Consciousness, p.
212, n. 20). Lukács argues that Fichte's 'absolute
subject' implies, and raises most clearly, the problem
of the concrete subject=object (p. 123). The philosophy
of law developed in the debates of German idealism
falls out of Kristeva's treatment of the subject in
social and political relations, because the theory of
the 'symbolic' identifies all forms of transcendental
philosophy in terms of the 'act' of the understanding.
2 In Oeuvres completes, Roger Caillois, ed.,
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris: Gallimard, 1985, 1:
976.
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